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Abstract 
 
Since the 1970’s and the emergence of so-called ‘identity’ struggles, we have 
seen a proliferation of political theories aiming to articulate the traditional 
movement of the working-class with these struggles and thus provide new 
strategies for the left. The work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe has 
been central to attempts to revise traditional Marxist theories on the centrality 
of the worker’s movement. Influenced by the structuralism of Saussure and 
Lacan, and by Derrida’s critique of structuralism, they have sought to develop 
an alternative strategy based on a post-structuralist conception of the social 
world. This thesis endeavours to show how this transition between 
structuralism and post-structuralism has been made in the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe, with a particular focus on the political and strategical implications of 
that transition as a contribution to theorising the articulation of struggles and 
of identities. Secondly, it attempts to compare and confront the hegemonic 
strategy and the so-called post-hegemonic strategy influenced by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophical work. Through a close examination of works within 
the field of radical democratic thought, and in particular through an 
exploration of the opposition between Ernesto Laclau’ and Lasse Thomassen’s 
‘ontology of lack’ versus Andrew Robinson’ and Simon Tormey’s ‘ontology 
of abundance’, the thesis casts new light on the most recent debates within 
radical democratic currents. The philosophical debate is also completed by the 
analyses of the political translations of these different ontologies such as 
Peronism and the Zapatista movements and enriched with Toni Negri and 
Michael Hardt’s theory of the Multitude. The contribution of this thesis is 
hence to map out and clarify some of the most important problems and debates 
concerning the question of the ‘unity’ and ‘fragmentation’ of the oppressed, 
and develop some tools in order to evaluate the best strategies for 
emancipatory social change.  
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8 
Introduction  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the genesis, development and 
consequences of the intellectual and political work of prominent ‘post-
Marxist’ theorists, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, co-authors in 1985 of 
Hegemony and socialist strategy, who claim to renew leftist critical thought.  
The post-Marxist authors’ project takes root in the idea that the Marxist 
theoretical system collapsed once and for all with the Berlin Wall. Although 
some attempts to reconstruct Marxian and Marxist thought exist, they claim 
that we are presently experiencing a ‘post-Marxist’ period, following the 
‘Marxist’ period of the 1960s and 1970s, which were two decades of great 
class struggles. For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, classical Marxist 
categories such as ‘class interests’, ‘revolution’ etc., have become unsuitable 
for explaining the changes which have taken place in the social and political 
spheres of contemporary capitalist societies. Indeed, according to these 
authors, classical Marxist categories have become inadequate to ‘the task of 
understanding the radical openness of the social and the rise of new, non-class-
based actors and social movements’ (Thoburn, 2007, 79). 
‘Post-Marxism’ is for them a label indicating both a process of re-
appropriation of the Marxist tradition (post-Marxist) and a process of going 
beyond this tradition (post-Marxist) (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 9). This 
necessity to go beyond traditional Marxism is the consequence of an alleged 
gap between today’s existing social categories and those which can be 
subsumed under classical Marxist categories, the latter being considered as no 
longer able to account for the changed order of society (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001, 10). 
  
9 
This proclaimed surpassing of classical Marxism is based on – amongst other 
things – the following observations and arguments:  
1. The appearance, during the second half of the twentieth century, of 
new forms of struggle which do not tally with class struggle (minority 
struggles, identity politics).  
2. That, as a result, political subjects are no longer fully defined by their 
affiliation to a class. The proletariat is no longer the historic subject of 
the emancipation of all the oppressed.  
3. The fragmentation of political identities and the multiplicity of 
identities become principles of social analysis. The political alternative 
to capitalist society must be thus thought on the basis of the 
fragmentation of struggles and multiple antagonisms (of class, race, 
gender, etc.) which traverse the whole social field. 
  
Mouffe, who was in the mid-60s a socialist student, chief editor of two minor 
socialist journals and a member of the left faction of the Socialist Party of 
Belgium, moved to Paris where she attended Althusser’s seminars and was 
involved in the seminar which gave birth to Reading Capital (Laclau, 1990, 
197), before moving to Colombia from 1967 to 1973 where she was a lecturer 
in the Department of Philosophy at the National University. Laclau was a 
member of the Socialist party of the National Left of Argentina since 1963, in 
which he was part of the leadership and the editor of the party’s weekly, Lucha 
Obrera (Worker’s Struggle) for several years. He left the party in 1968 
because of disagreement with its politics and according to Laclau its class-
reductionist approach which constituted an obstacle to a full understanding of 
the emerging mass phenomena, whose clearest expression was the rise of 
Peronism. It was at this time that he began to study Althusser and Gramsci in 
whose works he found key concepts and tools – such as ‘hegemony’ and 
‘overdetermined contradiction’– against ‘mainstream Marxism’ (Laclau, 1990, 
10 
199).  
 
How did these post-Marxist authors succeed in building their theoretical 
systems on such sociological, philosophical and political hypotheses? Why did 
they feel the necessity, starting from a Marxist framework and vocabulary, to 
build a new theoretical structure upon ‘the ruins of Marxism’1? To 
successfully complete my project to critically map out and answer these 
questions, I shall discuss several subjects and authors. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
‘Post-Marxism’ and radical democracy contain indeed many different 
influences from different periods. Concepts such as ‘democracy’ or 
‘hegemony’ refer to a set of concepts that preceded their integration within the 
post-Marxist framework. My task being one of intellectual history, I intend to 
identify the nature and the content of these influences first, second to analyse 
the context of emergence of such concepts, and third to challenge them by 
contrasting these concepts with alternative thoughts, to finally decide what 
intellectual tools militants can practically use in their global struggle against 
oppression. So with this work I hope to contribute to the clarification of the 
theoretical underpinnings of some of the most important debates currently 
going on in the political field.  
 
My dissertation has two sections. The first section is divided into two chapters 
and is devoted to the genealogy of Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism. 
Chapter 1 deals with one of the major problems posed at the end of the 
nineteenth century during the first crisis of Marxism. I show that central to 
                                                 
1 During a conference in Sorbonne, on March 19th, 2008, entitled ‘Refaire la gauche’, 
Achille Mbembe, a post-colonial studies thinker, insisted on the necessity of renewing the 
thought of the critical left on the ‘ruins of Marxism’. 
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post-Marxism is the issue of the nature of base and superstructure,
2
 and the 
relation between objective economic conditions and political subjectivity, to 
which first Bernstein, Gramsci and Althusser – among many others –attempted 
to provide answers. What will be called ‘Marxism’ throughout the thesis is not 
related to Marx’s work directly but to its interpretation by theorists of the 
Second International, mainly leaders of the German Socialist Democratic Party 
(SPD
3
). After the death of Friedrich Engels in 1895, the party divided into 
three main trends. The majority of the party defended a centrist line – the 
orthodox position – around the figure of Karl Kautsky whose political strategy 
was subordinated to the laws of capitalist development. Another trend in the 
right wing of the Party was constituted around Eduard Bernstein – the 
revisionists – who developed a strong critique of the naïve and simplistic 
‘dialectical materialism’ attributed to the orthodoxies.4 One of the central 
issues that divided them concerned the political strategy needed to bringing 
about social change. The political unity of the working class being the main 
goal of the strategy, the question was to know whether the political unity of 
the working class was a direct consequence of its social and economic 
                                                 
2 The terms of base and superstructure were first established by Marx himself, in the famous 
Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy written in 1859 where he 
states that: ‘in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, 
political and intellectual life process in general’ (Marx [1859], 1992, 424-428). 
3 The SPD is the main party of the Second International. He took his name in 1891 during 
the Erfurt Conference (see Tudor and Tudor, 1988, 7). It is the result of the unification of 
two organizations (the first merge occurred on May 22-25, 1875 in Gotha): the ADAV,  
Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle, and the 
SDAP, Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, founded by August Bebel and Wilhelm 
Liebknecht in 1869 and closed to Marx. Social democrats participate from 1871 onwards 
to parliamentary elections, in the Reichstag. Starting with 2 deputees in 1871, they become 
the first political party in Germany in 1912 with 34.8 % and 110 seats.  
4 The third trend or the Left wing of the party was represented mainly by young partisans 
such as Rosa Luxemburg. See Steenson G. (1991) and Gay P. (1962) for more details. 
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homogeneity as the orthodox position argued, or if this unity had to be 
constructed, as the revisionists argued, in other words if the movements of the 
infrastructure determined the movements of the superstructure or if the 
superstructure was autonomous and had its own history. In their major work 
Hegemony and socialist strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe seized upon this 
debate. In order to overcome the crises of Marxism, they produced a new 
conception of social identity, which, whether economic, political or 
ideological, is entirely constructed in and by discourse. By radicalising the 
notions of the autonomy of the political of Bernstein, of Gramsci’s hegemony 
and Althusser’s overdetermination, Laclau and Mouffe abandon the whole 
base/superstructure framework, and claim that in the context of 
overdetermination, which led to the concept of ‘discourse’, ideologies if 
considered as discursive constructions cease to be superstructures, in the sense 
that there is only superstructure, were replaced by discursive practices. They 
claim that the dichotomy between base and superstructure is itself irrelevant 
since it doesn’t really exist, and the dualism characterising this dichotomy 
must be overcome. The question of the autonomy of the political defended by 
Bernstein, through a progress compared to the orthodox economist tendency 
that linked economic catastrophe to revolutionary subjectivity, is not relevant 
anymore.  
 
Chapter 2 analyses the post-structuralist influences on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
thought and explores their key concepts of ‘antagonism’, ‘empty signifiers’ 
and their post-structuralist concept of hegemony. The key idea is that Laclau 
and Mouffe’s post-Marxism in general attempts to give a theoretical 
justification to their commitment to pluralism, a pluralism which they argue 
was completely denied in Marx’s theory of emancipation and its underlying 
Hegelian notion of dialectic and totality. For Hegel indeed, the development of 
a contradiction present in a situation brings about a change that negates the 
initial unity of its content. The new content negates what preceded it but was 
13 
always already present within it. Unity and negation are hence the two first 
moments of Hegel’s dialectic. The third moment of the dialectic is the 
negation of the negation or Aufhebung (A is not non-A). It is not a return to the 
first moment of the dialectic but a higher synthesis creating a totality where 
the contradictions have been partly resolved.
5
 I will show that one of the 
principal aspects of post-Marxism will be the rejection of Marxism’s Hegelian 
ontology and history of philosophy,
6
 whose weaknesses are considered to be 
central to the crises of Marxism. Firstly I show how the Derrida’s critique of 
structuralism as well as his deconstructionist method helped Laclau and 
Mouffe to produce their archetypal conception of open identities. The 
Derridean ontology of difference, i.e. the assumption that in the absence of a 
structure, which is a centre or origin or a transcendence, which would be a 
‘central’ presence able to fix meanings, everything becomes discourse, allows 
Laclau and Mouffe to argue that identities are constantly renegotiated. It 
means that there is no a priori subjectivity attached to a group and that when 
an identity has been created, it has been created contingently, it remains fragile 
and can be undone. Secondly, I outline another major influence on Laclau and 
Mouffe’s post-Marxism: the theorist of structuralist linguistics Ferdinand de 
Saussure, whose main claim is the arbitrary character of the sign and the 
relational character of the meaningful character of the sign. For these radical 
democrats, political identities operate in a way homologous to the sign as 
understood by Saussure. It means that there is no fixed or positive identity 
before the articulation with other elements of a chain, that is for example, the 
identity of the working class is not a priori socialist until its demands are 
connected to other democratic socialist demands, hence it refuses the vulgar 
                                                 
5 For more information, see the introduction to Hegel’s Science of Logic [1831], 2010. 
6 Marx partly applied Hegel’s dialectic to the understanding of historical changes. For him, 
the contradiction between ‘the forces of production’ and the ‘relations of production’ 
explained the genesis as to why society periodically changes its form. From this 
contradiction emerges the material bases for the development of new forms of society (see 
Marx [1844], 1992, 279-400). 
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Marxist notion of objective interests. Nevertheless, rejecting Saussure’s 
structuralism that considers language as a closed system and thus characterized 
mainly by its immutability, Laclau and Mouffe re-establish the openness of 
language as well as the openness of any other social object, and affirm the 
precariousness of such totalities. This allows them to develop the central 
notion of ‘antagonism’ as a constitutive outside which prevents structuralist 
totalisations, closed identities and total objectivity. The third part of the second 
chapter is devoted to the third influence on post-Marxism: Lacan. I outline that 
the Lacanian theory of the subject plays the role of the justification of the 
necessity of an articulation between identities and demands, that is of an order, 
if there is only social fragmentation and no structures to which we could refer 
to build a rational unified discourse of emancipation. The theory of the master-
signifier answers to the problem of the articulation of struggles and the 
arbitrariness of the hegemonic subject. In the end of that chapter, I show how 
Laclau and Mouffe synthesise these elements in order to provide a new theory 
of hegemony as a descriptive analysis of power relations within ‘society’. I go 
on to argue that the three influences on Laclau and Mouffe’s thoughts can be 
understood in terms of an ‘ontology of lack’. This ontology of lack is 
inseparable from their political commitments to hegemonic and populist forms 
of doing politics. I show that the ontology of lack is used as a way to 
consolidate the defence of a radical constructionism and the precariousness 
and openness of social identities.  
 
The second section starts with Chapter 3 where Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxist fundamental ‘ontology of lack’ is exhumed and contrasted to the so-
called ontology of abundance. The opposition lies in the different 
interpretations that one camp has of the specific nature of radical difference. 
They reflect two philosophical imaginaries of lack and abundance, and the 
study of one cannot proceed without the study of the other one lest the 
exposition be incomplete and partial. Having explained the problems raised 
15 
during the crises of Marxism and the solutions suggested by Laclau and 
Mouffe’s post-Marxism in my two previous chapters, in this third chapter I 
examine more closely the principal critique of these solutions within the post-
structuralist field. As an introduction I focus on Mouffe’s critique of the 
Habermasian notion of consensus. This allows me to expose her emphasis on 
the conflictual nature of politics influenced by the Schmittian concept of the 
political. I show that the notion of dissensus, linked to the notion of 
antagonism, is what differentiates Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of radical 
democracy from other radical democratic theories and what is characteristic of 
the ontology of lack. For a better comprehension of the politics of dissensus, 
and therefore of articulation, I discuss Laclau’s theory of empty signifiers and 
his conception of the hegemonic nature of construction of identities via their 
centring effects. In a second part, I analyse in more detail the so-called 
ontology of lack, whose main idea is that ‘being’ is characterized by the failure 
to constitute itself as a ground due to its fundamental manque-à-être. I recall 
how this peculiar ontology acts like a justification of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory of the hegemonic construction of identities. In the third part I focus on 
some critiques of the ontology of lack from methodological and political 
perspectives. I oppose it to the philosophy of ‘abundance’ as in the thought of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, which in contrast to the idea of the ontology 
of lack thinks of being as that which overflows, which focuses on the 
production of desires and affirms the priority of politics over ontology. I then 
critique recent claims of there being a symmetry between the Lacanian 
concept of ontological lack and Deleuze and Guattari’s so-called ontology of 
abundance and argue, like Deleuze and Guattari, in favour of an ethical and 
practical idea of philosophy. I finish the chapter by discussing the Deleuzean 
conception of the political vocation of philosophy as a creative activity whose 
aim is to bring about ‘new earths and new people’, in other words imagining 
utopias, in contrast with Laclau and Mouffe’s own statements on the danger of 
utopias.  
16 
 
Chapter 4 explores the link between such ontological imaginaries and political 
practices, in other words how different political practices stem from these 
ontologies or at least how they relate to each other. The dichotomy between 
abundance and lack can be understood politically as the dichotomy between 
hegemony and autonomy in terms of political strategy. I will illustrate this 
with Laclau’s theory of populism on one side and on the other side Robinson 
and Tormey’s Deleuzean interpretation of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas. 
I will show that the movements supported by the defenders of the ontology of 
abundance value forms of organisation that are not based upon traditional 
political channels (such as unions, parties etc.) but function rather like the 
alter-globalist mobilisation on the basis of autonomist movements. For this 
purpose, I shall confront the ethical commitment of Tormey and Robinson to a 
post-representational politics and to the Deleuzean concept of the multiplicity 
underlying it, in contrast to the ontological impossibility of post-representation 
defended by Thomassen. The question is whether we can organize outside a 
representational system, or whether representation is constitutive and what the 
political implications of that are. I argue that the universalising tendency of 
Thomassen to generalize ‘representation’ and to interpret the Zapatistas 
‘mask’ as evidence for that can fall under the post-colonial critiques of 
Western modernity developed recently. Finally the discussion broadens to 
include an analysis of Michael Hardt’ and Antonio Negri’s theory of the 
multitude and its singular blend of Marxian method and post-Marxist strategic 
claims for exodus and desertion. This study is justified by the fact that it 
highlights a position close to the one of Robinson and Tormey and to the 
Deleuzean perspective but from a totally different approach that gives to post-
Marxism another meaning. I confront the Laclauian hegemonic concept of 
emancipatory politics with Negri and Hardt’s position which is close to 
Robinson and Tormey’s but based on materialist assumptions. Influenced by 
Left Communism, Negri and Hardt state that with the caesura of the post-
17 
modern paradigm, struggles and organisation cannot be based on the modern 
pattern typical of Laclau’s thought anymore, but on a completely new one. By 
this exposition, I analyse how Robinson, Tormey, Negri and Hardt have 
judged Laclau and Mouffe as having insufficiently criticized and broken with 
the traditional vision of power contained within Marxism and Structuralism, 
that they have nevertheless constantly criticised. With this chapter I hope to 
show that a radical utopian politics is possible without necessarily being 
totalitarian.  
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Chapter 1  
Crises of Marxism  
 
I.i. Overview  
 
 
In this chapter, I will show how the aporiae of the economist vision of 
historical processes at the end of the nineteenth century favoured the 
development of Laclau and Mouffe’s constructionism, and how the primacy of 
politics developed by Bernstein has been progressively transformed and has 
laid the foundations for Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the entire society 
as a superstructural field.  
 
This chapter has four parts. The first part retraces the lines of the first crisis of 
Marxism where the main issues are posed. The second part will focus on the 
solutions brought by Gramsci with two fundamental ideas: 1) the idea that 
base and superstructure are two elements of the same organic totality 2) the 
idea of hegemony introducing a relative autonomy of ideology regarding class 
positions. The third part focuses on Althusser’s thoughts on the idea of the 
relative autonomy of superstructures and the determination in the last instance 
of the economy, as well as the key concept of overdetermination that points to 
the existence of simultaneous factors in the production of the same event. 
Finally the last part analyses how Laclau and Mouffe take up this debate and 
produce a completely new post-Marxist theory, abandoning the whole 
base/superstructure model. By outlining this history I hope to show that there 
is a progressive movement towards a conception of the independence and 
contingency between the class position of a group and its political subjectivity 
19 
from Bernstein to Althusser, which leads to post-Marxism’s radical 
constructionism.  
 
I.ii.a. Bernstein and the autonomy of the political 
 
 
Let us first contextualize the first crisis of Marxism and the rise of Bernstein’s 
revisionism. In the 1880s and 1890s, there was a general impression of 
imminent catastrophe in the SPD
 
characterized by the conviction as to the 
imminence of the social revolution. This impression was reinforced by the 
spectacle of the Great Depression of the capitalist system. Because of the 
profound recession since the 1870s in which the system seemed to have 
entered, many German social-democrats were indeed expecting a general 
collapse of society and the consequent advent of socialism. 
 
The Great Depression was a systemic crisis lasting from 1873 to 1895 and was 
characterized by a strong economic slump. The billions of marks of indemnity 
paid by France to Germany after its defeat in 1870 had helped to provoke 
financial speculation which ended in a full-scale crisis. ‘The speculation mania 
came to a dramatic end in 1873. In a few days three hundred bankruptcies 
were announced and there were an epidemic of suicides’ (Williamson, 1998, 
169). The financial crisis and the fall in the value of shares was followed by a 
decline in industrial output. In 1875, mining companies were in difficulties 
throughout the country and prices fell, sales dropped, wages were reduced and 
unemployment rose (Williamson, 1998, 170). This long depression which 
continued until 1890 partly explains the rise of the worker’s movement and 
trade-unionism. During the economic crisis, Germany was ruled by Otto Von 
20 
Bismarck, chancellor of the German empire from 1871 to 1890. He was 
confronted from the beginning of his reign by the rise of the Social Democrats. 
The success of the new party was indeed phenomenal. In the elections for the 
Imperial Parliament in 1877, it gained more than half a million votes and 
thirteen seats, which made it the fourth largest party in Germany. Bismarck 
feared this new strength growing inside the State. Using as a pretext two 
assassination attempts against the Kaiser, Bismarck imposed the first of a 
series of anti-socialist laws making the SPAD
7
 an illegal organisation; laws 
which lasted until 1890.  
 
On the intellectual level, the idea of an imminent advent of socialism was 
corroborated by more scientific convictions and an underlying philosophy of 
history, characteristic of the Marxism of the Second International: dialectical 
materialism, which was to be popularised by Stalinism. Its main idea was that 
history evolves according to natural laws leading inevitably to the collapse of 
the capitalist system. With their interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic the 
orthodox position hoped to have found the laws of development of human 
history. This conception was widespread within the SPD within which Karl 
Kautsky was enjoying great authority. Kautsky was the editor of Die Neue Zeit 
created in 1883 where he published the Socialist Programme in 1892. His 
detractors denounced the positivist element of his thought, positivism being 
characterized by the will to produce the same coherence and certainty in 
sociology as in the natural sciences, its vocation being not only to classify 
social phenomena in order to elucidate the development of given societies, but 
also to predict in a positive manner their evolution.
8
 The publication in 1859 of 
                                                 
7 The name of the SPD before 1891.  
8 In the 47
th
 lesson of the Cours de philosophie positive (Comte, 1908, V.IV, 132), Auguste 
Comte, using for the first time the word ‘sociology’, writes that it is equivalent to the 
already introduced expression ‘social physics’ pointing to this part of natural philosophy 
that referred to the positive study of the ensemble of fundamental laws proper to social 
21 
Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species had also deeply transformed the 
conception of human history as a social phenomenon. According to Terence 
Ball, the controversial link between Marx and Darwin must first be attributed 
to Engels
9
 and was disseminated by later Marxists as evidence for their 
theory’s ‘scientific’ status. The first comparison between Marx’s and Darwin’s 
works had been made in Engels’ speech at Marx’s graveside in 1883: ‘Just as 
Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx 
discovered the law of development of human history’ (quoted in Ball, 1979, 
470). These comparisons were then repeated once in 1888 in Engels’ preface 
to the English edition of the Communist Manifesto and a third time in 1895 in 
The part played by labour in the transition from Ape to Man. This comparison 
was reiterated in Lenin’s early works (1894), in Turati (1892) and Labriola’s 
works, Aveling in 1897, in 1894 by Buchner, Woltmann in 1899, and 
synthesised by Kautsky in 1906. The common view of all these Marxists was 
that human history should be regarded as a branch of natural history. Hence 
intention, purpose, teleology were completely out of their considerations. For 
Kautsky there was an identity between natural phenomena governed by laws 
and social phenomena which rest on the predictable movements of the 
infrastructure. Social phenomena were considered to be linked with causality 
and necessity.  
 
In the fifth chapter of the Socialist Programme written in 1892 that he 
considered as a commentary on the Erfurt Programme, Kautsky proposed a 
theory of the simplification of social antagonisms and of the social structure 
and radicalised some of the theses found in Marx and Engels’ Communist 
Manifesto:  
 
                                                                                                                                
phenomena.  
9 This is the thesis of Terence Ball, 1979, 469-483. 
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1) The concentration of private property into capitalist hands; 
2) The proletarianisation of the middle classes; 
3) The impoverishment of popular classes; all of these composing 
infrastructural movements following strict and necessary laws, whose 
trajectories can be predicted by Marxist science. These trajectories 
were supposed to lead irremediably to the unity of the working class 
and bringing about in society as a whole a revolutionary transition to 
socialism.  
  
Kautsky stated that the system’s natural law describing the proletarianisation 
of the middle classes and the progressive division of society into two 
antagonist classes would lead to the breakdown of capitalist society. He 
interpreted literally the idea that it is on the basis of increased misery that there 
must arise the will to contest capitalist society and of ‘working class resistance 
incessantly growing and more and more disciplined, united and organized by 
the mechanism of capitalist production’ (Marx, 1965, T.5, 1163). This Marxist 
position admits that the unity of the working class is already given, and would 
be the necessary result of the infrastructural movement. However for Marx and 
Engels, the situation was even more complex; since The Poverty of Philosophy 
they had recognized, by introducing the difference between class in itself, 
linked to objective organisation, and class for itself, linked to subjective 
consciousness, that the unity of the proletariat is never given but is created by 
a long political process of unification. The mechanical conception of Kautsky 
becomes an orthodoxy as soon as facts didn’t verify this catastrophist vision of 
society. It is indeed the economic factors as well as the new political situation 
– the resignation of Bismarck in 1890 – that mainly explains the emergence of 
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revisionism.
10
 Whereas the Bismarckian period was marked by a long 
economic depression, in 1985 Germany entered into a new phase of 
prosperity. The country underwent a new burst of economic growth, a ‘golden 
era of the world economy’, during those three decades before the First World 
War which were characterized by constant economic growth and the formation 
of monopolies and cartels following the depression of 1873. Indeed, many 
industries such as cement, textiles and chemicals formed cartels which helped 
to stabilize prices and production.
11
 Revisionists like Bernstein would claim 
that Kautsky did not grasp that the system was transformed and was turning 
into so-called ‘organized capitalism’ or monopolistic capitalism and 
maintained that the changes in collective production were superficial.
12
 The 
appearance of the premisses of organized capitalism disrupted the structuration 
of society; instead of the unity expected by Kautsky, one saw the 
fragmentation of society into different social layers, because the increasing 
parcellisation and division of tasks rose continuously.
13
  
 
A new epoch of capitalist prosperity began and this newly emerging situation 
completely destroyed the optimism for a ‘final crisis’ of capitalism leading to 
socialism. Moreover, the capitalist crisis led to a number of transformations 
which resulted in a fragmentation of the working class and a decomposition of 
its politico-ideological unity. Within Marxist political currents, divergent 
interpretations of these changes emerged which had consequences for political 
                                                 
10 See Laclau and Mouffe, 2001. 
11 See Williamson, 1998, 49. ‘The long crisis passed and capitalism survived. It overcame the 
crisis by transforming itself. Learning from the drastic effects of competition on prices and 
profit margins, capitalism reacted by adopting the path of monopolistic 
development. Capitalism entered the great depression into classical nineteenth century 
form of a competitive economy; it emerged at the end of the century with a radically 
altered physiognomy’ (Colletti, 1974, 58). 
12 See for example, Kautsky, 1899, 37. See also Kautsky, 1900, 149. 
13 For more details on the crisis of Marxism, see Kouvelakis, 2001 and Colletti, 1974, 59.  
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and strategical organisation. The question of the unity of the working class 
was central as this unity was considered to be the key to its fight for socialism 
and victory. The question was therefore to know whether the homogeneity of 
the working class, despite the transformations of the capitalist system, was 
guaranteed by sociological hypotheses such as the growing proletarianisation 
of the middle classes and the progressive simplification of class structure 
under capitalism, as Kautsky argued, or if the changes which took place within 
the social and political spheres due to capitalist reorganisation invalidated 
these hypotheses of homogenisation and simplification and that consequently 
other means to obtain the unity of the working class had to be found. This 
issue raised another fundamental and more general problem that went beyond 
the debate between revisionists and orthodox Marxists: is the politico-
ideological unity of the working class a direct consequence of the objective 
condition of the working class or does this politico-ideological unity have to 
be constructed? In others words, does the political have autonomy vis-a-vis the 
economy, or do the economic factors determine necessarily the movements of 
the political?  
 
I.ii.b. The revisionist theses  
 
 
These crucial questions were seized upon by Eduard Bernstein who developed 
his views partly in a series of articles published in Neue Zeit from 1896 on, 
under the heading ‘Problems of socialism’ and partly in a polemical exchange 
with the English socialist Bax (see Tudor and Tudor, 1988, 140-173) and 
subsequently in The Preconditions of Socialism published in 1898. In this 
book, Bernstein systematically attacked the entire framework of Marxist 
orthodoxy on four grounds: philosophical, economic, social and political. 
These attacks were an attempt by Bernstein to prove that the false predictions 
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about the breakdown of society were not accidental to Marxism but essential, 
intrinsically linked to the theoretical failures of Marxist theory and to its 
underlying conception of the world. But rather than attributing these failures to 
Kautsky’s Marxism, he accused Marxism in general and historical materialism 
of responsibility for them. More precisely he argued that the ‘breakdown 
theory’ descended directly from the ‘fatalism’ and ‘determinism’ of the 
materialist conception of history. The expectation of an imminent and 
inevitable catastrophe of bourgeois society, brought about by purely economic 
causes, reproduced, according to Bernstein, the inherent limits of any 
materialist explanation, in which matter and the movements of matter were the 
cause of everything (Colletti, 1974, 63).  
 
For Bernstein, if the movements of matter follow a mechanical logic of 
necessity and if ideas and other human productions are determined by the 
movement of matter, it follows that human history is a chain of predetermined 
events (Bernstein, 1993, 12). Pushed to its limit, historical materialism leaves 
no place for liberty as nothing can escape causality. That is why the materialist 
is a ‘Calvinist without God’ (Bernstein, 1993, 13). In Bernstein’s words, 
instead of being imposed by God, predestination is the product of matter. 
Everything is determined in advance by a given matter and the power relations 
of its elements. Bernstein thus rejects Marx’s affirmation in the preface to A 
contribution to the Critique of Political economy that ‘it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence 
that determines their consciousness’ because this conception reduces human 
beings to the living agents of historical forces (Bernstein, 1993, 13-14). 
Objectivity does not apply to economic facts because they are caused by 
human agents (Bernstein, 1900, 17). Indeed, economic facts tally the field of 
the will, because in the economic field human beings act according to their 
own subjectivity, hence there isn’t any objective necessity. That is why the 
defenders of this objective necessity often see inconsistent and contradictory 
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practical consequences. The mechanical, economist and workerist drifts 
Bernstein sees in historical materialism is for him due to the Hegelian 
ontology that introduced the category of necessity into the comprehension of 
social history. It was in this philosophical context that Bernstein first referred 
to Kant to replace the ‘Hegelian ontology’ to which he attributed Marx’s 
mechanicism and determinism. Indeed he identified the loss of individuality 
and subjectivity in Second International Marxism with Hegel’s dialectic. 
 
Bernstein challenged above all the idea of a ‘scientific socialism’ and saw two 
main obstacles to its foundation. Firstly, Marxist economic theory is 
objectively unable to prove the inevitability of socialism as a result of the 
breakdown of the capitalist system. Socialists indeed never managed to prove 
the existence of a direct causal link between such a breakdown and the rise of 
socialism. The second obstacle to the possible scientific character of socialism 
is the existence of and the role played by human volition in the socialist 
movement. Socialism for Bernstein has more to do with human needs, 
emotions and volition than with ‘objectives’ forces of factors. To illustrate this 
point, Bernstein writes:  
 
Ce n’est pas le fait brut qu’est la plue-value qui prouve la necessité d’une 
transformation socialiste de la societé; c’est plutot la désapprobation de cette 
plus-value par les masses, le fait qu’elle soit ressentie comme exploitation, 
qui prouvent que l’ordre actuel est insupportable (Bernstein. quoted in Lidtke, 
1976, 357).  
 
He proposed to replace ‘scientific socialism’ by a ‘critical socialism’ inspired 
by Kant’s epistemology based on the limits of knowledge and importance of 
ethics. He adds that if socialism was a historical objective necessity, then 
socialist parties would be useless (Bernstein, 1900, 18). Against Plekhanov’s 
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and Kautsky’s emphasis on economic base and objective factors, Bernstein’s 
solution consisted in the integration of both determinism and volition in its 
alternative theory of the rise of socialism. He considered that as long as 
socialism was based on objective factors, orthodox Marxists could pretend to 
scientificity; but in practice subjective elements frequently intervened. In 
particular he argued socialism contends incompatible elements with science 
for it is the doctrine of a particular class: the proletarian class. Bernstein 
solution is hence quite simple. Rather than challenging the foundations of the 
dual approach, he proposed to keep the dichotomy between objective and 
subjective factors present in Second International Marxist thought with which, 
according to Colletti, he shares ‘a vulgar and naive conception of 
the  economy’ (Colletti, 1974, 63), and to introduce between them a balanced 
causal effect.  
 
Against the reductionist theses of Kautsky and the orthodoxy of the party, 
Bernstein and other revisionists developed the idea that it is within the 
framework of an autonomous political activity that the fragmentation of the 
proletariat
 
into different wage layers will be transcended, and not only within 
the scope of infrastructural movements. That is the novelty of Bernstein’s 
argument. When Bernstein tackles the problem of superstructures, his attitude 
is thus very new: 
 
Sciences, arts, a whole series of social developments are today much less 
dependent on economics than formerly, or, in order to give no room for 
misconception, the point of economic development attained today leaves the 
ideological, and especially the ethical factors greater space for independent 
activity that was formerly the case (Bernstein, 1978, 15). 
 
Bernstein advocates giving a greater autonomy to superstructures and 
emphasizes political action as a means to overcome the infrastructural 
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fragmentation of the working classes. We will see that the three fundamental 
ideas brought by Bernstein will be found in Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxism namely 1) the critique of Hegelian dialectics and the rejection of 
historical materialism 2) the importance given to contingency and human 
action in politics and finally 3) the autonomy of political action in bringing 
about the conditions for social change.  
 
I.iii.a Gramsci’s theory of ideology 
 
 
It was not until the 1920s that the concept of ideology began to be 
considerably enriched. In this section I will highlight how, with Gramsci’s 
conception of ideology and his conceptualisation of hegemony, one could 
consider that the politico-ideological unity of the working class had to be 
constructed on a symbolic level.
14
 
 
The popular support given to the fascist and Nazi regimes in Europe raised 
new problems for Marxists. Wilhelm Reich in Germany and Antonio Gramsci 
in Italy for example participated in the important debate in communist parties 
regarding the nature of popular support for fascism. Communists and socialists 
were convinced that impoverished masses, thrown into unemployment by the 
general impoverishment of the after-war period, would embrace the socialist 
fight against capitalism. However, the illusion that impoverished masses 
                                                 
14 Gramsci and Bernstein belong to this tradition of thinkers who acknowledge that the crises 
and transformations of the capitalist system itself led to the fragmentation of the working 
class, first during the period of the passage from industrial and entrepreneurial capitalism 
to ‘monopolistic’ and ‘managerial’ capitalism, and second during the Fordist and Taylorist 
moment characterized by the rationalization of labour, the parcellisation of mental and 
manual labour and the separation between conception and execution (see Gramsci, 1971, 
279). 
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would get involved was based on Kautsky’s economist prejudices according to 
which the movements of the base determine the movements of the 
superstructure. This theory proved unable to explain, in terms of strict and 
simple causality between economy and ideology, why the impoverished 
masses didn’t become more radically left-wing, but shifted towards the far-
right. It is on the basis of this crucial problem that Gramsci works out his 
theory of superstructures. Here, I would like to recall simply the major 
advances Gramsci realized before focusing on the second crisis of Marxism, 
on Althusser and on post-Marxism. 
 
Gramsci’s theory of ideology can be found in the Prison Notebooks, compiled 
between 1926 and 1937 while he was incarcerated in Mussolini’s prisons for 
being one of the leaders of the Italian Communist party since 1922. In the 
seventh notebook, Gramsci writes that one must struggle against what he 
considered to be a ‘primary infantilism’, but one nonetheless accepted as a 
fundamental postulate of historical materialism, the mistaken practice of 
presenting any fluctuation of politics and ideology as an immediate expression 
of the economic structure (Gramsci, 1983, VII, 188). Indeed Gramsci was 
well-aware that ‘people combat historical economism in the belief that they 
are attacking historical materialism’ (Gramsci, 1971, 163). Again, in the 
seventh notebook, Gramsci attacks Croce’s critique of historical materialism, 
which that latter had accused of having rehabilitated ‘theological dualism’ by 
separating the structure or base from the superstructure (Gramsci, 1971, 172). 
Gramsci writes that this separation must be understood dialectically, as thesis 
and antithesis, and thus any accusation of theological dualism is superficial 
and meaningless (Gramsci, 1983, 172). Base and superstructure must be 
understood dialectically, since they are two ‘realities in movement’ each 
having their own effects, and while interacting, having some effects on each 
other. Thus Gramsci breaks radically with mechanicism, for which the law of 
causality, the search for normality and regularity characteristic of a vulgar 
30 
evolutionism is substituted with the historical dialectic. Gramsci hence claims 
to follow Marx and his third thesis on Feuerbach: ‘the materialist doctrine 
concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that 
circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the 
educator himself’ (Marx, 1845). That means there is a reciprocal interaction 
between the educator and the environment, and this reference aims more 
globally to recall the unity of the historical processes of reality. For Gramsci, 
base and superstructure are in an internal relationship within the same totality. 
While Bernstein advocated a replacement of the Hegelian dialectic by a 
Kantian ethics in order to overcome the crisis of orthodox Marxists’ 
mechanicism, Gramsci argues in favour of a return to Hegel.   
 
However there are two types of ideologies (Gramsci, 1971, 377); arbitrary 
ideologies on the one side and organic ideologies on the other side. The latter, 
by penetrating the masses and by organizing them, have a real efficacy on the 
corresponding structure. The importance of ideology comes from the fact that 
it is the field where social beings evolve and become conscious of their 
position and start to struggle against it. The dialectical unity between base and 
superstructure forms a ‘historical bloc’. In the historical bloc, the material 
forces ‘are the content, and ideologies the form’, this distinction between 
content and form being purely pedagogical, since material forces without form 
would be historically inconceivable and ideologies without material forces 
would only be ‘individual fancies’ (Gramsci, 1971, 377). In other words, the 
necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure forms a historical 
bloc, the result of their dialectical relationship in a particular historical 
situation.15  
                                                 
15 ‘Structures and superstructures form an “historical bloc”. That is to say a complex, 
contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the 
ensemble of the social relations of production. From this, one can conclude: that only a 
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When men, with their ideological struggles, carry out the existing conflicts in 
the material sphere between productive forces and relations of production, 
then a revolution or a reversal of praxis becomes possible. The existence of a 
layer of intellectuals constitutes the basis of all the ideological struggles. This 
is of great importance for understanding the possibility of ideological 
struggles; the layer of intellectuals, as a separate layer, forms an efficient 
superstructure. It becomes a cultural self-consciousness. However, by breaking 
away from the structural laws, far from being more closely united to them, 
ideology becomes capable of having its own history. This means that organic 
ideologies have their own history; they can not be considered as the passive 
reflections of the structure or of the economy. The most important element of 
this discussion is that Gramsci attempts to overcome Kautsky’s and 
Bernstein’s dualism by reintroducing dialectics in mainstream Marxism in 
order to overcome its crisis.  
 
I.iii.b. Hegemony and class reductionism  
 
 
Nevertheless, there is another aspect of economism Gramsci rejects, which is 
again revealed by the example of Italian fascism. As Daniel Guérin, a 
revolutionary syndicalist of that time asserts, while the Fascists were 
governing Italy from 1922, neither the socialists, nor the communists took this 
                                                                                                                                
totalitarian system of ideologies gives a rational reflection of the contradiction of the 
structure and represents the existence of the objective conditions for the revolutionising of 
praxis. If a social group is formed which is one hundred per cent homogeneous on the level 
of ideology, this means that the premisses exist one hundred per cent for this 
revolutionising: that is the “rational” is actively and actually real. This reasoning is based 
on the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure a reciprocity which is 
nothing other than the real dialectical process’ (Gramsci, 1971, 366). 
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danger seriously, but understood it in the guise of an ‘identity between the 
diverse forms of the bourgeois domination, rigged out by the “democratic” 
label or by the “fascist” label. The consequences of this misunderstanding of 
the nature of fascism were serious: neither the socialists, nor the communists 
put up any resistance.’16 “What are our opponents doing?” mocked Mussolini 
in a discourse in the Chamber of Deputees in 1924. “Do they trigger general 
strikes or even partial strikes? Do they organize demonstrations in the street? 
Do they try to provoke revolts in the army? Nothing of the sort. They restrict 
themselves to press campaigns” (Mussolini, quoted in Guérin, 1999, 123.)17 
The cynicism of Mussolini, although it is revolting and iniquitous, was 
unfortunately justified by the deplorable spectacle that the socialists and the 
Italian communists performed after 1922. For post-Marxist authors, to assert 
that fascism is a bourgeois ideology is to commit a double reductionism: 
 
1) First, the meaning of the present is revealed by the content of an a 
priori doctrine  
2) Second, an ideology is reduced to the class position of the one who 
expresses it (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001)  
 
                                                 
16 The same thing happened in Germany under the Nazi domination. ‘Le 7 février 1933, 
Künstler, le chef de la fédération berlinoise du parti, donne cette consigne: ‘Surtout ne 
vous laissez pas provoquer. La vie et la santé des ouvriers berlinois nous sont trop chères 
pour les mettre en jeu à la légère. Il faut les garder pour le jour de la lutte.” ’ quoted in 
Guérin, 1999, 123. Communists neither organized any resistance. Torgler, one of the 
leaders of the German Communist Party, would confess afterwards that the struggle for 
elections came before resistance to fascism.  
17 This is my translation. The original is: “Que font nos adversaires? railla Mussolini   la 
Chambre.   clenchent-ils des gr ves g n rales ou me me des gr ves partielles? 
Organisent- ils des manifestations dans la rue? Essayent-ils de provoquer des r voltes dans 
l’arm e  Rien de semblable. Ils se bornent   des campagnes de presse” (Mussolini, 1924.  
in Guérin, 1999, 123). 
33 
The second aspect of this reductionism is the most interesting one. How can 
we transcend this reductionism theoretically? For post-Marxist authors, it is 
the Gramscian notion of hegemony which will enable them to draw a path out 
of the crisis. Gramsci showed that Fascism, far from being a bourgeois 
ideology, was the organic ideology which was formed around the bourgeoisie, 
more precisely around the landowners of the south of Italy and the 
industrialists of the North, which managed to create a large consensus which 
important parts of the population, even among the working class, gave their 
support to. 
 
The concept of hegemony is intrinsically linked to the concept of ideology and 
lays the foundations for a non-economist interpretation of historical 
processes.
18
 The concept of hegemony has several levels to its elaboration. In 
1926, in Notes on the Southern question, Gramsci introduces this concept in a 
discussion of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. From 
1919 onwards,
19
 Gramsci insisted on the importance of an alliance between the 
working class and the peasantry and on the essential role that the peasantry 
had to play in the proletarian revolution. However it is in this text that Gramsci 
introduces for the first time the necessity of an ideological leadership by the 
proletariat, its ability to create a consensus between the working classes, that is 
to say to obtain the ideological and political conditions for its hegemony to 
become possible. There is already in this text the idea that the proletariat has to 
rid itself of its corporatism in order to win over the Southern intellectuals to its 
cause, because for Gramsci, by winning over those intellectuals, one also 
rallies the classes with whom they are supposed to have organic links. 
However the question of hegemony is still Leninist for the proletariat leads the 
peasantry politically. It is in the Prison Notebooks that a typically Gramscian 
                                                 
18 See Mouffe, 1979. 
19 See Gramsci, 2 August 1919, in Macciochi, 1974, 135. 
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conception of hegemony can be found, relying on its intellectual and 
ideological dimensions. Gramsci suggests that hegemony does not apply only 
to the proletariat, but applies also to the bourgeoisie, as was the case during the 
French Revolution. The Jacobins were for him the incarnation of the Modern 
Prince of Machiavelli,
20
 because they managed to convince the bourgeoisie to 
overcome its own corporatism and hence transformed it into a hegemonic 
class. Like the proletariat, the bourgeoisie must rely on popular support and 
not on a direct confrontation with the opposite class.  
 
According to Mouffe’s interpretation, Gramsci, analysing the different 
moments of political consciousness, distinguished three principal degrees 
(Mouffe, 1979, 180):  
 
1) A first primitive economic moment within which a group develops 
its professional interests but not yet class interests.  
 
2) A politico-economic moment within which the consciousness of 
class interests expresses itself, but only at an economic level.  
 
3) The third moment is that of hegemony: the purely economic interests 
of the group are overcome and become the interests of other 
subordinated groups; this operation is fulfilled through ideological 
struggles when a combination of ideologies tends to impose itself on 
the whole social area, thus determining not only the unity of the 
economic and political goals, but also the moral and intellectual unity 
                                                 
20 In his commentary on Machiavelli’s The Prince, Gramsci shows that the Prince cannot be 
a person but only a form of collective action and will, that means for the modern era, a 
party.  Its task is to create a popular unity around a programme for radical change. It would 
also allow a moral and economic elevation of citizens. See Gramsci, 1971, 130. 
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at a universal level as opposed to a corporatist one, hence creating the 
hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinated 
groups (Mouffe, 1979, 172). 
 
An efficient hegemony or ‘expansive hegemony’ is thus the result of a direct 
and active consensus of the popular classes and of the hegemonic class, whose 
result is the creation of a collective will.
21
    
 
With the theory of hegemony, the class identities at the level of the structure 
don’t correspond necessarily to the class subjects at the level of the 
superstructure. The creation of a common world conception prevents the latter 
from being attached intrinsically to a class identity (Gramsci, 1983, 228). Thus 
hegemony does not correspond, contrary to what one might think, to the 
imposition of a class ideology onto the whole society. In fact, a class who 
wants to become hegemonic has to ‘nationalize itself’, writes Gramsci, that is 
to say manage to create a ‘national-popular collective will’ (Gramsci, 1971, 
130)
22
 so that the hegemonic class could appear as the representative of the 
general interest, and by doing so, could create the base of a massive support to 
this new ‘popular religion’. The theory of hegemony allows us therefore to 
think of ideologies as separated from any class belonging.  
 
I.iv. Althusser and the concept of overdetermination 
 
 
Following Gramsci but very critical of Hegel, Louis Althusser is the other 
major philosopher to have proposed a theory that blurs the frontiers between 
                                                 
21 This collective will is also created through the action of organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 
1971).  
22 A national-popular will is a conception of the world, or a religion for Gramsci.  
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structure and superstructure, with its central notion of overdetermination. In 
his anti-Sartrean essay ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ for 
example, Althusser dismissed the humanist notions of subjectivity by arguing 
that any subject cannot pre-exist its ideological interpellation into class 
society. According to him, subjectivity is only ‘constitutive’ in the sense that it 
is simply an effect of ideology, for it is ideology that plays ‘the function of 
constituting concrete individuals as subjects’ (Althusser, 2008, 45). 
Althusser’s more general theory of ideology blends the orthodox position that 
sees the productive forces of society as directly determining all the other 
spheres of social, political and ideological life, and the more constructionist 
view of Gramsci that gives to the superstructure a ‘relative autonomy’ and a 
proper history. He tries to overcome what Croce was criticizing in economism, 
namely the ‘theological dualism’ that separates economy and politics as 
religious thought used to separate body and soul. This blend is the main cause 
of the tension we find in Althusser’s work and which will be the basis of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s rejection of structuralism.  
 
The notion of ‘overdetermination’ developed by Althusser expresses the 
tension between the determination in the last instance of the economy and the 
relative autonomy of superstructures. Althusser borrowed this terminology 
from psychoanalysis where it is used to define how several simultaneous 
factors can contribute to the formation of symptoms (Freud, 1965, 182-183, 
327-330, 341-343, quoted in Smith, 1984, 159). ‘A dream, for instance, is said 
to be overdetermined if it has multiple possibly contradictory interpretations. It 
is in this sense of multiple sources of determination that make it susceptible to 
several possibly contradictory interpretations’ as Smith summarises the matter 
(Smith, 1984, 159). Overdetermination refers therefore to a multiplicity of 
simultaneous determinations that converge on one single result whose causal 
factors cannot be reduced to only one of them. We can never observe the 
‘economy’ as a factor in its ‘pure state’. Althusser writes:  
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The economic dialectic is never active in the pure state; in “History”, these 
instances, the superstructures, etc. – are never seen to step respectfully aside 
when their work is done or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to 
scatter before His Majesty the Economy as he strides along the royal road of 
the Dialectic. From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the “last 
instance” never comes (Althusser, 1969, 96).  
 
Hence, ‘in the last instance’ does not mean that there will be a time when the 
economy will be determinant, the other instances preceding or following it: 
‘the last instance never comes’ because the structure is always the co-presence 
of all its elements and their relation of subordination (Poulantzas, 1987, 14). 
We could say that the repudiation of a monocausal model of base and 
superstructure relations is more than a rehabilitation of Marx and Engels 
dialectic, it is the outline of a ‘polyectic’ defining the complex or 
‘overdetermined’ relationship between the various instances and the social 
whole.
23
 
                                                 
23 Althusser in ‘Contradiction and overdetermination’ opposes the conception of the Hegelian 
contradiction and overdetermination. He explains that in the Philosophy of History of 
Hegel ‘we encounter an apparent overdetermination: are not all historical societies 
constituted of an infinity of concrete determinations, from political laws to religion via 
customs, habits, financial, commercial and economic regimes, the educational system, the 
arts, philosophy, and so on? However, none of these determinations is essentially outside 
the others, not only because together they constitute an original, organic totality, but also 
and above all because this totality is reflected in a unique internal principle, which is the 
truth of all those concrete determinations.’  (…) Then he continues ‘If it is possible, in 
principle, to reduce the totality, the infinite diversity, of a historically given society 
(Greece, Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and so on) to a simple internal 
principle, this very simplicity can be reflected in the contradiction to which it thereby 
acquires a right. Must we be even plainer? This reduction itself (Hegel derived the idea 
from Montesquieu), the reduction of all the elements that make up the concrete life of a 
historical epoch (economic, social, political and legal institutions, customs, ethics, art, 
religion, philosophy, and even historical events: wars, battles, defeats, and so on) to one 
principle of internal unity, is itself only possible on the absolute condition of taking the 
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Althusser appealed to a famous letter of Engels to Bloch written in 1890 where 
Engels writes that according to the materialist conception of history, the 
ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of 
real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted’ (Engels, 1972, 
294). Attributing the preponderance to the infrastructural determination ‘in the 
last instance’, Engels continues: ‘if somebody twists this into saying that the 
economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase’ (Engels, 1972, 294).  
Althusser claims then that: 
It is economism (mechanism) and not the true Marxist tradition that sets up 
the hierarchy of instances once and for all, assigns each its essence and role 
and defines the universal meaning of their relations; it is economism that 
identifies roles and actors eternally, not realizing that the necessity of the 
process lies in an exchange of roles “according to circumstances”. It is 
economism that identifies eternally in advance the determinant-contradiction-
in-the-last-instance with the role of the dominant contradiction, which forever 
assimilates such and such an “aspect” (forces of production, economy, 
practice) to the principal role and such and such another aspect’ (relations of 
production, politics, ideology, theory) to secondary role – whereas in real 
history determination in the last instance by the economy is exercised 
precisely in the permutations of the principal role between the economy, 
politics, theory, etc. Engels saw this quite clearly and pointed it out in his 
struggle with the opportunists in the Second International, who were awaiting 
                                                                                                                                
whole concrete life of a people for the externalisation-alienation (Entausserung-
Entfremdung) of an internal spiritual principle, which can never definitely be anything 
but the most abstract form of that epoch’s consciousness of itself: its religious or 
philosophical consciousness, that is, its own ideology. (…) It is why there is never for him 
any basic rupture, no actual end to any real history – nor any radical beginning. It is why 
his philosophy of history is garnished with uniformly “dialectical” mutations. This 
stupefying conception is only defensible from the Spirit’s topmost peak (Althusser, 2005 
[1969], 102-103).  
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the arrival of socialism through the action of the economy alone (Althusser, 
1969, 213).  
 
In another letter to Conrad Schmidt, Engels expresses an awareness of the 
autonomy of the state and ideology as factors independent of the economic 
base, hence capable of having their own historical development. He states that 
while ‘economic’ factors remain dominant, the ‘ideological outlook reacts in 
its turn upon the economic basis and may, within certain limits, modify it’ 
(Engels, 1958, 488-490). For Engels, there is thus more an interaction between 
base and superstructure than a causal relationship, which as we have seen is 
the starting point of Gramsci’s thought on ideologies. However, the status of 
the economy as the determining factor ‘in the last instance’ is not 
unambiguous. Why is it necessary for Althusser to recall that it is the 
determining factor in the last instance while explaining that this last instance 
never comes? If the plan in which Althusser wants to inscribe his theory of 
factors was really immanent, the economy wouldn’t have the status of 
determining factor in the last instance. Certainly, Althusser wants to minimize 
the role of the economy in determining the shape and nature of the whole 
structure and sometimes it seems that the economy is simply put on the same 
level as that the other instances. However, the importance of the other factors 
is ultimately limited by the ultimate primacy given to the economic instance. 
To say it differently, it is hardly possible to distinguish theoretically between 
primary causes without which an event could not have happened and 
secondary causes, which are merely circumstantial to the situation. ‘The 
context of Althusser’s discussion makes clear that every factor is absolutely 
contributory, so that we cannot abstract certain features from a situation and 
rank them in some relative order of importance. It appears that we must be 
content with a form of descriptive empiricism in which base and 
superstructure are accorded more or less status’ explains Smith (Smith, 1984, 
166). 
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Althusser tries to solve this tension by introducing a distinction between 
‘determinant’ and ‘dominant’ instances of a social formation, already outlined 
in the previous quotations. While the productive base is the determinant 
instance, it is not necessarily the dominant one (Smith, 1984, 169). In For 
Marx (Althusser, 1969, 111) he explains that this distinction provides a ‘new 
conception of the structure-superstructure complex which constitutes the 
essence of any social formation’. For example, ‘in European countries of the 
Middle ages, religious relations appeared to be dominant. (…) But his does not 
contradict the principle that economic relations are still determinant if only “in 
the last instance” (Atlhusser, 1969, 111).  
 
I.v.a. Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the social field as a 
discursive field 
 
 
Althusser’s work was a starting point for Laclau and Mouffe’s intellectual 
development in the post-68 era. The Parisian events of May-June 1968, and the 
spirit of revolt that came with it has had a strong effect on political thought; 
and the disparate, creative aspect of the revolt, the reappearance of the feminist 
and anti-racist movements and the withdrawing of young people from the 
Communist Party and its rigid and critical line regarding the events, have 
highly contributed to the rise of post-Marxist and post-structuralist thought.
24
 
                                                 
24 Althusser’s personal response to May ’68 was clearly not a good way to convince young 
students to follow the path of his renewed Marxist theory. Convinced that the only way to 
influence the French Communist party was to retain some form of influence within it, 
Althusser followed the party line in denouncing the revolt of the students as ‘infantile’, 
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Laclau and Mouffe integrate to their own theoretical edifice the main elements 
we have studied here 1) The primordial importance given to the political by 
Bernstein over the economic 2) especially Gramsci’s attempt to overcome 
Marxist dualism with a new conception of the relation between base and 
superstructure 3) the peculiar conception of multi-contradictions in a mode of 
production and the concept of overdetermination developed by Althusser. As I 
will show, the nature of Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism shares many 
characteristics with Bernstein revisionism, that some of Marx’s theses were 
not accidentally wrong but essentially flawed. It is however primarily the 
notion of hegemony developed by Gramsci that will be central to their 
theoretical framework. For them, it constituted a progress that tends to push 
forward the logic of contingency in the construction of political subjects. After 
Lenin, it is indeed Gramsci who has recognized the constructionist character of 
the hegemonic relation with the conception of a political, moral and 
intellectual leadership within an alliance of different classes or ‘subject 
positions’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 11). Yet the political leadership can be 
based on ‘a conjuncture of coincidence of interests in which the participating 
sectors retain their separate identity’, but as Laclau and Mouffe write, ‘the 
moral and intellectual leadership requires that an ensemble of “ideas” and 
“values” be shared by a number of sectors, or to use our own terminology, that 
certain subject positions traverse a number of class sectors’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, 66-67). It is ideology which is material, which becomes the 
constitutive terrain of the relations. Political subjects are hence not strictly 
speaking classes but ‘collective wills’25 and the ideological elements 
articulated do not belong necessarily to one class in particular. The field of 
historical contingency thus penetrates the sphere of political subjects’ 
                                                                                                                                
whose struggle only ended up strengthening bourgeois society (Johnson, 1972, 81).  
25 Cf. Gramsci, 1971, 133. 
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formation: their forms and contents are no longer guaranteed by any historical 
law. 
 
What differentiated Gramsci from Bernstein was that Gramsci, contrary to 
Bernstein, did not see the necessity of abandoning the Marxist framework in 
order to overcome these problems. He developed alternatively the concept of 
hegemony, which transforms the necessity of the unity of the working class as 
a precondition to revolutionary actions, into the necessity of the articulation of 
dissimilar elements capable of producing a collective will, that is a fusion 
between moral, political and economic objectives, and imposes a certain vision 
of the world within civil society. In other words, the concept of hegemony 
stipulated that, in order to seize power, bourgeoisie and proletariat have to gain 
popular support and consensus. A hegemonic class is a class which managed 
to articulate with its own interests the interest of others classes. For Laclau and 
Mouffe, two things are implied within the Gramscian theory of hegemony: the 
first one is that contrary to many economist and class-reductionist 
assumptions, the class character of ideologies is the result of hegemony itself, 
that is the result of the combination, or in post-Marxists’ words, the 
articulation of a set of ideological elements which pre-exist in the sphere of 
civil society. A hegemonic class is not a class which has imposed its class 
ideology on other groups, but a class which has been able to connect to its 
hegemonic principle the majority of the ideological elements of a given 
society. ‘In this way it has been able to create a determinate conception of the 
world and to establish a certain “definition of reality” which is accepted by 
those over whom hegemony is exercised’ (Mouffe, 1981, 173).  
 
The second implication of the Gramscian theory of hegemony is that the 
objective of the ideological struggles is not the destruction of the opposing 
conception of the world, but the ‘disarticulation’ of it, the transformation of it. 
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For Gramsci, to become hegemonic a class has to ‘nationalize’ itself, by 
creating a ‘national-popular collective will’: through this way, this class does 
not take state power, nor does it smash the existing state, but it becomes the 
state, which renders it capable to undertake historical actions of a 
revolutionary nature. From the Gramscian theory of hegemony, Laclau and 
Mouffe retain this non-class reductionist conception of the ‘superstructures’ 
and its ‘enlarged’ conception of politics: first the fact that ‘it is the formation 
of [a] matrix of meanings at the level of diverse discursive formations which 
establishes the class character of the discourses which are produced from 
them. Therefore, there are no class ideologies which exist prior to their 
inscription in discursive practices, but it is these practices themselves which, 
according to the way in which they articulate certain elements, produce 
discourses which will play a major role in the reproduction of certain types of 
relations of production’ (Mouffe, 1981, 184).  
 
Second that the ‘field of politics is coextensive with the “social” as such and 
all levels of society can be the loci of relationships of power and the terrain for 
political struggle’ (Mouffe, 1981, 184) and especially outside the traditional 
channel of politics. The third aspect they retain from Gramsci is attributable to 
the young Marx: that the hegemonic leadership must be democratic in both its 
aims and its practice and that democracy is the ‘terrain of permanent 
revolution begun by the bourgeoisie and concluded by the proletariat’ 
(Mouffe, 1979, 174). However, post-Marxist authors were confronted, at the 
end of the 60s, with a new parameter which was ignored by Gramsci: the rise 
of new forms of struggle and proliferation of identities which do not tally with 
the class struggle, namely minority struggles, LGBT struggles, feminist, anti-
racist, ecological and other radical democratic struggles. As was said in the 
introduction, the target of Laclau and Mouffe is the construction of an 
inextricable solidarity, an articulation where each movement would 
renegotiate and transform its identity in contact with the other movements but 
which at the same time would preserve their autonomy within all these forms 
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of struggles, from the anti-capitalist, socialist struggle of the proletariat
26
 to the 
feminist, anti-racist, minorities’ struggles for equality to ecologist struggles 
and anti-authoritarian and anti-productivist struggles. By integrating these new 
identities to the classical notion of hegemonic struggles, they realized that a 
contradiction existed within the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Indeed, a 
hegemony can only be constituted in connection with both classes with 
hegemonic vocations in the capitalist system, due to their places and their 
functions in the production process: namely either the bourgeoisie for the 
hegemony of the ruling classes, or the proletariat for the oppressed classes. If 
we enlarge the Gramscian perspective to all the members of the ‘exploited’ in 
general, if we wish to establish an ‘active’ hegemony between them, we can 
achieve it only with the working class; its importance dominates all other 
classes without power. It is not by essence that the proletariat has to lead the 
other classes to socialism, but because the objective conditions of the capitalist 
system give to the proletariat a mission he is the only one able to lead.  
 
‘From this perspective, the emergence of the new forms of political struggle 
from the 1960s (...) could only be figured as somehow less fundamental to the 
struggles of the industrial working class, and socialist strategy could only be 
conceived in terms of building a collective project by winning over these 
“peripheral struggles” to the world historical interest of the proletariat’ 
explains Mark Wenman (Wenman, 2009, 119). The idea of pluralism itself is 
put into danger, since there is no pluralism if there is not an a priori equality 
between subject positions. The Gramscian theory of hegemony implies hence 
for Laclau and Mouffe the existence of a hierarchy between the classes of the 
same alliance and a logic of exclusion rather than a logic of equivalence. By 
putting a priori the priority of the working class, does not Gramsci ruin the 
                                                 
26 ‘Every project for radical democracy implies a socialist dimension, as it is necessary to put 
an end to capitalist relations of production, which are at the root of numerous relations of 
subordination’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 178).  
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capacity of this class to gather ‘other’ classes behind it? Can the theory of the 
hegemony according to Gramsci avoid the anti-democratic danger which 
implies the idea of centrality of the proletariat? How could we convince the 
other groups to join the working class, while considering that these groups 
have peripheral interests to those of the proletariat? The attempt to develop a 
coherent democratic theory of hegemony which would not imply the necessary 
existence of a class basis as the hegemonic principle leads post-Marxist 
authors to construct a completely new theoretical edifice. Incorporating these 
three Gramscian assumptions, Laclau and Mouffe claim thence that it is 
necessary to go further the Gramscian conception as it contains this 
contradictory statement which reintroduces the dualism of classical Marxism 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 69). The problem is that ‘for Gramsci, even though 
the diverse social elements have a merely relational identity – achieved 
through articulatory practices – there must always be a single unifying 
principle in every hegemonic formation, and this can only be a fundamental 
class’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 69). The class character of the unifying 
principle is thus not the contingent result of the hegemonic struggle but the 
necessary structural framework within which every struggle occurs. For post-
Marxists, the deconstructive aspect of the hegemony as articulatory practices 
has not been driven to its ultimate consequences. In other words, within 
Gramsci’s conception, ‘the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject’s identity is 
constituted at a point external to the space it articulates’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001, 85).  
 
A distinction between a discursive formation of identities and a non-discursive 
formation of the identity of the fundamental class is introduced, the latter 
finally constituting a ‘transcendental signifier’. Laclau and Mouffe reject this 
differentiation of planes, or this ‘interiority/exteriority alternative’. Although 
the hegemonic subject, ‘as the subject of any articulatory practice, must be 
partially exterior to what it articulates – otherwise, there would be no 
articulation at all, such exteriority cannot be conceived as that existing 
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between two ontological levels’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 135). Laclau and 
Mouffe criticize the fact that the frame within which hegemony can occur is 
necessarily and a priori a class framework, instead of being the practical result 
of struggle. In other words, the fundamental class’ identity (proletariat or 
bourgeois) is constituted within another framework than the hegemonic field – 
or overdetermination field – which is economy. The economy is hence still 
thought of as a field separate from the political field which gives political 
identities to economic entities such as classes. The topographical vision of 
human reality is hence conserved, as the economy determines who are the true 
actors of the transformation of the world, whatever the type of society. Laclau 
and Mouffe write: ‘The constitutive logic of the economic space is not itself 
hegemonic. Here the naturalist prejudice, which sees the economy as a 
homogeneous space unified by necessary laws, appears once again with all its 
forces’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 69). In order to break with this paradigm 
and to put each of the forms of oppression and politics on a par, Laclau and 
Mouffe recognize the necessity of deconstructing the notion of a priori 
dominant groups within hegemony, especially the idea of a subject a priori 
constituted by the economy with objective interests implying a necessary 
emancipatory revolution for the entire society; and this can be achieved 
through the abandonment of the base/superstructure model itself. As a 
consequence the identity of the proletariat is not given but itself the production 
of a political construction. There is no logical and necessary relation between 
socialist objectives and the positions of social agents in the relations of 
production; it follows that, from the socialist point of view, the direction of the 
worker’s struggle is not uniformly progressive: it depends, just as with any 
other social struggle, upon its forms of articulation within a given hegemonic 
context (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 85-86).  
 
The same critique of dualism is made against Althusser. On the one hand, 
Laclau and Mouffe show that the logic of overdetermination necessarily 
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introduces contingency in the nature of the political subject which is 
constituted. If there is overdetermination, which is a political process, political 
subjects are not necessarily class subjects, as no identity exists between 
infrastructural datum and political datum. This phenomenon of 
overdetermination implies a logic of contingency also because the global 
‘signifier’ which gives a political meaning to social struggles is not determined 
in advance; hence the nature of the created subject from diverse and isolated 
elements is also not determined in advance. In other words, ‘political 
recomposition [is] unable to found the necessary class character of social 
agents’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 98). If so, there could not be two planes, 
one of essences and the other of appearances ‘since there is no possibility of 
fixing an ultimate literal sense for which the symbolic would be a second and 
derived plane of signification’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 98). This conception 
of the social as a symbolic order was nevertheless in contradiction with 
Althusser’s claim of a determination in the last instance of the economy 
independently of the type of society concerned; the simple and unidirectional 
determination of the economy for all types of society is incompatible with the 
conception of relations between overdetermined instances.  
 
For Althusser, the ideology of the dominant class is realized in ideological 
state apparatuses, but ‘it comes from elsewhere’ (Althusser, 1971, 185-186), 
namely ‘from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their 
conditions of existence, their practises, their experience of the struggle, etc.’ In 
other words, the ruling ideology, realized within the Ideological State 
Apparatuses, is merely ‘the reflection at the ideological level of a certain 
position within the relations of production at the economic level’ (Mouffe, 
1981. 171). Hence the ideological is determined by something which is not 
itself superstructural but rather social and in the last instance economic. The 
theory of ideologies has necessarily a class-belonging, in other words social 
classes are the bearer of structures and of superstructures. There is therefore a 
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dualism in Althusser’s thought, characteristic of a rationalist paradigm for 
which the social is unified in a space sutured by the economic infrastructure, 
which escape the process of overdetermination. 
 
I.v.b. Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-dialectical thought  
 
 
To the dualism which was the common denominator of various currents of 
Marxist thought, Laclau and Mouffe will hence oppose a monist vision of the 
social field, reducible to the field of discursivity. As such, they radically reject 
Hegelian ontology and the category of positivity, and rather create an 
alternative and fundamental vision of the openness of social and as a result, of 
articulation. For them, if everything is discourse (see chapter 2) the hegemonic 
force and the ensemble of hegemonized elements would constitute themselves 
on the same plane, which is the plane of the general field of discursivity. 
 
The category of articulation which is so important for post-Marxism, supposes 
that the articulated elements can be separately identified, hence that the 
elements have a separate existence independently of the articulated totalities. 
Within the field of articulation, the elements are organized within a totality 
which is external to the fragments themselves, hence it is contingent; on the 
opposite side, in the field of mediation, characteristic of the Hegelian concept 
of totality, the organisation is internal to the fragments organized, and they are 
considered like necessary moments of a transcendent totality.
27
 That is the 
                                                 
27 See for example the Romantic generation and Hölderlin in particular for the premisses of 
that conception. 
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definition of the dialectic.
28
 By rejecting the impossible logic of mediation like 
Trendelenburg did before them, they reintroduce the logic of fixation which is 
the logic of articulation in the understanding of the world. To come back to the 
Hegelian dialectic, it means that ‘the negation is irreducible to any objectivity, 
which means that it becomes constitutive and therefore indicates the 
impossibility of establishing the social as an objective order’ (Laclau, 1990, 
16). Indeed, if negativity ceases to be a moment of a higher positivity, it 
acquires an independent status and existence. To the system of logical 
transitions characteristic of the dialectical conception of reality, Laclau and 
Mouffe oppose a conception of contingent relation between objects and 
elements, and without the transcendence of the second moment of the 
dialectic, the identities of the elements become precarious and contingent and 
cannot be fixed in any ultimate literality. 
 
The questioning of discourses such as Hegelianism, including Marxism which 
adopted the Hegelian point of view on difference and identity, leads to a 
reformulation of the notion of fragmentation that we already used many times: 
if there is no such totality whose elements are necessary elements transcended 
by this totality, then, within the social field, society understood as a sutured 
and closed space does not exist. Society does not constitute a sutured space 
and the social has no essence. As we have seen, the relations between the 
                                                 
28 Following Trendelenburg (1840), Laclau and Mouffe argue that Hegel’s ambiguous 
dialectic of the Real is an impossible operation that violates constantly the method that it 
itself postulates. In that case logical transitions become a series of contingent transitions. 
They write: ‘For him [Hegel], identity is never positive and closed in itself, but is 
constituted as transition, relation, difference. If, however, Hegel’s logical relations become 
contingent transitions, the connections between them cannot be fixed as moments of an 
underlying or sutured totality. This means that they are articulations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001, 95). Indeed Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the real keeps the Hegelian 
conception of identities as transition, relation and difference which is normally the 
negative moment of the dialectic, but reject the positive moment of the dialectic – the 
transcendence of these differences – which was the ground on which the concept of totality 
was lying. 
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elements are therefore contingent because the connections between them 
cannot be fixed as moments of an underlying or sutured totality.  
 
We can thus talk of a growing complexity and fragmentation of advanced 
industrial societies not in the sense that, sub specie aeternitatis, they are more 
complex than earlier societies, but in the sense that they are constituted 
around a fundamental asymmetry. This is the asymmetry existing between a 
growing proliferation of differences – a surplus of meaning of the social – and 
the difficulties encountered by any discourse attempting to fix those 
differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure. (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001, 96)  
 
The originality of this reading is double: first, it means that the debates within 
revisionism did not consist in fact in discussing the reality of fragmentation 
within capitalism, but surreptitiously discussed the failure of dialectical or 
scientific ideologies to think fragmentation as a part of a higher unity; the first 
crisis of Marxism was a crisis of an ideology fissured by its incapacity to fix 
the flow of differences which is consubstantial with the real. In other words, 
Marxism and Hegelianism has always been incapable of grasping the 
pluralism inherent to the social, and always attempted to reduce it to a higher 
unity through a dialectical process.  
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Chapter 2 
Precursors to and influences on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
radical democratic thought 
 
II.i. Overview 
 
 
The idea of an ontological fragmentation I evoked at the end of my first 
chapter echoes the post-structuralist theorisation of the ontological plurality of 
the social. In the current chapter I will explain this in detail. I place an 
emphasis on the key moments of the elaboration of post-Marxist theory rather 
than on its historical development.  
 
In the first part, I discuss the short-term occasion which gave rise to the 
elaboration of a post-Marxist theoretical edifice during the 60s, namely the 
critique of structuralism as an essentialism and a more detailed analysis of the 
elaboration of the concept of discourse. Then I move on to examine the direct 
theoretical influences upon post-Marxism, in particular Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s theory of the sign, Jacques Derrida’s critique of the notion of 
totality, and Jacques Lacan’s theory of the subject and identifications. Finally I 
analyse key post-Marxist themes, such as antagonism, and the logic of the 
signifier. I then show how these concepts are rearticulated all together and 
synthesized to produce a new democratic concept of hegemony.  
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II.ii. Derrida’s critique of structuralism 
 
 
Chapter 1 examined some of the problems perceived by Laclau and Mouffe as 
central concerning the traditional Marxist imaginary of the social as separated 
between the economic base and the political, cultural and ideological 
superstructures. I showed that the concept of base and superstructure as a 
dialectical unity in Gramscian thought was an attempt to overcome this 
dualism and had a great influence on Laclau and Mouffe’s thoughts. The other 
great influence on the young Laclau and the young Mouffe was Althusser’s 
structuralism; the elaboration of the concept of discourse is a direct response to 
its underlying ‘essentialism’; I will here expose what this means and this will 
allow me to demonstrate the basis on which the transition from structuralism 
to post-structuralism has been made.  
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, the failure of Althusserianism to overcome 
the two types of economism (epiphenomenalism and class-reductionism) is 
related to the ‘myth of a unified society’, based on the theory of the social as 
an intelligible and closed system of relations, a structural totality where the 
economy plays the role of structural causality, as we have seen in Althusser’s 
theory of the determination in the last instance of the economy. The critique of 
such a conception is particularly clear and eloquent in a 1983 article by Laclau 
named The impossibility of society. There we find this main argument: the 
failure of structuralism and more broadly Marxism to elaborate a theory 
capable of explaining the specificity of the political is due to its fundamental 
essentialism. Laclau writes:  
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The structural totality was to present itself as an object having a positivity on 
its own, which it was possible to describe and to define. In this sense, this 
totality operated as an underlying principle of intelligibility of the social 
order. The status of this totality was that of an essence of the social order 
which had to be recognized behind the empirical variations expressed at the 
surface of social life. (Laclau, 1990, 90)  
 
Indeed, what is presupposed within the Althusserian notion of mode of 
production and of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, is that society is an 
intelligible object of knowledge, since it is a structural totality. That means we 
can actually know the essence of the phenomena by studying the strictly 
economic processes underlying them. The economy or the kernel of this 
totality or system of relations between elements operates as an underlying 
principle of intelligibility of the social order. Structuralism is hence 
contradictory: indeed, on one hand, it claims that the meaning of each element 
of the totality is relational,
29
 that is to say defined outside itself (Laclau 1990, 
90), but at the same time this intelligible object of knowledge – society – has 
an essence, according to Laclau, ‘the essence of the social order which had to 
be recognized behind the empirical variations expressed at the surface of 
social life’ (Laclau, 1990, 90). This essence is the economy, understood as the 
‘real’ while the superstructures were considered as ‘appearances’. In other 
words as a structuralist Althusser recognized that any social identity is defined 
through relations with other elements in society and simultaneously, it 
transformed those relations into a system, thanks to its knowledgeable kernel: 
the economy. He thus fixed these identities in a system. But if every element is 
relationally defined, why has the economy always this privileged position of 
being the bearer of the other structures? Laclau and Mouffe simply refuse this 
dualism. To the society understood as a system of structures and as an 
                                                 
29 This will be particularly clear in our analysis of Saussure’s theory of linguistics.  
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intelligible object of knowledge, they oppose the impossibility of fixing 
meaning and identities in a system and hence the ‘infinitude of the social’ 
(Laclau, 1990, 90).  
 
In chapter 1 we have seen that for Laclau and Mouffe everything is discourse. 
Derrida’s critique of structuralist essentialism is in fact the basis of these post-
Marxists’ fundamental tools that allow them to elaborate a conception of 
politics as articulation of identities. The well-known deconstructionist method 
tracks down the desires for fully constituted meaning and grounds. It also 
gives a new light to the concepts of language and discourse which are central 
to post-structuralism. In his essay on Structure, Sign and Play in the Human 
Sciences (1978 [1967]) Derrida identifies the paradox of essentialism in the 
following logical way:  
 
The general model of essentialism assumes the existence of an underlying 
essential principle that structures the social totality by delimiting the play of 
meaning, while itself escaping the process of structuration. (1978, 278-279)
30 
 
This centre of social structure – in Marxism the economy as distinct from the 
political domain – is supposed to govern the structuration of the structure 
while itself escaping this process: it is thus supposed to be at the same time 
within the structure and beyond it. Consequently it would be equivalent to a 
sort of ‘transcendental signifier’ whose exteriority could not be justified and 
which would act as the foundation of all the signified in a closed system. 
Derrida rejects any such transcendental meaning as a fiction and calls 
‘metaphysical’ any thought system which depends on a principle or ground 
                                                 
30 See also Torfing, 1999, 19. 
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upon which a whole hierarchy of meaning would be constructed. The act of 
‘deconstruction’ is the critical operation by which one can cast light on the 
‘binary opposition’ used to define such first principles: these are commonly 
defined by what they exclude. For Derrida, binary oppositions represent a way 
of thinking typical of ideologies, which draw rigid boundaries between a 
superior and privileged term which belongs to the presence and to the logos, 
and an inferior one; for example: intelligible/sensible, soul/body, truth/falsity, 
self/non-self, sense/nonsense, objective/subjective etc. Deconstruction 
methods are used then to show how one term of an antithesis inheres within 
another.  
 
Derrida argues that this tendency typical of ideologies relates to ‘centrism’ or 
to the desire to posit a transcendence which would be a ‘central’ presence able 
to fix meanings. But this desire is always unfulfilled for the centre does not 
exist as a fixed, autonomous locus but has rather to be thought as an absence. 
It is Derrida first who claimed that if such a transcendental signifier does not 
exist, or how ‘in the absence of a centre or origin, everything becomes 
discourse’ (Derrida, 1978, 280). Discourse is here defined as ‘a differential 
ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly 
renegotiated’ (Torfing, 1999, 85), or a field of infinite substitutions (Derrida 
1978, 289). As we have seen above, the absence of a fixed centre extends 
infinitely the process of signification within the structure. Furthermore the 
always unfulfilled desire for this centre gives rise to the endless displacements 
and substitutions of this centre (Torfing, 1999, 40). This is because language 
in its nature excludes any totalizing attempt of the desire, because language 
lacks a centre ‘which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions’ contrary to 
the field of structures (Derrida, 1978, 289). As Derrida writes: 
 
This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions 
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only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an 
inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, 
there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the 
play of substitutions. (Derrida, 1978, 289) 
 
Complete totalisation, or closure is thus impossible: without a complete 
totalisation, a ‘structure’ exists only as a field of signification in which the 
order is temporary and threatened by a ‘constitutive outside’ which prevents 
an ultimate closure through totalisation. Adopting the thesis of Derrida, Laclau 
and Mouffe claim that: 
 
If the being – as distinct from existence – of any object is constituted within a 
discourse, it is not possible to differentiate the discursive, in terms of being, 
from any other area of reality. It means that the discursive is the horizon of 
every object. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990, 105)
31
  
 
In this passage of Laclau and Mouffe’s explanations, the coextensivity of the 
discursive with ‘any other area of reality’ seems to refuse the Kantian 
distinction between the noumena or the realm of the objective existence and 
the realm of phenomena which is the realm of being and representations. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, everything is constructed through discourse hence there is 
no grounds for the noumenal at all.  
They write:  
 
                                                 
31 To avoid equivocation, let’s recall that for Laclau and Mouffe, the discursive is not an 
object among other objects, although concrete discourses are. The discursive is only a 
theoretical horizon (Laclau, 1990, 220).  
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Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices. It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of 
discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of 
emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the 
linguistic and behaviourial aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect 
distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social 
production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive 
totalities. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 107)  
 
As a logical consequence and as I have explained in Chapter 1, the concept of 
discourse entails that ideologies, if considered as discursive constructions, 
cease to be superstructures, in the sense that there is only superstructure. 
Social identity, whether economic, political or ideological, is entirely 
constructed in and by discourse. As a consequence the base/superstructure 
model, which were at all stages one of the main aspects of the various crises of 
Marxism, and which supposed a definition of the social as an object of 
knowledge from which one could extract some objective laws, is definitively 
abandoned.  
 
The absence of a fixed centre extends the field and the play of signification 
infinitely (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 112). Assessing the consequences of 
these statements within the field of Marxist theory, classes no longer play their 
previous role of bearers of structure. Post-Marxist authors argue that structures 
exist, however they always have a precarious being, because they are 
essentially discursively constructed. This conception also destroys the idea of 
class interests. Although capitalism is a system of production based on wage 
labour, it does not necessarily mean that ‘antagonism is inherent to the 
relations of production. Antagonism is not established within capitalist 
relations of production, but between the latter and the identity of the social 
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agents – workers included – outside of them’ (Laclau, 1990, 221). 
 
Here I would like to put into perspective the plural conception of the social 
with the Marxist conception of the social, as represented by the successive 
Internationals, in more detail. According to Laclau, traditionally, the notion of  
the ‘social’ was characterized by its homogeneity, because it could be reduced 
to economic processes whose direction was supposed to go towards its 
homogenisation. According to Laclau, if the notion of ‘social’ is defined 
relatively to its supposed opposite ‘individual’, ‘then the homogeneous and 
indivisible nature of community must be automatically accepted’ (Laclau 
1990, XIII). 
 
This social homogeneity assumed the function of the concrete embodiment of 
universality in Marxist discourse, and was guaranteed by sociological 
hypotheses such as the growing proletarianisation of the middle classes and 
the progressive simplification of class structure under capitalism. (Laclau, 
1990, XIII) 
 
Nevertheless this simplification did not occur and automatically, the 
homogeneity of the social was necessarily absent. The post-Marxist authors 
argue that this was from the beginning flawed because this whole conception 
was based on a misconception of what the social really was. The social is 
‘infinite’ and essentially plural and these pluralities cannot be subsumed into a 
higher unity. This does not mean however that capitalism and oppression 
cannot be overcome, that without any unity the system cannot be changed. In 
fact radical politics is not subordinated to the quest for unity of homogeneity 
anymore, and the whole meaning of the radicality of politics is inverted: if 
radicality does not result from the emergence of a unified subject who can 
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embody the universal, it results from the irruption on the political scene of the 
multiple, fragmentary, partial and limited subjects composing the ‘social’. 
Hence post-Marxism provides the most striking answer to the traditional 
problem of the realization of the unity of the oppressed studied in my first 
chapter. It is not the real unity of the oppressed which is a condition of 
possibility for the realisation of socialism, but actually it is their 
fragmentation. 
 
II.iii. The Saussurean influence 
 
 
To come back to the post-Marxist concept of discourse, the development of 
this concept has clearly absorbed the impact of Saussurean linguistics (Laclau, 
2007a, 541). The principal impact of Ferdinand de Saussure’s work is its 
theory of the sign, conceived as the combination of a sound image and a 
concept (Saussure, 1974, 65). In order to suppress the ambiguity of usage 
which generally designates by sign only a sound-image, Saussure decided to 
replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified (signifié) and 
signifier (signifiant), while keeping the term sign to designate the whole 
resulting from the association of the signifier and the signified. For example, 
the sound image (signified) arbor in Latin is intimately linked to the concept 
of tree (signifier). The first major thesis of structural linguistics is that the 
bond between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary. There is no necessary 
or natural connection between the two. There is only a connection established 
by convention and tradition. One signifier can be replaced by another signifier 
for the same signified. Language is hence form and not substance, and ‘that 
each element of the system is exclusively defined by the rules of its 
combinations and substitutions with the other elements’ (Laclau, 2007a, 542). 
60 
To use Saussure’s analogy, if I substitute the wooden pieces in a chessboard 
by marbles or even pieces of paper, I can still play chess as far as the rules 
governing the movements of the pieces remain the same. The only thing that 
matters in these substitutions is that ‘the same value is attributed to it’  
(Saussure, 1966, 110). The most important implication of the arbitrary 
character of the sign is that each language ‘articulates’ reality. 
 
It is through language that the objects that are meaningful for us are 
constructed. Each language divides up, categorizes, and makes coherent the 
totality of objects that is used by its corresponding language-using 
community. (A.M. Smith, 1998, 85) 
 
Nothing exterior to linguistics determines the particular articulation of reality 
within a language. For example ‘there is nothing in “nature” which determines 
where we should place a boundary between “green” and “blue” or “hill” and 
valley’ (A.M. Smith, 1998, 85). There is not only a contingent link between 
the signifier and the signified, but language constructs also the signified in a 
process that is independent from the extra-linguistic (Saussure, 1966, 113). 
  
This leads us to the other principle at the basis of structural linguistics which is 
that in language there are no positive terms, but only differences. Every 
meaning is relational; for example to understand the meaning of ‘father’ we 
have to understand the meaning of ‘mother’, ‘son’, etc.; consequently 
language constitutes a system in which no elements can be defined 
independently of the others (see Laclau 2007a, 542). The sign is arbitrary and 
the meaning is exclusively constituted through the relational differences 
obtained within a language. As Jameson claims:  
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Meaning is not a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, 
between the materiality of language, between a word or a name, and its 
referent or concept. Meaning for Saussure is generated by the movement from 
signifier to signifier. What we generally call the signified – the meaning or 
conceptual content of an utterance – is now rather to be seen as a meaning-
effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated and projected by the 
relationship of signifiers among themselves. (Jameson, 1991, 26) 
  
The link between Saussure and Laclau and Mouffe is that, as Anna-Marie 
Smith states, there is a homology between Saussure’s conception of the sign 
and post-Marxists’ conception of political identities (Smith, 1998, 87). The 
concept of articulation is based on the Saussurean theory of the sign. Political 
identities are constituted through articulation which is defined as ‘any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 105). These 
articulated elements have the same status as signifiers in Saussure’s 
linguistics. To be more precise ‘discourse’ is the name given to the structured 
totality resulting from the articulatory practice (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
105). When some elements are articulated and hence produce a discursive 
totality, it means that every element occupies a differential position, thus its 
meaning is fixed relatively to the meaning of the other elements. In post-
Marxist vocabulary, in an articulated discursive totality, ‘every element has 
been reduced to a moment of that totality, all identity is relational and all 
relations have a necessary character’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 106). The 
identity of the elements cannot be specified outside the relation itself. 
However, contrary to the Saussurean conception of language as a totality of 
necessary moments,  
 
discursive totalities never exist in the form of a simply given and delimited 
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positivity, the transition from the “elements” to the “moments” is in fact 
never entirely fulfilled because every relational logic of discourse is in fact 
limited by an “exterior”, which is constituted by other discourses (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, 110 and 146). 
 
This last point is extremely important as it is the main critique addressed to 
Saussurean structuralism, and joins the critique of Althusserian structuralism. 
Saussure is a structuralist, for him a language is a collection and multiplicity of 
signs constituting a system (see Saussure, 1974, 70). And Saussure claims 
about the characteristics of a system that ‘[it] is a complex mechanism that can 
be grasped only though reflection; the very ones who use it daily are ignorant 
of it’ (Saussure, 1974 in McNeil and Feldman, 1998, 301). That is explaining 
the ‘inability of the masses to transform it’ (…) ‘We can conceive of a change 
only through the intervention of specialists, grammarians, logicians; but 
experience shows us that all such meddling have failed’ (Saussure, 1974 in 
McNeil and Feldman, 1998, 301). 
 
Hence the main character of language is its immutability:
32
   
 
Of all social institutions, language is least amenable to initiative. It blends 
with the life of society, and the latter, inert by nature, is a prime conservative 
force. (Saussure, 1974 in McNeil and Feldman, 1998, 301). 
 
                                                 
32 The principle of immutability does not mean that language does not evolve with time; it 
evolves because it is linked to a community of speakers (une masse parlante) whose 
relations are subject to change. In fact it is the principle of continuity ‘which cancels 
freedom’ which implies change, ‘varying degrees of shifts in the relationship between the 
signified and the signifier’ (Saussure, 1974 in McNeil and Feldman, 1998, 303).  
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We find the same problem of ‘immutability’ in Althusserian structuralism. In 
addition to the repressive apparatuses Althusser states the existence of a 
plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses
33 – the educational, familial, 
religious, the political, the juridical, the trade union, the communications and 
the cultural ISAs – which function primarily through ideology to secure the 
ideological conditions of the relations of production (Mouffe, 1981, 168). But 
by exercising its domination both by violence and by ideology, according to 
Mouffe the domination of the ruling class becomes almost total, and the 
possibility of historical change, therefore, becomes only conceivable as the 
destruction of these ideological state apparatuses. Althusser’s theory of 
ideologies invokes hence a paradoxical disappearance of politics: in the 
context of the omnipotence of dominant ideology and in the absence of a 
‘grand soir’, any historical change becomes impossible. In the same way, if 
language or society are considered as systems, or as some closed system of 
relation, immutability becomes one of their prominent characteristics and it is 
hardly possible to get out of these systems. Linguistic change like social 
change is unlikely to happen, because a system is characterized by the 
continuity of its structure. If this does not constitute a problem for semiologists 
it does for radical left political theorists who try to ground theoretically the 
possibility of political changes and emancipation.  
 
                                                 
33 The same impossibility of change can be found in Althusser’s interpretation of the state. 
For him the Marxist theory of the state operates a distinction between state power and state 
apparatus. State power may be affected by ‘revolutions’, ‘coup d’état’ etc., without 
affecting or modifying the state apparatus. The bourgeois revolutions of 1830, 1848, the 
fall of the empire in 1870 in France, and the coup of 1958 etc., illustrate it perfectly 
(Althusser, 1984, 14). He sums up: ‘1) the State is the repressive State apparatus 2) State 
power and State apparatus must be distinguished 3) the objective of the class struggle 
concerns State power, and in consequence the use of the State apparatus by the classes (…) 
4) the proletariat must seize State power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State 
apparatus and, in a first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian, State apparatus, 
then in later phases set in motion a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the 
end of State power, the end of every State apparatus)’ (Althusser, 1984, 15).   
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II.iv. The concept of antagonism 
 
 
It is the theorisation of a discursive exterior or an antagonism that preserves 
Laclau and Mouffe from the status quo brought about by the structuralist point 
of view of social relations and of their immutability. If a discursive totality 
never exists in the form of a simple and delimited positivity, the relational 
logic is always incomplete and ‘pierced by contingency’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, 110). This is in fact what makes articulatory practice possible.  
 
There is no social identity fully protected from a discursive exterior that 
deforms it and prevents it becoming fully sutured. Both the identities and the 
relations lose their necessary character. As a systematic structural ensemble, 
the relations are unable to absorb the identities; but as the identities are purely 
relational, this is but another way of saying that there is no identity which can 
be fully constituted (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 111).  
 
That’s why Laclau and Mouffe abandon the premise of ‘society’ as a sutured 
and self-defined totality and insist on the open character of discursive 
totalities. This also explains why they insisted so much on the necessity to 
overcome Marxist dualism and conception of the economy as the bearer of the 
other structures.  
 
There is no single underlying principle fixing – and hence constituting – the 
whole field of differences. The irresoluble interiority/exteriority tension is the 
condition of any social practice: necessity only exists as a partial limitation of 
the field of contingency. It is in this terrain, where neither a total interiority 
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nor a total exteriority is possible, that the social is constituted. (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, 111) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe transform the Saussurean sign as the name for a split, ‘of 
an impossible suture between signified and signifier’. The fact that there is no 
ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be only partial fixations, 
thus every identity never manages to be fully fixed, and its fixity – its identity 
– is always precarious. That’s why, for Laclau and Mouffe, the status of the 
elements composing a discourse is that of ‘floating signifiers’, ‘incapable of 
being wholly articulated to a discursive chain’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
113). The impossibility of fixing meaning in a sutured space because of the 
existence of this discursive exterior has some implications that we need to 
consider. It denies an identity by preventing its constitution as an objectivity, 
as a closed structural system. In other words this ‘outside’ negates the full 
identity of the elements articulated within a discourse. This ‘exterior’ or 
constitutive outside is not the reintroduction of the category of the extra-
discursive, for the exterior is constituted by other discourses (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, 146). This throws up an alternative according to Laclau:  
 
Either the element of negativity is reabsorbed by a positivity of a higher order 
which reduces it to mere appearance; or the negation is irreducible to any 
objectivity, which means that it becomes constitutive and therefore indicates 
the impossibility of establishing the social as an objective order (Laclau 1990, 
16). 
 
The first part of the alternative – that the negativity is reabsorbed by a 
positivity – is found in philosophies of history such as the Hegelian one. With 
a concept such as ‘cunning of reason’ Hegel asserted indeed ‘the rationality of 
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the real at the expense of reducing antagonism, negativity to an appearance 
through which a higher form of rationality and positivity works’ (Laclau, 
1990, 16). The second part of the alternative – the constitutive nature of the 
negative – can be found within Marxist texts through the idea of ‘class 
struggles’. This privileges the moment of negativity as a basis of historical 
change. However, within Marxist theory the moment of negativity was finally 
reabsorbed through the process of the revolution and the rise of a communist 
society. With Laclau and Mouffe the negativity becomes absolutely 
constitutive because it cannot be a moment of a positivity. It ‘blocks the 
identity of the “inside”, in other words it blocks the identity of the elements 
from becoming absolutely necessary and introduces contingency in the 
constitution or destitution of these identities’ (Laclau, 1990, 17). It becomes an 
antagonism, ‘which prevents the constitution of objectivity itself’ through the 
suturing of the discursive structure. In that sense Laclau can state the 
assumption in his text Psychoanalysis and Marxism that, with the discursive 
outside being constitutive and radical, there is no Aufhebung: negativity 
cannot be absorbed in an internal moment of higher unity as was the case in 
the Hegelian conception of the real (Laclau, 1990, 98). 
 
Antagonism is a heterogeneous discourse that negates a given order, and is 
therefore the limit of that order, ‘and not the moment of a broader totality in 
relation to which the two poles of the antagonism would constitute difference 
i.e. partial instances’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 126). The existence of a 
plurality of discourses grounds the definition of the social as an order which 
always fails to constitute itself as an objective order.
34
 Antagonism is hence 
                                                 
34 Laclau and Mouffe distinguish antagonism from Hegelian contradiction and from Kantian 
‘real opposition’ (Realrepugnanz, or principle of contrariety). The meaning of 
contradiction is understood here not in the sense that the real itself would be contradictory 
(as in the theory of the ‘dialectic’) but in the sense that contradictions exist within the real. 
In the case of contradiction and real opposition the two elements in the relation have fully 
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this Other which reveals the impossibility of any closure, and is the experience 
of the limits of the social and of objectivity’ (Laclau, 1990, 17).  
 
At the same time, as the identities are relational and would not be what it is 
outside the relationship with the force antagonizing it, the antagonism is also 
part of the conditions of existence of that identity (Laclau, 1990, 21). That’s 
why the antagonizing force fulfils two contradictory roles at the same time: 
first it blocks the full constitution of the identity to which it is opposed and 
thus shows its contingency. On the other hand it is constitutive of that 
unfulfilled identity (Laclau, 1990, 21). Moreover as antagonism implies the 
existence of different antagonic discursive formations, it necessarily implies 
the existence of several spaces of representation. An entity is heterogeneous 
with another if they are in an antagonic relationship: each of them interrupts 
the space of representation of the other, hence what Laclau calls ‘the inherent 
failure of representability’ (Laclau, 2006, 106). In other terms, antagonism is 
an interruption in the design of language to fix the system of differences in a 
sutured totality. Antagonism is always the place of a taboo, of an unspeakable: 
‘antagonism escapes the possibility of being apprehended through language, 
since language only exists as an attempt to fix that which antagonism subverts’ 
                                                                                                                                
constituted identities: contradiction and real opposition are objective facts. Laclau and 
Mouffe explain: ‘It is because A is fully A that being-not-A is a contradiction and therefore 
an impossibility. In the case of real opposition, it is because A is also fully A that its 
relation with B produces an objectively determinable effect’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 
124-125). On the one hand the opposition concerns concepts and in the other hand there is 
no real antagonic relations but a frontal opposition. 
 The situation concerning the logical implications contained within the antagonic relation is 
very different: far from being an objective relationship, antagonism is what reveals the 
limit of any objectivity: it is paradoxically a non-relational relation. ‘How so? From the 
viewpoint of each of the two antagonistic forces, its opponent is not an objective presence, 
completing the fullness of one’s own identity, but represents, on the contrary, that which 
makes reaching such a fullness impossible. This means that, as far as we remain within the 
perspective of each of the two antagonistic forces, the moment stricto senso of the clash, 
far from being objective, indicates the impossibility of society reaching a full objectivity’  
(Laclau, 2006, 104).  
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(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 125). In other words, the social is hence a 
permanent space of a reciprocal subversion between the attempt of objectivity 
and negativity. In a more general point of view, ‘the social only exists as the 
vain attempt to institute that impossible object: society’ writes Laclau (Laclau, 
1990, 92). 
  
Combined together, the Derridean influence and the Saussurean influence 
produce a very peculiar conception of political identities. Not only do they 
have to be entirely constructed, but they are also purely relational, that is 
negatively constituted. A centre has to be produced (as an analogy a fixed 
definition of mother will fix the meanings of ‘son’, ‘father’ etc. in a 
differential system). And because there is no fixed centre but that discursive 
identities are always threatened by an outside which negates them, they can’t 
ever be fully constituted within a sutured totality and their contents become 
perfectly open to a variety of equivalential rearticulations (Laclau, 2005, 42); 
this is a reality which, according to Laclau and Mouffe, must be preserved 
because the ‘social’ itself has an irreducible plural character, and any attempt 
to negate this plurality would be ‘totalitarian’. The unity of the revolutionary 
subject through the action of inevitable economic processes was a precondition 
for the rise of socialism in orthodox Marxist thought; in post-Marxism, it is the 
opposite which is valuable: as we already seen, the promotion of differences 
and plurality is the condition for the expansion of the democratic revolution 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 166). 
 
II.v. The Lacanian influence  
 
 
The absence of a fixed centre extends the field and the play of signification 
69 
infinitely (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 112). For Laclau and Mouffe, this 
implies that if there is meaning, there have to be partial fixations, otherwise 
the ‘flow of differences’ would be impossible. In the social process, state 
Laclau and Mouffe, there is another movement which tries to limit this 
infinitude, to ‘domesticate infinitude, to embrace it within the finitude of an 
order’ (Laclau, 1990, 91) or a structure. The social always excess the limits of 
the attempts to constitute society, but at the same time the impossible totality 
does not disappear. In the absence of any complete totalisation, a structure 
exists only as a field of signification within which a temporary order is 
constructed by a multiplicity of mutually substituting centres.  
 
Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of 
discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001, 112) 
  
Why is there a necessity for the construction of temporary orders? As Žižek 
has asked: why is there something – a centre, an order – rather than nothing at 
all (Žižek, in Laclau and Zak, 1994)? In the recent works of Laclau and 
Mouffe, there has been a tangible Lacanian shift, mostly due to Žižek’s 
critiques of post-Marxist conceptions of subject positions as we find in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. This shift consists in extending the domain 
of negativity to subjectivity itself by defining subjectivity as the domain of the 
precarious character of any structuration (Laclau, 1990, 92). This allows 
Laclau and Mouffe to justify the necessity of a precarious centre to order 
fragmentations. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge the fragmentation of 
all identities, but at the same time they claim that fragmentation only leads to 
chaos, and from pure negativity one cannot extract any practice of politics and 
creation of common values. As Laclau writes:  
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Contingency and fragmentation are not the end of the matter, because a 
discourse in which the meaning cannot be fixed is the discourse of the 
psychotic. (Laclau, 1990, 90) 
 
 
So what is the ground upon which one could make rest this necessary order 
which domesticates infinitude, which would not be an essence? For Laclau and 
Mouffe, the answer must be found within Lacanian psychoanalysis, and more 
particularly in its theorisation of the subject. Although antagonism plays this 
double role of negating the identities and preventing them from being fully 
themselves, at the same time it constitutes its identity by imposing its limits, 
and what is negated in social antagonism, according to Žižek, is in fact always 
already negated. The negation of the social antagonism is in fact always a 
negation of the negation (Žižek in Laclau, 1990, 249-254). What is negated in 
a social antagonism is a subject of lack, a split subject who is trying to 
establish itself as a fully achieved identity through acts of identification 
(Torfing, 1999, 52). The influence of Lacanian theory leads Laclau and 
Mouffe to conceive the social as structured around a ‘certain traumatic 
impossibility’ as Žižek stated it in an article of 1987, ‘around a certain fissure 
which cannot be symbolized’ (see Žižek in Laclau, 1990, 249). More precisely 
Laclau and Mouffe have transposed the Lacanian notion of the Real as 
impossible within the social field. The idea of the impossibility of society, 
which is grounded on ‘antagonism’ is the political transposition of the 
Lacanian notion of the Real as impossible.  
 
It is because there is a lack which centres the subject that antagonism is 
constitutive. The aspiration of a political order is the negation of a negation 
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which is the negativity inscribed within the subject: its incapacity to be a 
totality. As I have mentioned above, the problem is to justify the negation of 
antagonism by the attempt to construct a centre. If we deny the existence of a 
structure, then we need to replace its ordering effect by something else. In 
Lacanian psychoanalysis it is the search for the jouissance which is at the basis 
of this research.  
 
To fully understand this notion and its implications for politics within the post-
Marxist framework, I have to analyse it in relation to the two other parts of the 
triptych Imaginary-Symbolic-Real. But first let’s begin with the Lacanian 
theory of the subject as a lack, as the locus of an impossible identity, which 
tallies with the post-structuralist interpretation of Saussurean linguistics. The 
first subversion operated within the notion of the subject happened with 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious, which denounced the modern ‘cogito’ as a 
basis to understand subjectivity as a pure mirage (see Stavrakakis, 1999, 15). 
Lacan, like the post-structuralists who reduce the subject to a set of subject 
positions, eliminates the locus of the subject but contrary to them he 
introduces an alternative definition of subjectivity.
35
 From childhood, the 
human being lives the experience of fragmentation. First, during the ‘mirror 
stage’, a period from the sixth to the eighteenth month of life, the 
fragmentation experienced by the infant is transformed ‘into an affirmation of 
its bodily unity through the assumption of its image in the order’ (Stavrakakis, 
1999, 17). But this jubilation provoked by the success of integrating this 
fragmentation into an imaginary totality is ended soon after by the continuous 
fragmentary character of the infant’s experiences of its real body. The ego is 
the synthesis of an original ‘inchoate collection of desires’ then always an 
alien alter-ego (Lacan, 1993, 39 in Stavrakakis, 1999, 18). The infant’s unity is 
hence imaginarily constituted through the identification with its own image, 
                                                 
35 Contrary to the classical views, the subject is not reducible to consciousness or to the ego. 
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which always contains within itself an element of difference, of otherness. In 
that sense, ‘every purely imaginary equilibrium or balance with the other is 
always marked by a fundamental instability’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, 18). 
 
This alienating dimension of the ego is the reason for the failure of a stable 
identity. Nevertheless, the register in which the ego will be capable of 
acquiring a stable identity is the symbolic register to which belongs the field of 
linguistic representation. It is the symbolic which gives consistency to the ego 
and then creates a subject. The symbolic is a guide beyond the imaginary 
order; it is the register of language, and will be used by the infant to acquire a 
stable identity.  
 
By submitting to the laws of language, the infant becomes a subject in 
language, (…) and hopes to gain an adequate representation through the 
world of words: the symbolic provides a form into which the subject is 
inserted at the level of his being. It’s on this basis that the subject recognises 
himself as being this or that. (Lacan, 1993, 179; Stavrakakis, 1999, 20)  
 
If the symbolic creates the subject and if the symbolic is the field of language, 
then it is the signifier that creates an identity and hence determines the subject. 
Not only does the signifier determine the subject, but the subject comes into 
being by agreeing to be represented by the signifier. The symbolic order is 
constitutive for the subject. This is what Lacan describes as the ‘pre-eminence 
of the signifier over the subject’ (Lacan 1988, 51, see also Stavrakakis, 1999, 
20). Becoming an effect of the signifier, the subject is in a certain way 
subordinated to the laws of the symbolic, which simultaneously acquires 
power. Regarding the relation between signifier and signified in Lacanian 
theory, I shall mention the fact that for Lacan – as was the case for Saussure – 
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meaning is produced by the signifier, and not by the signified, and thus the 
symbolic is the order of the signifier (Lacan, 1993, 292). The implications of 
the constitutive alienation in the imaginary and the symbolic for a theory of 
subjectivity are the following ones: the fullness of identity that the subject is 
seeking is impossible both on the imaginary and on the symbolic level. The 
subject is doomed to symbolise in order to constitute her or himself as such, 
but this symbolisation cannot capture the totality and singularity of the real 
body, the close-circuit of the drives. Symbolisation, that is to say the pursuit of 
identity itself, introduces lack and makes identity ultimately impossible’ 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, 29). 
 
Because alienation is constitutive of the subject, and that the constitution of 
subject is this movement towards an impossible identity, Lacan can state that 
an irreducible lack is inscribed within the subjective structure. Moreover, the 
determination of the subject operates as the constitution of a lack. 
Identification is the only possible solution to construct a stable identity, either 
on the imaginary or the symbolic level, and the subject of lack emerges 
through the failure of these attempts at identifications. Indeed, identifications 
cannot result in stable subjective identities for their only horizon is failure. 
Laclau writes:  
 
The identification never reaches the point of a full identity; any act is an act 
of reconstruction, which is to say that the creator will search in vain for the 
seventh day of rest. (Laclau, 1990, 60)   
 
This concept of identification is central in both Lacanian and post-Marxist 
theories. The condition of entry within the symbolic order is a loss, the 
exclusion of something through an act of decision; it is then a dual process: on 
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the one hand, in order to gain the symbolic world, we have to accept the 
symbolic laws of language, and then make a sacrifice and accept that 
symbolisation can never be total, and on the other hand, for Lacan this 
acceptance allows the subject to live a neurotic – normal – life, by entering the 
social world in which he or she can constitutes him or herself as a desiring 
subject at the level of language. On the opposite side, the psychosis appears 
when the signifier fails to appear and when identifications within the symbolic 
order become impossible.
36
 
 
Laclau contends that it is the impossible return to unity and completion in a 
formal sense that the subject seeks through his identification with a subject 
position. A priori any content is theoretically capable of occupying that space. 
Because the subject is a subject of lack and his identity is marked with 
indeterminacy, he is caught in an endless and impossible search for completion 
and is thereby driven to perform an infinite series of identifications (Smith, 
1998, 76). Only the phantasmatic realm offers a full conception of the social. 
How do we operate the passage from a purely subjective level (the Lacanian 
subject) to an objective level (the level of political identities)? Does not the 
objective domain of politics obey a different set of theoretical concepts and 
analysis? How can we ground a political theory upon a purely subjective 
theory? This is possible precisely because within Lacanian theory the 
individual/collective and subjective/objective bipolarities are deconstructed. 
Indeed, both the subjective (the subject) and the objective (the other) lack 
domains.  
                                                 
36 In Lacanian terms, the Name-of-the-Father that designates the primary signifier which 
supports the matrix of significations, and which destroys the imaginary relation of 
identification between the ‘Mother’ and the child, is not accepted and the psychotic cannot 
constitutes himself as a subject of the signifier within the symbolic order. Then, the lack of 
the symbolic is covered by imaginary constructions which take the form of delusions 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, 32). 
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If I need to identify with something it is not because all my attempts to 
acquire it by identifying with a supposedly full Other are failing. 
Identification becomes thinkable only as a result of the lack within the 
structure, the structure of the social Other. The objective as a closed totality is 
a semblance; the objective Other is lacking (Stavrakakis, 1999, 41). 
 
From a Lacanian perspective, those investments are made not because the 
signifiers have specific meanings that resonate organically within a given 
context, but because the ‘empty signifiers’ promise to deliver a jouissance, the 
primal unity and completion that was foreclosed at the entry into language. 
The objects of identifications have to represent a fullness to be attractive to the 
subject of lack (see Laclau, 1990, 63). Laclau especially, inspired by Lacan’s 
works and by Žižek’s critiques, has hence gone further than the theory of 
hegemony of Gramsci by emphasizing the formal character of hegemonic 
discourse. Laclau argues that the most important aspect of a hegemonic 
discourse consists primarily in the function of giving order and coherence to a 
social imaginary, and not in its content. This is due to the fact that a 
hegemonic discourse has a ‘filling function’ as it offers compensation to the 
subject of lack, who is condemned to the endless search for completion 
through identification. Laclau’s Lacanian shift could appear in this respect as a 
departure not only from post-structuralist theory, but also from the Gramscian 
tradition, for Gramsci insists that ‘a political discourse will only resonate with 
“the people” insofar as it organically resonates in some way with popular 
traditions’ (Smith, 1998, 80-81). However, Laclau does not completely reject 
the post-structuralist and Gramscian approaches, as he argues that if the 
contents of a political discourse are of secondary consideration in contrast to 
their formal characteristics (Laclau, 1994, 3) this implies that they still remain 
some significance. A hegemonic discourse must be more than the formal 
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embodiment of order itself.  
 
This does not mean, of course, that any discourse putting itself forward as the 
embodiment of fullness will be accepted. The acceptance of a discourse 
depends on its credibility, and this will not be granted if its proposal clashes 
with the basic principles informing the organisation of a group. (Laclau 1990, 
66) 
 
By integrating the Lacanian justification of the necessity of order, not only do 
Laclau and Mouffe distinguish themselves from post-modernists such as 
Lyotard who only advocates practices of interruption, displacement and 
subversion (Lyotard, 1984, 16-17) or ‘local determinism’ as what make unique 
political practice possible, but they demarcate themselves from Deleuze and 
Guattari, for whom the processes of identification introduce a form of 
transcendence that leads to a form of repression of the singularities, inherently 
present in the social. As was mentioned above, the real is fragmentary, plural 
and heterogeneous but at the same time, a discourse which does not overcome 
this state of reality is the discourse of the psychotic. That’s why a discourse is 
simultaneously an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to construct a 
centre. For Mouffe for example, ‘any “extreme pluralism” that fails to value 
the construction of a “we”, a collective identity that would articulate the 
demands found in different struggles against subordination, dangerously 
negates the political just as liberalism does with its illusions of neutral 
procedures and universal rationality’ (Mouffe, 1996, 247, Smith, 1998, 146). 
 
This adoption of Lacanian concepts is highly problematic, especially when 
Laclau in his latest works, separates the content of identification which is 
irrelevant, from the function of identification. In a text that I will analyse in 
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more depth in Chapter 3, Laclau (with Zak) argues that: 
 
The content of a political discourse is almost irrelevant, for it is the formal 
framework of a political discourse that makes it compelling for “the people”. 
Various political signifiers may appear to operate differently, but they are all 
“empty signifiers”, blank spaces whose organisational form – and not its 
content – compels phantasmatic investments. (Laclau and Zak, 1994, 36) 
 
This poses a number of ethical and political problems that I will develop in the 
following chapters; for Laclau, there is no particular discourse or no particular 
order that is better or worse in itself than any others. He doesn’t appear 
interested in the wider ethical question as to the nature of the order chosen; on 
the contrary he claims that it is almost not relevant, since what is important is 
the function of the order chosen. This absence of ethics or normative 
commitment for a radical politics will be highly criticized by a number of 
theorists such as Robinson and Tormey who will accuse the theory of the 
‘lack’ of being responsible for this normative absence. Before going on with 
the exposition of this debate, let’s recall how the influences of Saussure, 
Derrida and Lacan altogether produce Laclau and Mouffe’s unique post-
structuralist theory of the construction of political subjectivities.  
 
II.vi. The post-Marxist strategy of hegemony 
   
 
The post-structuralist notion of hegemony is the true novelty of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s political philosophy. The reinterpretation of Gramsci within a post-
structuralist theoretical environment is what gives post-Marxism its originality 
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as regards the other post-structuralist currents. Introduced within the 
framework of an open system of relational identities, hegemony loses its 
‘essentialist’ remnant, namely a fundamental class as its ultimate core and 
articulating subject. Hegemony is no longer to be conceived in terms of the 
unification of political forces around a set of interests previously constituted. 
Rather, hegemony involves the articulation of identities which are wholly 
constructed through discourse. As we have previously stated, no interests flow 
directly from one structural position. Subjects are constituted in a contingent 
way through the process of identification with subject positions. Hegemony is 
then defined as the articulation of floating elements in a process of 
confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices and therefore suppose 
phenomena of ‘equivalence’ and ‘frontier effects’ (see Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001, 135-136). 
 
If everything is discourse, as we have previously explained, the hegemonic 
force and the ensemble of hegemonised elements would constitute themselves 
on the same plane, which is the plane of the general field of discursivity.
37
 
This means that for Laclau and Mouffe, the terrain in which the hegemonic 
articulation operates is itself the product of that articulation. Namely the 
dichotomisation of society into two camps or classes is itself the product of the 
hegemonic articulation. It does not pre-exist it as a necessary framework for 
the logic of articulation to arise. The main consequence of this radical 
constructivist interpretation of Gramsci is that we cannot predict in advance 
                                                 
37 ‘Hence, if the exteriority supposed by the articulatory practice is located in the general 
field of discursivity, it cannot be that corresponding to two systems of fully constituted 
differences. It must therefore be the exteriority existing between subject positions located 
within certain discursive formations and “elements” which have no precise discursive 
articulation. It is this ambiguity which makes possible articulation as a practice instituting 
nodal points which partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of 
differences’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 135).  
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which movement or group ‘will become the hegemonic agent, for this depends 
upon the specific conditions that obtain in a given historical formation’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 135). This is a departure from the traditional 
conception of the centrality of the proletariat but it is also a partial departure 
from the Saussurean theory of relational identities. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe 
acknowledge that although subject positions are constituted through their 
differential relations, some of these relations have more force than others.  
 
A single subject position may, in a particular context, become privileged such 
that the meaning of other subject positions becomes increasingly defined 
through their relations with that position. (Smith, 1998, 98) 
 
This is this privileged position that is called in a post-Marxist framework a 
‘nodal point’ or point de capiton. These nodal points, which act as ‘centres’ of 
a discursive formation, tend to totalise several discourses so that their 
elements partially lose their floating character. In the Gramscian framework a 
fundamental class always played this role of ‘centre’ in the constitution of a 
hegemony. Within a post-Marxist framework it is unpredictable and 
impossible to determine in advance which subject position will play this role. 
The primacy of some subject positions constituted in nodal points is 
furthermore always temporary and could always be interrupted by new 
articulations. There is always a risk of a subversion of an articulation, – as for 
example in fascism – and that is because a system thus created is never a 
closed totality of elements linked by necessary relations but an open formation 
where the identities of the subject positions are never completely constituted, 
but precarious and contingent (See Laclau, 2005).  
 
Indeed, a hegemonic process tends to divide society between two camps or 
two great discourses. That is why Laclau and Mouffe, following Schmitt’s 
arguments, can affirm that the distinction friend/enemy is necessarily present 
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in the hegemonic process.
38
 It is worth recalling now the main assumption we 
analysed in the second part of our chapter: the affirmation of the irreducible 
character of social plurality or division. Combined with the hegemonic 
characteristic of politics, it means that ‘radical democracy’, in the post-Marxist 
sense, is an unending process of articulation-rearticulation, an ‘unending war 
of position’, in which ‘politics’ can’t be annihilated and in which the attempt 
of closure and end of politics would be totalitarian (Mouffe, 1996, 24-25). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian forms of dictatorship, 
Laclau and Mouffe affirm that today the main totalitarian menace comes from 
the bureaucratic apparatus of modern democracies that accompanies the 
neutralisation and depoliticisation of the ‘people’. Indeed, the most 
fashionable liberal discourses today proclaim the ‘end of politics’ under the 
banner of ‘deliberative democracy’.  
 
Rejecting the “aggregative” model of democracy as negotiation of interests 
which, with the development of mass democracy had become the standard 
consensus, contemporary liberals advocate a different view of the nature of 
the liberal-democratic consensus. They affirm that a simple modus vivendi is 
not enough, and that a democratic society requires a stronger form of 
consensus, a moral one, based on impartiality and resulting from rational 
deliberation. (Mouffe, 1999, 3) 
 
Antagonism, that which precludes any form of rational resolution through 
deliberation is completely erased here. The denial of conflicts does not make 
them disappear. For Mouffe, ‘to recognize the constitutive role of power 
relations implies abandoning the misconceived ideal of a reconciled 
democratic society’ (Mouffe, 1999, 4). To avoid both the Stalinist form of 
                                                 
38 More specifically, Laclau and Mouffe name popular struggles as a particular form of 
hegemonic struggles where certain discourses tendentially construct the division of a single 
political space into two opposite fields (as opposed to democratic struggles where these 
imply a plurality of political spaces) (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 137). 
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totalitarianism and the totalitarianism of certain liberal discourses, Laclau and 
Mouffe affirm that, even in a socialist-like society, politics – which contains 
an ineradicable dimension of conflict – will continue to exist. Nevertheless, 
the political aim of Laclau and Mouffe is the construction of a society where 
antagonism would be replaced by ‘agonism’. In an antagonistic relationship, 
the two antagonists share no common grounds: they are antithetic and negate 
each other. Within an agonistic relationship, the two elements are not enemies 
but adversaries, that is they share a common symbolic ground and this is the 
condition of possibility of pluralism. As an alternative to socialism as the main 
project of the Left, the final project of post-Marxism is hence to construct an 
‘agonistic pluralist democracy’.  
 
The discussion above leads us to expose the project of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
radical democracy: ‘socialism is one of the components of the project of 
radical democracy, and not vice-versa’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 178), and 
the other components are anti-sexism, anti-racism, etc., and all other separate 
struggles who fight against domination and work for equality and liberty. This 
implies a decentralisation of the centre of power, and the proliferation of 
political spaces. This leads also to a reconsideration of revolutionary politics. 
Revolutionary actions are implied within the process of ‘war of position’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 178) but they must be considered as an internal 
moment of this process. Indeed for Laclau and Mouffe:  
 
The classic conception of socialism supposed that the disappearance of the 
private ownership of the means of production, would set up a chain of effects 
which, over a whole historical epoch, would lead to the extinction of all forms 
of subordination. Today we know that this is not so. There are not, for 
example, necessary links between anti-sexism and anti-capitalism, and a unity 
between the two can only be the result of a hegemonic articulation. (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001, 178) 
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It is the same thing with ecology: socialism is not necessarily linked to 
ecology. In a radical democracy project, socialization of the means of 
production cannot simply mean workers self-management but it must mean a 
social appropriation of production, ‘a participation of all subjects to decisions 
about what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and the forms in which 
the product is to be distributed’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 178) and must be 
articulated to ecological struggles in order to construct an anti-productivist 
form of socialism. This leads to three drastic changes in the classical 
conception of ‘socialism’ as an emancipatory project: 1) we should today 
speak of ‘emancipations’ rather than ‘Emancipation’. ‘Any struggle is a partial 
struggle and none can claim to embody the “global liberation of man”‘ 2) If 
struggles are partial, they nevertheless tend to extend to more and more subject 
positions, hence a proliferation of identities 3) There is a ‘de-universalization 
of the socialist project’, as socialism is just a part of the democratic revolution 
and must be articulated to other struggles, and these will vary from country to 
country. ‘For example, demands in a country subject to colonialist or racist 
subordination will not be the same as in a West European-style liberal 
democracy. The decomposition of the universalist project of one socialism 
would hence give rise to a variety of local “socialisms”’ (Laclau, 1990, 225).39   
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The peculiarity of post-Marxism is hence to combine, in terms of a strategy of 
emancipation(s), both gradualism and revolutionary politics. Indeed, the project of radical 
democracy is gradualist for it is conceived as a piecemeal realisation but at the same time, 
the internal moments of this project can be of a revolutionary nature, can proceed by 
successive ruptures with the old forms of domination.  
83 
II.vii. Concluding remarks  
 
 
Although the main goals and analyses of Laclau and Mouffe are shared by a 
number of post-structuralist thinkers – the refusal of totalitarianism and of the 
end of politics, the proliferation of political spaces, the decentralisation of the 
centre of power, etc., – some currents within poststructuralism refuse the 
hegemonic strategy defended by Laclau and Mouffe and their minimalist 
project for a social change. This is for example the case of thinkers who claim 
to be influenced by the radical thinkers Deleuze and Guattari, who have a 
totally different political imaginary. In the first section of my thesis, I have 
explored only one trend in post-structuralist political thought which is Laclau 
and Mouffe’s post-Marxism. There is nonetheless another fundamental trend 
which stands opposed to it. This line of demarcation within post-structuralism 
can be understood as two different trajectories issuing out of contemporary 
French philosophy: ‘a trajectory of transcendence, which includes Levinas and 
Derrida, and goes back through Husserl and Kant; and a trajectory of 
immanence, which includes Foucault and Deleuze, and goes back through 
Nietzsche to Spinoza’ according to Giorgio Agamben (Agamben in Smith, 
2003, 46). According to this typology Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
hegemony could be aligned with the trajectory of transcendence, due to their 
Lacanian conception of subject identifications, their conception of the 
antagonism as a transcendent other, the logic of the signifier and their 
conception of populist construction of identities, that I will analyse later. As 
such, it is the target of strong critiques by thinkers who attempt to think a 
strategy based on horizontal and non-representational practices. 
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Chapter 3 
Ontology of Lack versus Ontology of Abundance  
 
III.i. Overview 
 
 
While the first two chapters focused on the theoretical and political 
explanations for Laclau and Mouffe’s rupture with Marxism and structuralism, 
the last two chapters relate to the theoretico-political debates with and 
oppositions to other post-structuralist currents. The present chapter contrasts 
the ‘ontology of lack’ based on Lacanian psychoanalysis to the so-called 
‘ontology of abundance’ based on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (see 
Thomassen and Tonder, 2005, 5-9). The analysis of the so-called ‘ontology of 
lack’ in contrast to an ‘ontology of abundance’ will allow me to situate more 
precisely Laclau and Mouffe’s work in relation to other post-structuralist 
currents. 
 
In the first part I will focus on Mouffe’s critique of the Habermasian notion of 
consensus. First by discussing her emphasis on the conflictual nature of 
politics influenced by Carl Schmitt’s conception of politics, I will show that 
the notion of dissensus, linked to the notion of antagonism, is what 
differentiates Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy from other 
ones. For a better comprehension of the politics of dissensus, I will explore in 
more depth Laclau’s theory of empty signifiers and his conception of the 
hegemonic nature of construction of identities via their centring effects. In a 
second part, after having analysed the so-called ‘ontology of lack’ whose main 
85 
idea is that ‘being’ is characterized by the failure to constitute itself as a 
ground due to its fundamental manque-à-être, I will show in depth how this 
peculiar ontology acts like a justification of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of the 
hegemonic construction of identities. In the third part, I will focus on some 
critiques of the ontology of lack from methodological and political 
perspectives and oppose it to the philosophy of ‘abundance’ related to the 
philosophers Deleuze and Guattari, which in contrast to the idea of the 
ontology of lack thinks of being as a flow, focuses on the production of desires 
and affirms the priority of politics over philosophy. I will then critique the 
recent claims of a symmetry between the Lacanian conception of ontological 
lack and Deleuze and Guattari’s so-called ontology of abundance and will 
argue in favour of an ethical idea of ontology and philosophy like that of 
Deleuze and Guattari.  
 
86 
 
III.ii. Radical democracy and the rise of New Social Movements  
  
 
‘Radical democratic’ currents adopted the thesis defended by Claude Lefort in 
his well-known book L’Invention democratique (1981) according to which the 
‘democratic revolution’ inaugurated by the French Revolution of 1789 has 
accomplished a profound mutation in modern societies especially at a 
symbolic level which implied a new form of the institution of the social. This 
key moment is to be found in the French Revolution because its affirmation of 
the absolute power of the people introduced something completely new at the 
level of the social imaginary. Indeed, the Revolution, by abolishing the Ancien 
Régime whose power was theologically grounded, has transformed the locus 
of power into an empty place; with the theological-political order suppressed, 
the reference to a transcendence guarantor of the unity of the society 
considered as a body disappeared too. As a consequence, the foundations of 
power, law and knowledge were no longer assured and this opened the space 
for an unending process of questioning. For Laclau and Mouffe, following the 
idea of Lefort, the ‘democratic revolution’ began with ‘this break with the 
ancien régime, symbolized by the Declaration of the Rights of Man, [which] 
would provide the discursive conditions which made it possible to propose the 
different forms of inequality as illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus make 
them equivalent as forms of oppression’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 155). 
 
The representation of the ‘centre’ of society disappeared and it inaugurated a 
society which couldn’t be controlled or apprehended, and in which the people, 
whose identity fluctuates, is proclaimed sovereign. In this democratic context 
only, the attempts at re-establishing the symbolic unity that democracy had 
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destroyed would be totalitarian (Lefort, 1981, 173). The idea of the people in a 
democracy implies the notion of the multiple, plurality, and alterity as well as 
the notion of equality between men. These mutations regarding the centre of 
power and the growing influence of the values of liberty and equality has a 
profound link with the rise of new social movements in the 60s. Indeed, with 
this unending process of questioning and because of the equalitarian 
imaginary, the democratic logic and discourse is destined to expand to groups 
other than just white, male men. For instance, although liberal enlightenments 
were not meant to include women, the discourse of equality found in the 
French revolution, i.e., the idea that all individuals are born free and equal ‘has 
permitted the subversion of other relations of subordination into relations of 
oppression by means of the construction of an antagonism’, such as that of the 
subordination of women to men. ‘In the case of women we may cite as an 
example the role played in England by Mary Wollstonecraft, whose book 
Vindication of the Rights of Women, published in 1792, determined the birth of 
feminism through the use made in it of the democratic discourse, which was 
thus displaced from the field of political equality between citizens to the field 
of equality between the sexes’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 154). This 
interpretation is directly influenced by what Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out: 
‘It is impossible to believe that equality will not finally penetrate as much into 
the political worlds as into other domains. It is not possible to conceive of men 
eternally unequal among themselves on one point, and equal on others; at a 
certain moment, they will come to be equal on all points’ (Tocqueville, 1985, 
Vol. 1, 115, quoted in Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 156).  
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, the rise of so-called ‘new social movements’ 
since the 60s attests of this logic of expansion, the will to ‘expand equality into 
every area of life’, showing therefore the phenomenal multiplication of 
struggles which have been rendered possible by the democratic discourse. 
They also show the continuity between nineteenth century struggles and the 
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‘new social movements’ as they share the same democratic imaginary. As 
Laclau and Mouffe state:  
 
The unsatisfactory term ‘new social movements’ groups together a series of 
highly diverse struggles: urban, ecological, anti-authoritarian, anti-
institutional, feminist, anti-racist, ethnic, regional or that of sexual minorities. 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 159) 
 
But what has to be pointed out is: 
 
the novel role they play in articulating that rapid diffusion of social 
conflictuality to more and more numerous relations which is characteristic 
today of advanced industrial societies. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 159-160) 
 
Its main consequence is the challenge to relations of oppression and 
domination and the possibility of creating a politics of emancipations.  
 
On the other hand, these new struggles have been constituted through their 
antagonistic relationship to recent forms of subordination, derived from the 
implantation and expansion of capitalist relations of production and the 
growing intervention of the state and are therefore in discontinuity with the 
previous movements. These new conditions characterizing late capitalism 
define different shapes of struggles, and as these new antagonisms are the 
expression of forms of resistance to commodification, bureaucratization and 
increasing homogenization of social life, ‘it explains why they should 
frequently manifest themselves through a proliferation of particularism, and 
crystallize into a demand for autonomy itself’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, 164). 
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According to Laclau and Mouffe, the pluralism contained within these 
struggles reveals the irreducible pluralist character of the social itself; and far 
from being a problem to resolve, it is on the contrary the sign of the 
‘expansion and deepening of the democratic revolution’. As I have shown in 
Chapter 1 and 2, this defence of pluralism must be put in the larger context of 
Derridean post-structuralist currents of the rejection of Hegelian dialectics and 
of elaboration of a new conception of difference, with Laclau and Mouffe’s 
notion of ‘antagonism’ being a variant of it. For Derrida, contrary to Hegel, 
there is a supremacy of difference over identity ‘that is, that identity is always 
potentially disrupted by the differences within it that it cannot subsume’ (Little 
and Lloyd, 2009, 6). Identities are thus always multiple, precarious and none 
can pretend to absolute universality. It is linked to the existence of pluralism 
which is the condition of possibility of democratic politics. Democracy is 
intrinsically linked to pluralism and to preserve democracy is to preserve those 
differences which have been reduced in the past to a moment of a higher 
identity, unity, as it is conceived in the Hegelian conception of dialectics.   
 
III.iii.a. Rational consensus versus politics of dissensus 
 
 
According to Moya Lloyd and Adrian Little in their book The politics of 
radical democracy (2009), we can draw a broad classification of radical 
democrats who criticize the Marxist heritage of the left in two trends. All the 
various theories of radical democracy defend the extension of notions of 
equality and liberty to more and more areas of social life. These trends come 
from the crisis of the left and especially that of Marxism within the principal 
communist parties in the 60s and 70s, and with this crisis the notion of ‘radical 
democracy’ has tended to replace the word of ‘socialism’ which was perceived 
as too narrow and too centred on the dimension of economic work to the 
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detriment of new equalitarian demands expressed within new social 
movements. First of all, according to Iris Young, Moya Lloyd and Adrian 
Little, there is a broad group of radical democrats inspired in their critiques of 
Marxism by the theories of the Frankfurt School, mainly Adorno and 
Horkheimer mainly (cf. Young, 2000, 183, in Lloyd and Little, 2009, 2). This 
group is mainly formed by Claus Offe, Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato, Jürgen 
Habermas, Nancy Fraser and Iris Young herself. The first group or ‘critical 
theory radical democrats’ emphasizes the possibility of a rational consensus, 
achieved through deliberation according to normatively grounded procedures; 
this is typical of Habermas’ work.  
 
A second broad group of post-Marxist theorists are mainly inspired by the 
French post-structuralism of Derrida and Foucault, or by so-called ‘French 
Theory’, which is blended with typical Marxist analysis of the world (see 
Cusset, 2003). Post-structuralist radical democrats emphasize dissensus, 
conflicts, antagonism/agonism as the core of politics. Its members share ‘an 
emphasis on the primacy of the political, on the contingency of identity 
formation, and on the agonistic nature of democratic politics’ (Mark Wenman, 
2009, 112). The second group includes Laclau and Mouffe of course but also 
Judith Butler, William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Claude Lefort, Jacques 
Rancière, and Sheldon Wolin, even if this appellation would be rejected by 
some of them (Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd, 2009, 4). The two groups of 
post-Marxists are thus extremely different; they are opposed by a different 
conception of power. Indeed the first group considers that reason stands over 
power, and the second group considers that democratisation is the result of a 
force relationship embodied by hegemonic practices. A theoretical battle 
opposes one group to the other and Chantal Mouffe has been particularly 
active in the critique of Habermas’ notion of rational consensus (see her The 
Democratic Paradox). It would be useful here to look closer at Mouffe’s 
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critiques since this would allow us to display once again her definition of 
politics.  
 
III.iii.b. The Habermasian theory of rational consensus and its 
critique  
 
 
If we want a pacific society, writes Habermas, there is no other alternative 
than to construct politics on the principles of communicative action, or on the 
mutual understanding characteristic of rational consensus. According to 
Habermas, any interaction in fact presupposes communicative action, that is, 
some criteria of argumentation:  
 
(a) the openness and full inclusion of everybody affected, b) the symmetrical 
distribution of communication rights, c) the absence of force in a situation in 
which only the forceless force of the better argument is decisive, and d) the 
sincerity of the utterances of everybody affected. (Habermas, 1999, 48, 
quoted in Thomassen, 2008, 17) 
 
Following Mouffe’s argumentation, Lasse Thomassen undertakes to show that 
not only is the presupposition of a rational consensus at the basis of 
communicative action contradicted by experience but mainly that this theory 
suffers from inherent limits, and impassable logical aporias.
40
 For Mouffe, 
who, according to Lasse Thomassen, sometimes modifies the meaning of some 
Habermasian texts, the obstacles to the realisation of the ideal speech situation 
                                                 
40  Aporias are difficulties in a system which the system cannot solve with its own conceptual 
resources.  
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and to the consensus without exclusion that it would bring about, are inscribed 
within the democratic logic itself. Indeed, the free and unconstrained public 
deliberation of all matters of common concern goes against the democratic 
requisite of drawing a frontière between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. According to 
Thomassen, here Mouffe relies on Schmitt’s argument that:  
 
…since democracy involves the identity of rulers and ruled in the demos, 
democracy also requires the establishment of the limits of the demos, as well 
as the creation of an antagonistic frontier between “us” (the demos) and 
“them”’. (Thomassen, 2008, 26) 
 
A deliberative democracy based on the notions of rational discourse and 
rational consensus is in opposition with true democracy which involves the 
exclusion of those who are not part of ‘us’. Hence the democratic speech 
situation described by Habermas is impossible because of the constitutivity of 
antagonism in democratic politics. Seen in this light,  
 
Habermas attempts the impossible, namely to create a universal “we” without 
a corresponding (excluded) “them”. (Thomassen, 2007, 26)  
 
In fact, argues Mouffe, dissensus and difference are the conditions of 
possibility of rational discourse; that’s why a rational consensus would mean 
the end of discourse itself. Mouffe argues that:  
 
Democratic consensus is conceived as an asymptotic approaching to the 
regulative idea of a free unconstrained communication, and the obstacles are 
perceived as being of an empirical nature. [In agonistic democracy] one 
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acknowledges the conceptual impossibility of a democracy in which justice 
and harmony would be instantiated. Perfect democracy would indeed destroy 
itself. (Mouffe, 2000, 137)  
 
According to Thomassen, Habermas himself recognises the self-defeating 
character of the idea of a final and rational consensus, even as a conceptual 
possibility (Habermas, 1996, in Thomassen, 2008, 28). Not only does it 
contradict the central presupposition of rational argumentation, namely the 
openness to contestation of any norm or validity claim, but furthermore it 
would simply mean the end of human history. The aporia is thus that rational 
consensus is implied within communication but at the same time it means the 
end of communication. Does this mean for Mouffe that no consensus can ever 
be achieved on any political matter? It is not very clear if Mouffe talks of the 
guarantee of the possibility of conflicts or of their actual presence. Is a society 
in which the resolution of conflict is conducted by rational arguments 
impossible? Is the possibility of resolving conflicts a given or are any conflicts 
ever to be solved by means of irrational acts of decision?  
 
Against the idea of a rational consensus in political life, Mouffe argues that 
what is truly constitutive of politics is irrationalism, acts of decision, and 
especially antagonism or the exclusion of other in the constitution of one’s 
own identity rather than deliberation with the other as Habermas would argue. 
According to her Schmittian conception of the political and to her Lacanian 
conception of language, the terrain of the political is constituted through 
power, like language, which is framed by a set of unquestioned assumptions 
such as master-signifiers that makes all discourses conditioned by authority.
41
 
For Mouffe, the idea of a neutral rational consensus free from power is flawed 
                                                 
41 I will focus on this point later.  
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conceptually because of the arbitrariness of language which is used within 
deliberation, and because politics fundamentally is a matter of conflict, 
exclusion and therefore violence. Mouffe explains:  
 
The psychoanalytical “ethics of the Real” (Žižek) is, in my view, particularly 
suited to a pluralist democracy. It does not dream of an impossible 
reconciliation because it acknowledges not only that the multiplicity of ideas 
of the good is irreducible but also that antagonism and violence are 
ineradicable. What to do with this violence, how to deal with this antagonism, 
those are the ethical questions with which a pluralistic-democratic politics 
will forever be confronted and for which there can never be a final solution. 
(Mouffe, 2000, 139) 
 
For Mouffe, the constitutivity of antagonism is intimately linked to the 
preservation of pluralism, which for her manifests itself through conflicts. She 
does not prove the universality for all time and all places of antagonism, but 
rather asks to ‘accept the permanence’ of it and of conflicts (Mouffe, 1995, 20) 
(see Robinson, 2004). Not only can antagonism not be transcended, but it also 
reveals ‘the essence of the political itself’ (Mouffe, 2005, 8) and the 
‘constitutive and primordial character of negativity’ (Laclau, 1990, 180). As I 
have shown, this is influenced by her Schmittian definition of the political as 
the friend/enemy dichotomy. The constitution of a hegemonic bloc needs to 
define itself against an exterior, another group excluded to allow for the 
articulation to exist. This excluded element must be defined as the 
embodiment of negativity and disorder, and presented as ‘anti-space, as anti-
community’ (Laclau, 1990, 69). Hence politics is based in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s minds on a necessary vertical process which involves necessarily 
representative politics. The concept of hegemony emphasizes indeed the 
necessity of representation and vertical relations of identity.   
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One question, or one paradox which will form the basis of the critiques 
addressed to Laclau and Mouffe in the third part of this chapter and in Chapter 
4 can be raised. The notion of antagonism in Laclau and Mouffe’s thought is 
playing an ambiguous role: indeed, on one hand its pure negativity unfolds on 
the rejection of the Hegelian conception of dialectics in which negativity was 
absorbed by a superior positivity and unity, and as a consequence differences 
and pluralities being not respected for what they truly are. Antagonism’s role 
is thence supposed to preserve pluralism and differences. However, on the 
other hand, the necessity of articulation between differences leads to the 
construction of hegemonic blocs, with the presence of empty signifiers 
realizing the precarious unity of the blocs. Thus the pluralities internal to the 
antagonism are subsumed under a form of totality, albeit a precarious one, and 
a form of universalism is still constructed, destroying at some level a part of 
this pluralism. This tension between the preservation of pluralism and the 
erasure of it will be strongly criticized by others defenders of pluralism, as we 
will later see. Post-Marxists have a normative commitment to pluralism; 
Mouffe claims that it is the principle over which the future leftist politics must 
be constructed’ (Mouffe 1996b, 246).42 However, the debate that opposes the 
politics of ‘transcendence’  on one side (including Laclau and Mouffe) and the 
politics of ‘immanence’ on the other (including Robinson and Tormey) 
focuses on this question of pluralism; both currents recognize the inalienable 
                                                 
42 This is also ‘linked to the idea of a pluralist emancipation (as defended by Laclau in 
Emancipation(s), 1994) founded on the egalitarian articulation of a series of social 
movements potentially universalistic, but with each resting on proper experiences and 
creating its own collective identities, inventing its own language to interpret the world and 
setting its own goals to transform it’ (cf. Balibar, 2009, 7-8). ‘Cet imperatif est l’idée d’une 
emancipation pluraliste (ou d’emancipations) fondée sur l’articulation égalitaire d’une 
série de mouvements sociaux potentiellement universalistes, mais dont chacun repose sur 
des experiences et crée “ses identit s” collectives propres, invente son propre langage pour 
“interpreter” le monde et fixe ses propres objectifs pour le “transformer” : le “vieux” 
mouvement ouvrier bien sûr, dont les luttes contre l’exploitation ne sont nullement 
perimées, meme si elles doivent s’adapter à des conditions nouvelles, mais aussi le 
féminisme, le mouvement écologiste, les revendications culturelles des “minorit s” 
opprimées’ (Balibar, 2009, 7-8). 
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existence of pluralism and differences within reality, but the dispute is centred 
around the question of knowing how one can develop a political strategy for a 
radical transformation of power relationships in our societies while preserving 
a part or the totality of these differences, and if one can or should compromise 
the existence or some levels of these pluralities.  
 
III.iv.a. The Ontology of lack  
 
 
In the following section, I shall show that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
empty signifiers and of articulations necessarily compromises pluralism, and 
this is what will be rejected by the philosophers of immanence who are bound 
up with an ‘ontology of abundance’. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is the empty 
signifier that renders possible the hegemonic process, as in any discourse. 
These empty signifiers can be demands, such as ‘peace, bread, land’ as in 
Russia in 1917, principles such as the ‘Rights of Man’ in prerevolutionary 
France of 1789, or even leaders, as in the Peronist movement. An empty 
signifier, whether a demand, an idea, a discourse or a name, is a ‘positive 
symbolic expression’ around which different demands or actions crystallize in 
becoming hegemonic or popular (Laclau, 2005, 82). In other words, demands 
become hegemonic in a process of the articulation of these demands, when one 
of the social demands, while remaining a particular demand, is able to stand in 
for other social demands, speaking for the people universally.  
 
One difference, without ceasing to be a particular difference, assumes the 
representation of an incommensurable totality. (Laclau, 2005, 70) 
 
97 
Hence the ‘catachrestical’ character of hegemony and of the political 
construction of the people. An empty signifier is empty in the sense that it can 
serve as a vessel for other social demands or represent them symbolically; but 
at the same time, the empty signifier, because it does not cease to represent a 
particular demand is never completely empty, ‘the remaining particular 
content of the empty signifier being “ontic” … its discursive function in 
condensing signification of the people being “ontological”’. (Laclau, 2005, 87) 
 
The existence of empty signifiers brings about a tension between on one hand 
the existence of difference and multiplicity and the concept of hegemony via 
the action of empty signifiers which implies a certain notion of universalism,
43
 
the transcendence of one’s particularities in order to create a united front 
between disparate struggles or demands. For Laclau this tension is a tension 
between two logics: the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. In his 
words, ‘all identity is constructed within this tension between the differential 
and equivalential logics... this means that in the locus of the totality, we find 
only this tension. What we have ultimately, is a failed totality; the place of an 
irretrievable fullness’ (Laclau, 2005, 70). These comings and goings between 
absence and presence, absence being characterized by fragmentation and 
                                                 
43 The status of the empty signifier with the other components of the differential system; 
Laclau calls it ‘a name’ rather than a concept. Indeed the notion of a concept includes the 
idea of subsumption of each component, or rather the content of the concept is found 
without alteration in every component of the group unified by the concept; it means that 
the concept must somehow be a universal and that the part of it shared by the other 
component is a positive feature that unifies all of them; yet we have just seen that each 
pole of an antagonism is unified by the opposition of all the elements to the force with 
which they are confronted; that’ s why it is impossible that the empty signifier could have 
a conceptual status. The issue of the empty signifier and its nominal character is mainly 
developed in Laclau’s The populist reason. Contrary to the conceptual idea of subsumption 
where the elements are unified by something they have in common, in the naming process, 
‘the unity of the object is only the retroactive effect of naming it’ (Laclau, 2006, 109); it 
means that for Laclau the name is the ground of the thing. Hence Laclau’s Lacanian shift 
appears as a radicalisation of the linguistic turn in political philosophy. 
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presence by unity or fullness through hegemony is said to refer to the logic of 
the subject itself; its fundamental lack being filled though a process of 
identifications by contents that determine its shape, form and possible action. 
Laclau is assuming that every political identity knows one single law of 
construction which is the hegemonic logic with an articulatory principle. What 
is questionable is that he asserts that the process of overdetermination by 
which a particular word condenses around itself a plurality of meanings is a 
universal process, that means, it is true for the constitution of every identity.
44
 
What are the reasons for the necessity of such totalisations in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s system? On one hand, the process of hegemony and therefore 
universalisation is closely linked to the context according to Laclau (historical, 
cultural, etc.) and explains why some signifiers can ‘come to represent the 
whole and others do not’ (Laclau 2005, 295). But when Laclau attempts to 
define the reason for such empty signifiers he explains the function of 
hegemony by Lacanian ‘ontological’ claims about humans’ psychological 
functioning. Indeed, what would be a set of differences without the totalisation 
effect of master-signifiers, but psychosis? In the following paragraphs, I shall 
therefore argue that the reasons for Laclau and Mouffe’s political pessimism 
about the impossibility of resolving conflicts must be found in their Lacanian 
conception of human psychology, and that to consider its pertinence or 
impertinence, one should first confront it with its political consequences.  
 
III.iv.b. The threat of psychosis and the need for order  
 
 
                                                 
44 For him as we will see in Chapter 4, populism is the royal road to understand something 
about the ontological constitution of the political.  
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Against the threat of psychosis, people need and desire some forms of socio-
symbolic order. This thesis is particularly clear in Laclau and Zac’s article 
(1994) in the book The making of political identities edited by Laclau that I 
mentioned briefly in the previous chapter. Laclau and Zac begin by quoting Dr 
Faustus by Thomas Mann (Mann, 1968, 64-65, in Laclau and Zac, 1994, 11) 
in which we find the claim that freedom, which is another word for 
subjectivity, seeks ‘shelter and security in the objective’. Freedom realizes 
itself in ‘constraint, fulfills itself in the subordination to law, rule, coercion, 
system’; the result is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective, like in a 
piece of art in which a subjectivity expresses itself through organisation’ 
(Mann, 1968, 184-185, quoted in Laclau and Zac, 1994, 11). Laclau and Zac 
focus then on the tension between subject and object and that leads them to 
theorize the ‘subject of the lack’ who finds its principle of organisation outside 
itself, echoing hence the opposition of Hobbes between the state of nature and 
the Leviathan (see for example Laclau, 2005, 88). Freedom or subjectivity, 
they write, needs an external determination to accomplish itself, something 
opposite to it.  
 
Freedom (…) realizes itself through its identification with something that is 
its opposite, that is, with an objectivity than can only fulfil its identificatory 
role as far as it accomplishes the alienation of the subject. (Laclau and Zac, 
1994, 14) 
 
The object bringing order is said to accomplish simultaneously the alienation 
of the subject. We could wonder then why the ‘freedom that fulfils itself in 
coercion is still freedom’ and not simply a pure alienation as the authors ask 
themselves. Indeed, Laclau and Zac raise this problem in the beginning of their 
article but never really answer it directly, but by claiming that it is based on a 
psychological necessity. Despite this alienation, the identificatory act does not 
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suppress the subject’s lack or nothingness. All identifications are precarious 
and, because the subject is originary and ineradicable lack, ‘any identification 
will have to represent, as well, the lack itself’ (Laclau and Zac, 1994, 15). Acts 
of identification are endless because the gap between the subject and the 
fulfilling object is never completely bridgeable; a perfect identity between the 
two is impossible. Moreover, the fulfilling role of the object can be compared 
to the role of the law, which do not take its power from rationality but by its 
mere existence:  
 
If the law can fulfill this role, it necessarily follows that this role has to be its 
own justification, and that the latter cannot be granted by any a priori tribunal 
of reason. (Laclau and Zac, 1994, 15) 
 The immediate consequence of this arbitrariness of the justification of the law is that:  
The filling function requires an empty place, and the latter is, to some extent, 
indifferent to the content of the filling, though this filling function has to be 
incarnated in some concrete contents, whatever these contents might be. 
(Laclau and Zac, 1994, 15) 
 
Then, in the case of an anomic situation, what would be required would be the 
introduction of an order, any order, ‘the concrete of which would become quite 
secondary.’ Quoting Mann in Lotte in Weimar, where the novelist writes 
‘order and quiet are good – no matter what ones owes them’ to justify the 
peace felt by Prussians during the Napoleonian invasion of Prussia, Laclau and 
Zac agree that human beings are ‘by nature submissive’ and ‘need to live in 
harmony with outward events and situations’ (Mann, 1968, 138, quoted in 
Laclau and Zac, 1994, 16).  
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As shown by the two authors, this conception is immediately connected to 
Lacan’s own conception of the ego as ‘an ensemble of successive imaginary 
identifications’ (Laclau and Zac, 1994, 31) operating through two 
mechanisms: ‘projection and introjection of the features of the “object” of 
identification’. We find in Lacan the two aspects exposed earlier namely 1) the 
alienation of the subject that internalizes the law as a condition for its 
existence and stability 2) that the constitution of his identity is at the same time 
a failure because of an asymmetry between projection and introjection, the 
outside never able to be the perfect mirror of the inside. This failure, this 
discordance, is said to involve anxiety and permanent renewing of acts of 
identification (see Laclau and Zac, 1994, 32). More generally, Lacan’s basic 
thesis is that the unconscious is structured as a language and that existence is 
constructed around the repression of a fundamental, unrepresentable 
negativity, a void.
45
 This is characteristic of the ‘Real’, and the ‘Symbolic’ 
tries permanently to fill this void.
46
 Nevertheless, the real is permanently 
haunting the symbolic and the void can never be permanently filled. The 
symbolic is constructed via master signifiers which create temporary centres 
and give the illusion of fully-fixed identities. Without the action of master 
signifiers, we would simply live in psychotic worlds, that’s why the order is 
necessary and considered a priori as a good thing. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the Lacanian mirror stage is the site of a necessary alienation, as the 
infant who recognizes its image in the mirror begins a lifelong course of 
searching outward for identity. Here are the foundations of Lacan’s pessimistic 
view on human beings, that ‘there is something originally, inaugurally, 
profoundly wounded in the human relation to the world’ (Lacan, 1988, 167), 
that ‘life does not want to be healed’ (Lacan, 1988, 233). Something is 
                                                 
45 By extension for Laclau politics is structured as a language. Language like politics is a set 
of differences in which one master-signifier plays the role of a centre that gives 
signification to the whole set. We can see here how much the Saussurean and Lacanian 
conception of language impacts on Laclau and Mouffe political theory. 
46 cf. my second chapter. 
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intrinsically missing, as the castrated thing, which is another very important 
Lacanian idea.  
 
According to Laclau himself,  
 
The logic of hegemony and that of the Lacanian object a largely overlap and 
refer to a fundamental ontological relation in which fullness can only be 
touched through a radical investment in a partial object. (Laclau, 2006, 651)  
 
In other words, the empty signifier is, in the Lacanian psychoanalytical 
terminology to which Laclau adheres, a partial object invested and hence 
transforming the system into a totality, which brings back the lost jouissance, 
of ‘the mythical wholeness of the mother/child dyad’ (Laclau, 2005, 114 
quoted in Simmons, 2011, 208). Investments in empty signifiers are hence 
affective and their function is subconsciously to revive the lost primary unity, 
to fill the void although constitutive of the real: 
 
Lacan’s object petit a is the key of social ontology, because both individual 
and political life are driven by a vain search for mythical fullness... the 
restoration of the Mother/child unity or in political terms, the fully reconciled 
society. (Laclau, 2005, 119) 
 
The process being that unfulfilled demands are transferred to the empty 
signifier or partial object becoming the ‘rallying point of passionate 
attachments’ (Laclau, 2005, 115) and the space of popular identity. 
Transposed onto the political terrain, it means that against the threat of being 
dissolved into the chaos of the state of nature, society requires ‘the unicity of a 
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principium’ (Laclau and Zac, 1994, 35), any order that would prevent it to fall 
into chaos or anomie.
47
 This need of an order is, as we have seen, based on the 
configuration of the human subject itself. Politics, as the unconscious and as 
discourse, are in their fundamental structure authoritarian. Indeed Mouffe 
states:   
 
Out of the free-floating dispersion of signifiers, it is only through the 
intervention of a master signifier that a consistent field of meaning can 
emerge. For him [Lacan], the status of the master signifier, the signifier of 
symbolic authority founded only on itself (in its own act of enunciation), is 
strictly transcendental (we underline): the gesture that “distorts” a symbolic 
field, that “curves” its space by introducing a non-founded violence, is stricto 
sensu correlative of its very establishment. (Mouffe, 2000, 138)  
 
The conception of the subject as ‘no-one’ (Lacan, 1978, 72, in Bannet, 1989, 
22) or ‘nothing’ is profoundly anti-humanist (Bannet, 1989, 23). It also 
presupposes that the basic structure of existence based on relations of power 
and domination cannot change, hence that a radically better world can hardly 
be constructed. Lacan’s model of subject is opposed to every theory, since the 
seventeenth century, that sees the human as autonomous, free, responsible: the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment, Marxism, Existentialism and so on. As Eva 
Bannet explains: ‘He [Lacan] insisted that there is no difference between 
exploiters and exploited in society, since they are both equally subject to the 
economy as a whole, and that there is no present possibility of a revolution 
which would not simply replace one tyrannical symbolic order by another, 
equally arbitrary’ (Bannet, 1989, 23). Humans do not create anything, s/he 
isn’t a free agent, neither are culture, society and language human creations, 
but rather ‘an impersonal circuit into which each of us is integrated we will or 
                                                 
47 See also Laclau, 2005, 88.  
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no, which remains irrevocably alien to the subject’ (Bannet, 1989, 34).  
 
The core structure of the current system seems to be placed beyond challenge 
in Lacan’s psychoanalysis and in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to politics: 
the concept of antagonism and lack reveal the submission of their approach to 
a so-called necessity of alienation that can find reactionary political 
correspondences. The legitimate question that Robinson asks is, as Thomassen 
has pointed out, what kind of political theory is possible from a post-
structuralist perspective, if not a Lacanian one? (Thomassen, 2004, 559). Does 
this have to be based as Robinson argues on a politics of ‘abundance’ rather 
than a politics of ‘lack’?  
 
III.v.a. ‘The ontology of abundance’  
 
 
The first problem that arises as a consequence of the use of Lacanian theories 
in political theory, as Robinson does, is methodological. Indeed, the political 
discourse of the thinkers of lack is subsumed under a prior theoretical 
framework rather than being enlightened by this framework after a close 
analysis of facts and events. The analyses come to confirm already-accepted 
assumptions rather than being attempts to assess the theory itself. In the same 
trend towards the non-falsifiability of the theory, it is supposed that one has 
just to ‘accept’ the primacy of antagonism, that is to say ‘the central 
ontological claim of the Lacanian edifice itself’ (Robinson, 2004, 3). Mouffe 
demands for example that one accepts ‘the negative aspect inherent in 
sociability’, that ‘violence is ineradicable’ because hostility and violence 
constitute the nature of ‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2000, 132). If someone 
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challenges the existence of such an element of hostility, this must mean that 
one doesn’t ‘accept’ one’s own void as a subject. This would thus be an 
illustration of the symbolic trying to repress the real. The same applies to 
anyone, even to political thinkers or philosophers. Mouffe states, for example, 
quoting Stavrakakis:  
 
“What lies beyond the successive conceptions of the good, beyond the 
traditional ethical thinking, is their ultimate failure, their inability to master 
the central impossibility, the constitutive lack around which human 
experience is organized.” (Stavrakakis, 1999, 129, in Mouffe, 2000, 138) 
 
However, since such ontological claims cannot be scientifically proven but can 
only be argued and accepted in relation to some political aims, it cannot be a 
valid basis for political theory and political action. Laclau and Mouffe affirm 
the constitutivity of antagonism and as a consequence they fall into the trap 
they criticized as being the main problem within the orthodox Marxist 
tradition, which was essentialism. Robinson explains:  
 
Rather than being treated as a contingent phenomenon, lack is turned into 
something akin to an essence, which can be used to explain social 
phenomena. (Robinson, 2004, 2) 
 
This echoes Judith Butler’s statement criticizing the transformation of single 
instances into universal facts: ‘Are we using the categories to understand the 
phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories “in the 
name of the Father”?’ she asks (Butler, 2000, 152). This dogmatic approach to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis also reveals an ignorance of the different debates 
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traversing psychoanalysis itself. What Lacan describes is just one modality of 
human existence under specific contexts and in that sense his assumptions are 
themselves political, hence subject to contestations.  
 
A second problem of the use of the Lacanian framework in political theory is 
ethical and political. The main consequence of this use is the affirmation that 
the structure of our current existence is not changeable, and that one has to 
accept exclusion, violence and dissensus as part of our social nature on the one 
hand, and a form of political submissiveness to a leadership on the other. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism lacks any positive ethics that would be the 
basis of any politics that they would advocate. The only ethical strategy of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis consists in ‘the symbolic recognition of the 
irreducibility of the Real’ (Mouffe, 2000, 138). The political outcome of it is 
reformism, with a dismissal of forms of political relations other than the actual 
one based on violence. This anti-humanist core is blended with a paradoxical 
demand for emancipation and is simultaneously a claim about its radical 
impossibility. As Robinson and Tormey argue, the political logic of Laclau 
and Mouffe excludes the possibility of an overthrow, of a fundamental 
transformation of the world, and in reference to the activist slogan found in 
anti-capitalist movements throughout the world, for them a radical other 
world is not possible. Robinson and Tormey analyse it as a ‘dystopian 
submission to the totalising logic of the dominant system’ (Robinson and 
Tormey, 2009, 133). Robinson writes:  
 
To be sure, an existing master-signifier can be replaced with a new one, but 
the basic structure of existence, including, crucially, the central role of 
violence, antagonism, and exclusion is beyond question. (Robinson, 2004b, 
268) 
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Laclau and Mouffe indeed always emphasise conflict over and above its 
resolution. Political translations of Lacanian conceptions of human structure 
are therefore ‘about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, 
not about resolving or removing these’ (Robinson, 2004, 3). Every attempt to 
create a society not based on these would be totalitarian, and as it would 
attempt to recreate the lost unity, they would deny this element of human 
nature. The necessity of preserving society against totalitarianism has 
paradoxically driven Laclau and Mouffe to essentialise lack and violence. The 
argument is that democracy is a better system than dictatorship or oligarchy 
for example because it embraces lack and avoids totalitarianism. All 
harmonious society or ‘fully reconciled society’ as Laclau and Mouffe call it, 
is treated as ‘fantasmatic’, that is the fantasma to fill the void of the real. A 
certain leadership is necessarily imposing its violence to create an order, and 
thus the basic political relations of oppression cannot really change. But we 
could also imagine a harmonious society which would find practical ways to 
prevent totalitarianism, by keeping permanently alive the mechanism of 
collective decisions acting for the principles at the basis of democracy (liberty 
and equality) but this would presuppose a minimal deliberative account of 
democracy which has no place in Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical framework. 
The political consequences of Lacanianism seem to a certain extent to be 
conservative and not turned towards radical emancipation.  
 
III.v.b. Productivity and positivity: Deleuze and Guattari 
 
 
Against this pessimistic and minimalist view of human emancipations, the 
political philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari offers a post-structuralist 
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alternative to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony. They provide first an 
ethics equivalent to a praxis able to sustain a politics of their own, and on a 
theoretical level, they find a non-contradictory way to both defend their own 
conception of pluralism and differences and find a general immanent 
framework compatible with this defence. This alternative has been recently 
theorized as the ‘ontology of abundance’ in opposition to the ‘ontology of 
lack’ in the recent book Radical democracy: between abundance and Lack 
(2005) edited by Thomassen and Tonder. According to Olivier Marchart, 
author of an article in this book, the ‘ontology of abundance, which 
emphasizes networks of materiality, flows of energy, process of becoming and 
experimenting modes of affirmation’ is inspired by another vision of radical 
democracy that we can find in the works of Bennett, Connolly, Patton, and 
Widder to mention the most well-known ones. Deleuze and Guattari have been 
famous for having criticized Lacanian reductionism, that is the fact of reducing 
the experience of difference to a question of failure of the identificatory 
processes. Peter Hallward shows the incompatibility between Lacan’s 
conception of the truth of the subject found in the symbolic, and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s non-subject as a positive force of self-differentiation (Hallward, 
2010, 40). The Lacanian subject is indeed the subject ‘of unconscious speech’ 
defined by castration and lack, and ‘by its incorporation into a symbolic order 
that lacks any natural plenitude or positive orientation’ (Hallward, 2010, 36). 
This incorporation is precisely the process of identification or determination 
theorized by Laclau in his article with Zac. By contrast, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘subject’ is a becoming, located in an in-between, a non-localisable 
place (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 293). As a movement, it cannot suffer 
any representation that would fix it and can only produce an exclusive 
immanent plane, a flat surface where desire can flow. This field of immanence 
echoes the single dimension of reality described by Spinoza, the pure 
immanence of nature.
48
 
                                                 
48 We can recall here Agamben’s dichotomy between two trajectories, immanence and 
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Deleuze and Guattari proposed indeed the idea of rhizomatic relations, 
decentred and based on the participation of all rather than the hierarchical 
model of traditional representative and hegemonic politics. Anti-Oedipus is a 
work against the ‘Law’, the ‘Father’, both of these considered as a single 
determination of the life of the subject. This work sheds light on the opposite; 
on the positivity of desire and being in the context of a vitalist philosophy. The 
notion of rhizomatic relationships is opposed to what Deleuze and Guattari 
named the gesture of despotic signification, which has many names: 
hegemony for Laclau and Mouffe, the ‘Act’ for Žižek or the ‘Event’ for 
Badiou, which is equivalent to master-signification in Lacan’s work. Against 
Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari advocated ‘psychosis’ as a solution to the 
oppressive and authoritarian structures of contemporary societies, rather than 
considering psychosis as the zero-point of politics, a state of nature to use 
Hobbes’ expression. 
 
Following Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari reject negativity as a problem taking 
root in representational thinking. According to Bergson, ‘negativity refers to a 
negative judgment’ hence not a reality.  
 
Initially we experience reality in its full plenitude, in the complete affirmation 
of all that is, and to which, secondarily, is the negation of judgment is added. 
The negative judgment is the negation of a judgment that is originally 
positive. (Bergson, 1941, 286, quoted in Bolle, 2010, 8) 
                                                                                                                                
transcendence (Agamben in Smith, 2003, 46). This can also refer to Badiou’s own 
distinction between two different traditions of thought, ‘le paradigme “vital” (ou “animal”) 
des multipliciés ouvertes (dans la filiation bergsonienne)’ and ‘le paradigme mathematisé 
des ensembles, qu’on peut aussi bien dire “stellaire” au sens de Mallarmé’ (Badiou, 1997, 
11). 
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One of Deleuze and Guattari’s inspirations is Nietzsche’s idea of affirmation. 
According to Nietzsche, the greatest powers of life are instinctive, elementary 
forces that are original and authentic. All negative and reactive forces should 
be eliminated in favour of a pure affirmation of life. The other major influence 
on Deleuze and Guattari’s views on being is Spinoza, which we can find 
especially in A thousand plateaux, which justifies the recent denomination of 
‘ontology of abundance’ I mentioned. For Spinoza as for Deleuze and 
Guattari, being equates with desire (conatus). For psychoanalysis, desire is 
understood as lacking an object. However Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
desire is not defined as a tendency towards an object, or a state of need that 
searches for fulfilment by an object (real or hallucinatory), but it is the positive 
essence of every being. The conatus is the tendency by which each thing seek 
to persevere in its being (see Spinoza 1677, III, 7, quoted in Bolle, 2010). 
Since desire lacks nothing, being lacks nothing. It is indeed really important to 
notice that for Spinoza this effort of persevering in its own being is ‘the actual 
essence of the thing itself’ (Spinoza, 1677, III, 7). Desire is the conatus that 
has become self-conscious, along with the will, conatus of the mind and 
appetite, conatus of the body. Spinoza concludes that:  
 
For what has been said, it is plain, therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, 
seek, nor desire anything because we think it to be good, but on the contrary, 
we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek or desire it. 
(Spinoza, 1677, III, 9, in Bolle, 2010)  
 
In other words, the truth of the subject is not in the external object that would 
fill its nothingness or lack, as was the case in Laclau and Mouffe’s conception 
of subjectivity, but is located within itself and equivalent to the conatus, or 
desire to persevere in its own being. Desire is hence a force independent of 
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objects: it is said to be a certain power to be affected. Following Spinoza, to 
the three poles of the Oedipal triangle, ‘father-mother-child’ present in the 
unconscious where desire is supposed to be repressed in the unconscious 
behind the curtains of a theatre, Deleuze and Guattari oppose a multitude of 
‘desiring machines’. The unconscious is like a factory or a workplace that 
products great varieties of desires (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1972). Because it 
has not its cause in an object, it is not linked to a lack. If desire equals the 
essence of each thing, then that means that being itself is productive and 
creative. 
  
It follows from this conception that psychosis is not seen as a threat or as a 
loss of reality as it is the case in psychoanalysis and in the Hobbes
49
 inspired 
political theory of Laclau and Mouffe. Deleuze and Guattari argue that:  
 
…far from having lost who knows what contact with life, the schizophrenic is 
closest to the beating heart of reality to an intense point identical with the 
production of the real, and what leads Reich to say: “what belongs 
specifically to the schizophrenic patient is that... he experiences the vital 
biology of the body.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 96, quoted in Bolle, 2010, 
21)  
 
Deleuze and Guattari are not trying to repress the desires of the psychotic but 
to extract life out of them. Even though this is difficult to accept as a thesis, 
what has to be retained is the defence of the creative power of composition, 
decomposition and recomposition. Indeed, linked to the Ethics of Spinoza, the 
conatus stands for the capacity to be affected; as such, it is the essence of each 
                                                 
49 The political translation of ‘psychosis’ would be the Hobbesian conception of the state of 
nature.  
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thing. When this capacity is transgressed, resumes Bolle, the body decomposes 
and dies. This decomposition however must not be understood as deficiency, 
as a failure for example, but as the extreme point of this capacity to be 
affected. Deleuze and Guattari oppose two types of desiring-machines, or two 
types of system of production of desires: ‘a paranoia machine, fixing and 
stratifying the flows of desire, having an affinity with fascism in its micro- and 
macro-social forms; and a schizo machine generating processes of 
deterritorialisation and which is revolutionary, proliferating flows and 
liberating desire’ (Patton, 2001, 1150). Hence what master-signifiers do is 
clearly on the side of the paranoia machine, because their essence is to create 
some totalisations.  
 
III.vi. The political vocation of philosophy 
 
 
In this section, I argue that even if we can find in Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
a defence of a Spinozist ‘ontology of abundance’, it would be misleading to 
take it as the exact counterpart of an ontology of lack. Indeed, what ‘ontology’ 
designates in the thought of many contemporary thinkers is subordinated to 
political philosophy in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought (cf. Patton, 2000, 230, 
170). In fact Deleuze and Guattari subvert Laclau and Mouffe’s schema 
Ontology > Politics, and turn it into the schema Politics > Ontology. Political 
philosophy does not pretend to be true, it does not describe the primacy of 
negativity and the absence of ground for things and hypostatisation of a lack, 
but its aim is, like politics, to shape the real, transform existing thoughts and 
behaviours, ‘bringing out new earths and new peoples’. One common principle 
can be found in Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of philosophy and in 
politics that are inspired by them. The influence of Kantian morality on 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy is analysed in depth in Paul 
Patton’s book, who demonstrates that ‘we can properly take Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy to be a form of practical reason’ (Patton, 2000, 139).50 
This is also linked to Spinoza’s Ethics. Ethics for them – in particular for 
Deleuze – is to be understood as practice and the space of practice is the space 
of ontology, of practical composition of being (Deleuze, 1990, 270). The 
practical object of philosophy is to denounce all that is sad and ‘those who 
cultivate and depend on sad passions, that enslave us, because all that involves 
sadness involves tyranny’ ( eleuze, 1990, 270).  
 
Ethics and politics are intimately linked in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. 
This is exactly what Mouffe refuses. For her, this is typical of the type of 
pluralism she does not want to celebrate; namely a pluralism without 
antagonism, a positive pluralism ‘of a friend without an enemy, of an agonism 
without antagonism (….) This is to imagine that there could be a point where 
ethics and politics could perfectly coincide’ (Mouffe, 2000, 134) whereas for 
her, violence and consequently limits to pluralism, are inevitable. The text 
What is Philosophy written by Deleuze and Guattari focuses on the inherently 
political vocation of philosophy. There, Deleuze and Guattari explain and try 
to demonstrate that the vocation of philosophy is the creation of concepts 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 11). A concept is not a ‘given knowledge or 
representation that can be explained by the faculties able to form it (abstraction 
or generalisation) or employ it (judgement)’ explain Deleuze and Guattari 
                                                 
50 Kant distinguishes theoretical reason from practical reason by ‘suggesting that theoretical 
reason is concerned with the knowledge of objects that are given to us by means of the 
sense, whereas practical reason is concerned with objects that we produce by means of 
action in accordance with certain principles’ (Patton, 2000, 139). In practical reason, 
principles come before actions. As such, ‘Kant revoked Machiavelli’s separation between 
morals and politics, and by integrating political philosophy under the authority of pure 
practical reason re-created the old unity of morals and politics in a revolutionary new 
conceptual framework and on the basis of a revolutionary new theory of justification’ (in 
Guyer, 1992, 343).  
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(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 22). On the contrary, the ontology of lack’s 
pretention is to discover a form of universal, thus it is very far off Deleuze and 
Guattari’s constructionist conception of philosophy. In other terms, philosophy 
constructs its discourse, and does not neutrally discover objects or name 
phenomena. This conception is opposed to the traditional conception of 
philosophy as putting into light things preceding it. Plato for example created 
concepts, such as the One, or non-being, but posed them as representations of 
an uncreated that preceded him, although in fact the concept is ‘self-
referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time it is created’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994, 22). It does not mean that the concept is just an abstract 
idea, completely disconnected from reality. It does not come from nothing but 
has a history and relations with other concepts. It also has a tangible reality 
because:  
 
The concept speaks the event, not the essence of the thing – pure Event, a 
hecceity, an entity. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 21) 
 
Philosophy is not disconnected from reality because it constructs something 
from the real by focusing on one singular aspect of it, by extracting from it one 
event: consequently it is very similar to art in general, understood as a process 
of recreation of the world. Philosophy cannot hence pretend to embrace the 
totality of the real but only a part of it. If philosophy is considered as the 
activity of creation of concepts, which does not represent pre-given objects 
given in experience, it is also because concepts are action-guiding rather than 
descriptive. For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy, with or without ontological 
claims, is already always an ethics.  
 
Like all concepts, Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts are normative in the sense 
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that they enable some influences and disable others. (Brandon, 2012, in 
Patton, 2000, 144) 
 
Philosophers, theorists, choose to create the concepts that would guide 
collective actions and even individual actions. Not only is philosophy already 
always normative and provides general action-guiding for collective action, 
but it also provides action-guiding in the case of the individual.  
 
[Concepts] are also normative in the sense that they provide a framework 
within which to evaluate the character of particular events and processes. 
They enable us to pose questions such as: is this negative or positive 
reterritorialisation? Is this a genuine line of flight? Etc. (Patton, 2000, 145) 
 
For Patton as was the case for Foucault, Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics (see 
Foucault 1977, xiii) which offers: 
 
Individual guidance in identifying and avoiding all the varieties of ‘fascism’ 
that entrap our desires and bind us to the forms of power that maintain 
systems of exploitation and domination. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari 
may be taken to provide rules for the conduct of a nonfascist life such as: 
pursue thought and action by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction 
rather than by hierarchization, and subdivision; prefer positivity over 
negativity, difference over uniformity, nomadic or mobile assemblages over 
sedentary systems, and so on. (Patton, 2000, 145-146)  
 
As Foucault writes, Anti-Oedipus is an Introduction to the Non-Fascist life 
(Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, xv) that pushes us to ‘withdraw 
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allegiance from the old categories of the negative (law, limit, castration, lack, 
lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power 
and an access to reality.’ Foucault goes on and equates Anti-Oedipus’ message 
to these injunctions: 
 
…prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over 
unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is 
not sedentary but nomadic. (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, XV) 
 
We cannot therefore confound science and philosophy. On what side must we 
put the ontology of lack, or the affirmation of the unquestionable lack 
characterizing subjectivity and the prelude to a necessary transcendental 
politics? The lack is clearly a concept, hence it is not referential, it is not a 
proposition, but it chooses to highlight something from the human experience 
that puts it on the side of ethics and politics and not on the side of “science” or 
absolute objectivity. No ultimate evidence can prove that this ontology is 
preferable to the Deleuzean and Guattarian conception of desire, or ‘ontology 
of abundance’. The determining argument is hence political: what kind of 
political relations we want to develop, which ones have to be deconstructed; 
these are the preliminary questions a political theorist has to ask before 
undertaking the development of an ontology that would insist on one aspect of 
facts and events, of reality. The role and function of philosophy is directly 
connected to the political aim of philosophy for Deleuze and Guattari, which is 
the production of utopias, because it is oriented towards the future where the 
future is understood in its potential difference from the present. The goal of the 
creation of new concepts should not just be the recognition of the existing state 
of affairs or the justification of existing opinions and forms of life, but the 
absolute deterritorialisation of the present in thought, explains Patton (see 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 99). Deleuze and Guattari state that:  
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…philosophy takes the relative deterritorialisation of capital to the absolute; it 
makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and 
suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon 
forth a new earth, a new people. Actually, utopia is what links philosophy 
with its own epoch, with European capitalism, but also with the Greek city. In 
each case it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the 
criticism of its own time to its highest point (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 99).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari hence manage to link the productions of utopias with the 
preservation of difference and plurality, whereas what was reproached by 
Mouffe and Laclau was the dangerous systematized thought of utopias that 
could and have been oppressive in the past.  
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III.vii. Conclusion  
 
 
Before continuing in Chapter 4 to explore the political implications of the 
different ‘ontologies’ described in the current chapter, I will resume examining 
the main problematic assumptions emphasised. 
 
In the first part of the chapter, I have shown that the main target of Mouffe has 
been Habermas’ conception of rational discourse and rational consensus. 
Mouffe developed the dissensus aspect of politics, well evidenced by her 
Schmittian conception of politics. In her own theoretical edifice, the 
hegemonic centring via the master-signifier is the act of decision, that is, 
violence and exclusion. Andrew Knops has nevertheless noticed a 
contradiction, by showing that contrarily to her arguments, Mouffe’s theory 
requires the possibility of, at least, a rational consensus ‘not merely on 
procedural matters that frame democratic exchange, but also on the substance 
or outputs of that process – practical political decisions’ (Knops, 2007, 3). 
That is, even the agonistic alternative to deliberative democracy developed by 
Mouffe is based on rational consensus, argues Knops, that is on commonality 
and shared values of equality, liberty and respect for others’ beliefs and rights 
to defend them.  
 
I have then explained that the exclusion of rational consensus is grounded on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s idea of a ‘constitutive Other’. The impossibility of a 
rational use of language excludes the possibility of a continuous deliberation. 
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This conception of language derived from Lacan admits the existence of 
‘master signifiers’, which are also used to describe the arbitrariness of 
meaning and the fact that language is based on authority. Hence for Mouffe 
the idea of a neutral rational consensus, free from power, is flawed (see 
Mouffe, 2000, 137-138). The irrationalism of decision and its violence would 
be constitutive of politics, that means it would be true for all situations and all 
times. The terrain of the political is portrayed as constituted through power, 
making antagonism ‘ineradicable’ (Mouffe, 2000, 104).51 Apart from the 
problematic claim of having found the ‘essence of the political’ from the 
methodological point of view, is this not a problem for a theory which is 
targeting emancipation to conceive the oppressive way of doing politics as the 
constitutive construction of politics itself? Indeed, there is a tension between 
1) the relations of oppression Mouffe wishes to fight, and 2) the acts of 
decisions and the dangers of reproducing relations of subordination. In other 
words, the aim of emancipation is the elimination of the oppressive use of 
power, but at the same time, it seems to be impossible to eradicate in certain 
configurations. The question of the institution or the group making the 
decisions is also posed. Mouffe translates the need of an order into the 
necessity of the existence of a state as solely capable of imposing control and 
creating this necessary order. The articulatory principle that is citizenship is 
particularly important, as it is not simply an identity among others: ‘to be a 
citizen is to recognize the authority of [political] principles and the rules in 
which they are embodied’ (Mouffe, 1993, 65, in Robinson and Tormey, 2009, 
136). The state ‘must have primacy’ (Mouffe, 1993, 99, in Robinson and 
Tormey, 2009, 136). ‘To deny to the state as something “different and 
decisive” over and above associations, is to “deny” the “essence of the 
political”‘ (Mouffe, 2000, 51-52, quoted in Robinson and Tormey, 2009, 137) 
whereas the state is considered by the followers of the ‘ontology of 
                                                 
51 Let us just remark that the Schmittian conception of politics of Mouffe is different from the 
Gramscian conception of hegemony which worked through consent and not coercion. 
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abundance’ as an apparatus of ‘capture’  alienating desires of the individuals 
and of the groups.  
 
For a second time, I have explained that Laclau throughout his works since 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy has developed the idea that politics is by 
definition the hegemonic process by which a master-signifier gives a meaning 
to a differential system of elements, and by doing so gives to it an identity and 
an order, and fixes a centre, though precarious and fragile. This hegemonic 
process of centreing is synonymous with the action of the ‘master-signifier’ as 
regards others’ empty-signifiers. This is for Laclau how particular and 
corporatist aims can be transcended and universalized on the basis of the 
equivalential relation some sectors establish with other subordinated sectors. 
The action of fixing meaning is the action of creating a new power around the 
hegemonic centre. It follows that for him too the elimination of power 
relations is impossible, and because antagonisms are constitutive of the social 
and of the political, a total emancipation is strictly impossible. Laclau’s 
conception of radical democracy is traversed by the same paradox as the one 
found in Mouffe’s work: on one hand it struggles for emancipation which 
involves the elimination of power, and on the other hand, it affirms that 
emancipation is necessarily contained by power because the essence of politics 
is to be hegemonic. In Laclau’s work, (which is closer to the initial Gramscian 
conception of hegemony as a power based on consensus as compared to 
Mouffe’s works) the only definition of politics can be found in its conception 
of populism as characteristic of the constructing of political identities. For 
him, as I will explain in Chapter 4, populism as the dichotomy of society in 
two antagonistic camps reveals the nature, the essence of politics itself: the 
exclusion of the other is its main character, and through the need for a master-
signifier to build a hegemonic bloc, politics is conceived as a vertical 
relationship between led and leaders. 
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Mouffe supports these theses and adds, in relation to her own commitments, to 
the Schmittian conception of politics that individuals must submit to the 
master signifier, which is ‘founded only on itself’ and which is ‘introducing a 
non-founded violence’ without which ‘the [discursive] field would 
disintegrate’ (Mouffe, 1993, 138, quoted in Robinson and Tormey, 2009, 137), 
echoing the analysis of freedom in Laclau and Zac’s article based on two of 
Thomas Mann’s novels. Laclau’s conception of the social, of its ontology as 
he often writes, and Mouffe’s conception of antagonism find their exact 
translation in Lacanian psychoanalysis and is the major if not the only caution 
or argument to understanding politics and the social as irreducibly constituted 
around a lack, an antagonism that prevents the subject – individual or 
collective – to be totally himself.  
 
At the opposite side of this ontology based on a conception of the identity of 
the subject shaped by an external object explaining the desire of the subject for 
that object, stands Robinson and Tormey’s interpretation of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘ontology of abundance’ which is characterized by the primacy of 
ethics on ontology. While Laclau and Mouffe took the psychoanalytic theory 
of the subject as a subject of lack as a basis for their political strategy, authors 
like Robinson and Tormey, Negri and Hardt (as I will show in Chapter 4) take 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis that the unconscious is machinic, that is 
productive and non-representational, as a basis for their political advocations. 
Founded on a Spinozist ‘ontology’ that claims the independence of desire from 
objects, it denounces the closedness of systems and celebrates alterity, 
differences without limits, not in their negative aspect but in their full positive 
sense, movements and process of decomposition-recomposition that leave no 
space for Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the precarious fixation of 
identities and irreducible lack. It denounces the successive claims of the 
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alienation of the subject, through language and through politics, through 
everything symbolic. As such, it is profoundly anti-Lacanian, and opens up the 
perspective of a new humanism inscribed in a larger vitalist philosophy. 
Though the proposition of this alternative logic has a liberating effect for it 
opens the field of possibilities that Laclau and Mouffe had restrained, the 
question of the efficiency of the political translation of this model is posed, as 
well as its actual power to make substantive change happen in the political 
world. That is what I will try to look at in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 
The impact of the ontologies of Lack and Abundance for 
political strategy 
 
IV.i. Overview 
 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of the hegemonic construction of identities leads 
them naturally to encourage hegemonic forms of socialist practices in order to 
create a hegemonic radical democratic bloc. The articulation of struggles 
created would challenge the dominant hegemony of the ruling classes and 
within it various anti-equalitarian ideologies such as sexism or racism. My 
purpose in this chapter is hence to look at what kind of concrete struggles 
Laclau and Mouffe encourage and which struggles are for them destined to 
fail, on the basis of their ontology of lack. I will also look at how the defenders 
of the philosophy of abundance challenge politically the political theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe. I will look at the critiques of hegemonic forms of 
organisation with the example of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas with 
Robinson and Tormey (2006-2007) that I will oppose to the populist form of 
organisation by taking Peronism as an illustration. 
 
This will allow me to confront post-Marxist strategic aims with the most 
recent contributions in terms of radical movements, through the concept of the 
globalisation of struggles and the appearance of new forms of organisation 
which are not based upon the traditional political channels (such as unions, 
124 
parties etc.) but function rather like the alter-globalist mobilisation on the basis 
of various networks, associative organisations, and autonomist movements. A 
good point of entry into this discussion will be the recent debate that opposed 
Simon Tormey and Andrew Robinson to Lasse Thomassen. I shall shed light 
on the ethical commitment of Tormey and Robinson to a post-representational 
politics and on the Deleuzean conception of multiplicity underlying it, and the 
ontological impossibility of post-representation defended by Thomassen. The 
question is whether we can organize outside a representational system, or 
whether representation is constitutive and what the political implications of 
that are. I will argue that the universalising tendency of Thomassen to 
generalize ‘representation’ and to interpret the Zapatistas ‘mask’  as an 
evidence for that can fall under the post-colonial critiques of Western 
modernity developed recently. Consequently, this chapter is mainly about 
strategic questions: what kind of organisation is possible in order to face the 
current oppressive and unjust system of relationships between individuals, 
groups and institutions? Whereas Laclau judiciously points out the fact that 
Robinson and Tormey are unable to explain how and why political identities 
are constructed, Robinson and Tormey reject Laclau’s ‘submissive gesture to 
the real’ and its anti-utopian political theory (Robinson and Tormey, 2009, 
133). Whereas Laclau’s view can be pessimistic, Robinson and Tormey’s 
might lead to a form of passivity, as the conditions for the ‘horizontal’ 
movements they would like to see emerge could never been provided. I will 
also show the link that exists between the political strategy one embraces and 
the conception of power underlying these choices. In the last part of my 
chapter, I will enrich the debate and confront Laclau’s hegemonic conception 
of emancipatory politics to Negri and Hardt’s position which is close to 
Robinson and Tormey’s and clearly based on an ontology of abundance (a 
Spinozist ontology) but one based on materialist assumptions. Influenced by 
Left-communism, Negri and Hardt state that with the caesura of the post-
modern paradigm, struggles and organisation cannot be based on the modern 
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pattern typical of Laclau’s thought anymore, but on a completely new one. I 
shall expose and explain concepts such as ‘multitude’ and try to show the 
weaknesses and strengths of these concepts by confronting them with Laclau 
and Mouffe’s critiques.   
 
IV.ii. Representational versus post-representational politics: 
Populism as Politics 
  
 
As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Laclau and Mouffe’s main thesis stipulates 
that any political identity necessarily contains a lack which guarantees its 
radical openness. Any political identity is constituted through a hegemonic 
process, during which one signifier or social force (for example a constituted 
group such as workers) becomes the hegemonic representation of a bloc 
constituted by the articulation of other forces. The hegemonic process is hence 
a moment of identification of the articulated signifieds, where the empty 
signifier and the signified are placed in a relation of representation. If politics 
is necessarily a matter of hegemonic articulations, because of the existence of 
an ontological lack, it means that we cannot go beyond representation. I will 
explain this with the exposition of Laclau’s theory of populism which 
illustrates in its purest form the process of hegemony. Indeed, for Laclau, 
populist movements are the quintessence of hegemonic processes because they 
presuppose very large equivalential links of demands and large communities. 
Benjamin Arditi has successfully summed up the six steps that structure 
Laclau’s theory of populism:  
 
1)When a series of social demands cannot be absorbed differentially by 
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institutional channels, they become (2) unsatisfied demands that enter into a 
relationship of solidarity or equivalence with one another and (3) crystallize 
around common symbols that (4) can be capitalized by leaders who 
interpellate frustrated masses and thus begin to incarnate a process of popular 
identification that (5) constructs “the people” as a collective actor to confront 
the existing regime with the purpose of (6) demanding regime change. 
(Arditi, 2010, 489)  
 
In contrast to ‘democratic demands’ which are demands that can be satisfied 
without challenging the system, popular demands are demands that have not 
been satisfied by the institutions, which couldn’t be absorbed by the 
institutional ensemble and which finish by challenging the existing order. The 
same process of creation of a precarious unity – the subject – through various 
identifications applies to political identities, through the articulations of 
demands. The creation of a chain of equivalence between demands leads to the 
creation of an antagonistic frontier that separates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ , where 
the two members of the opposition are said to be heterogeneous.  
 
As I stated in Chapter 2, in Hegemony and Socialist strategy Laclau and 
Mouffe have exposed the tension between the logic of difference leading the 
demands to keep their differential nature and a form of autonomy, while 
entering in a relation of equivalence with the other demands (the logic of 
equivalence). Elements of the chain of equivalence are linked together by their 
common identification and subsumption under an empty signifier. An empty 
signifier is one of the demands that comes to represent each of the particular 
demands of the chain (all the others demands) under certain circumstances. 
Hence with the existence of empty signifiers a form of unstable universality is 
preserved. After several level of hegemonic process, of articulation between 
small unities to bigger unities, the result of the process is the creation of a 
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‘People’. In his book On Populist Reason (2005) where he proposes his fully 
developed theory of populism, Laclau starts by retracing the entire history of 
the notion of populism, or this creation of a people, discussing theories of 
mass psychology, crowd behaviour and Gustave Le Bon, Freud, and Tarde’s 
interpretations. Influenced by the Freudian breakthrough in this field (Freud, 
1921) Laclau’s hypothesis is that there are two modes of social aggregation 
that enter into the composition of all social groups (Laclau, 2005, 58); the first 
one involves identification between peers as members of the group (the 
equivalential logic) and the other one the transference of the role of ego ideal 
(the phantasm of the real ego) to the leader. These are the two extremes of a 
continuum and many different configurations are possible between these two 
extremes, but usually both modes are present in populism.  
  
There is a plurality of socio-political alternatives and their differences are 
explained relatively to ‘the degree of distance between ego and ego ideal’ . If 
that distance increases, ‘one will find a situation described by Freud with the 
identification between the peers as members and transference of the role of 
ego ideal to the leader and in that case the grounding principle of the 
communal order would be transcendent to the latter’ (Laclau, 2005, 58-59); if 
on the contrary the distance between ego and ego ideal is narrower, ‘the leader 
will be the object choice of the members of the group, but he will also be part 
of the group, participating in the general process of mutual identification. In 
that case there will be a partial ‘immanentisation’ of the ground of the 
communitarian order’. Nevertheless, despite this immanentisation, the general 
plan of identifications is always the plan of transcendence (Laclau, 2005, 58-
59). The completely immanent field would be a case limit in which the breach 
between ego and ego ideal would be entirely bridged; we would have ‘the total 
transference – through organisation – of the functions of the individual to the 
community’ (Laclau, 2005, 63). A completely immanent organisation would 
be equivalent to ‘the various myths of the totally reconciled society which 
128 
invariably presuppose the absence of leadership, that is the withering of the 
political (...)’ (Laclau, 2005, 63). In other words, this kind of immanent 
organisation is a myth that can lead to totalitarianism. In a totally immanent 
field, antagonism, and therefore heterogeneity and conflicts, couldn’t exist. 
Fortunately for Laclau the fundamental ontological lack and the necessary 
identificatory processes which are the precondition to the hegemonic approach 
to politics cannot be overcome. In other words, the transcendental logic 
contained in the populist process cannot be overcome. Following the Freudian 
argument, Laclau continues and characterizes the investment in empty 
signifiers as affective, their function subconsciously being to revive the lost 
primary unity (as described in Chapters 2 and 3) for the subject for the groups; 
that’s why one can apply the tools of psychological analysis to the behaviour 
of groups. In other words, their function is to fill the void constitutive of the 
real; with this theory Laclau is reviving the tradition of mass psychology that 
he deployed in his book on populism. He repeats that ‘both individual and 
political life are driven by a vain search for mythical fullness... the restoration 
of the Mother/child unity or in political terms, the fully reconciled society’ 
(Laclau, 2005, 119). The unfulfilled demands are transferred to the empty 
signifier or partial object becoming the ‘rallying point of passionate 
attachments’ (Laclau, 2005, 115) and the space of popular identity. 
 
IV.iii. A basis and an illustration: Peronism 
 
 
The influence of Peronism is structural in Laclau’s thought; in fact it shapes all 
his work. Peronism was a peculiar political and cultural movement in 
Argentina during Perón’s exile, from 1955 to 1973. For Laclau, Peronism 
reveals something substantial about politics itself and construction of political 
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identities, and as we will see matches perfectly his model of the political 
construction of identities. Laclau uses the interpretation of Peronism as an 
extreme model also to explain how the creation of an almost unlimited chain 
of equivalences can lead to its own subversion. During the last years of the 
Peronist government at the beginning of the 50s and many years after, the 
stabilisation of the revolutionary process was recurrent in the Peronist 
discourse, and ‘the figure of the descamisado (literally shirtless) was being 
replaced by the image of the “organized community”‘ (Laclau, 2005, 214). 
According to Laclau who quotes a letter that Perón sent to his left-wing 
organisation in 1967, the PSIN (Socialist Party of the National Left, that he 
left in 1969), Perón believed in three stages of the revolutionary process: the 
first one was ideological preparation, which corresponds to the figure of 
Lenin, the second one was the seizure of power corresponding to the figure of 
Trotsky, and the third one was the institutionalisation of the revolution, 
corresponding to the figure of Stalin. Perón added that the Peronist revolution 
had to move from the second stage to the third.  
 
After the military coup of September 1955, Perón was forced into exile to 
Francoist Spain; the new Argentinian regime was repressive and anti-Peronist; 
it dissolved the Peronist Party, intervened in the trade unions and forbid 
everything related to Perón; even pronouncing his name was forbidden. 
However the government needed the support of groups of Peronist politicians 
and was forced to engage in discussions with them: in that context the idea of 
a ‘Peronism without Perón’ has been propagated (see Laclau, 2005, 215). 
Perón in his exile was nevertheless resisting these attempts at ostracization 
contained in the idea of a ‘Peronism without Perón’. Laclau analyses: ‘the 
more repressive the new regime became, and the more its economic 
programme was seen as a sellout to international finance capital, the more the 
figure of Perón became identified with an anti-system popular and national 
identity (sic).’ He concludes: ‘a duel between Perón (from exile) and 
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successive anti-Peronist governments was starting; this would go on for 
seventeen years, and come to an end only with Perón’s triumphant return to 
Argentina and to government’ (Laclau, 2005, 215). For Laclau, Argentinian 
populism started to take shape with this duel, with two conditions that 
rendered it possible. First it was the ethnic homogeneity of Argentina that 
eased the spread of ideological events in the areas of the major urbanized cities 
Buenos Aires, Rosario and Cordoba, that facilitated the unity of the Peronist 
opposition.
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 And second Perón in his exile was forced to abstain from any 
public political statements and the only statements that circulated privately in 
Argentina were subject to many different interpretations. Progressively, Perón, 
the leader, his words and statements were considered with more and more 
respect, even devotion. In order to keep this status of infallibility, Perón had to 
keep the silence and not to express himself too frequently (see Castagnola, 
2002, 63). In this context, his word was indispensable to giving a symbolic 
unity to the various resistant Peronist groups: ‘his word had to operate as a 
signifier with only weak links to particular signifieds’, Laclau goes on: ‘It is 
exactly what I have called empty signifiers’, the Name ‘Perón’  being one of 
these master-signifiers (Laclau, 2005, 216). 
 
A chain of equivalence was created between these Peronist groups all unified 
by the same desire to see Perón’s return to Argentina. This explains why left-
wing groups and right-wing groups that everything opposed could belong to 
the same side, and describe themselves as ‘Peronist’. They could make 
alliances and together fight a common enemy. Left-wing Peronism included 
many organisations, from the Montoneros and the Fuerzas Armadas Peronista 
to the Peronist Youth, the Revolutionary Peronist Youth, Peronismo en Lucha, 
Peronismo de Base, and other Marxist groups. On the other hand Peronism 
was also a flag for anti-communist right-wing groups, such as the Unions 
                                                 
52 This analysis can also be found in James P. Brennan (ed.), 1998.  
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Obrera Metalurgica led by Augusto Vandor, who was commited to the 
‘Peronism without Perón’ tendency, or the 62 Organizaciones ‘de pie justo a 
Perón’ led by Jose Alonso and opposed to the right-wing unionist movement. 
The danger of that populism was that the link between the elements of the 
equivalential chain was very fragile since what really linked all these groups 
was only the tie with ‘Perón’ – the love of the Father that unites brothers for 
Freud – but with very different interpretations of what ‘Perón’ really meant. In 
1969 social protest exploded with the violent seizure of the city of Cordoba by 
armed left-wing Peronist guerrilla groups, that extended to other cities. 
General elections were held in 1973 in which Peronism won a huge victory 
with the election of Hector Jose Campora, who had been named as Perón’s 
personal delegate and who was a left-wing Peronist; after that Perón could 
finally return to Argentina. With his return, Perón could no longer be a master-
signifier, nor could the signifier continue to be empty. Finally some groups 
who were previously all Peronist became deadly enemies, as shown by the 
massacre of Ezeiza during which the Peronist left and right violently clashed. 
After the death of Perón in 1974, and instability growing, the country finally 
saw the establishment of a military regime in 1976, one of the most repressive 
regimes of the twentieth century.  
 
IV.iv. Populism as a political logic  
 
 
Laclau’s interpretation of Peronism highlights for him how every political 
identity is constructed. For him populism is not just a type of movement but a 
political logic, the logic that creates a precarious unity between groups unified 
by master-signifiers and in opposition to a common enemy. As Arditi argues, 
at first in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy hegemony was defined simply as 
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‘a political type of relation, a form, if one wishes, of politics’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, 139); nevertheless by the end of the book Laclau and Mouffe’s 
temptation was simply to equate hegemony with politics tout court, with the 
idea that the ‘political is the field of a game called hegemony’. According to 
the convincing argument of Arditi, the same progression can be found in On 
Populist Reason not with the equation hegemony = politics but with the 
equation populism = politics. Laclau begins to write that ‘populism is quite 
simply, a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau, 2005, XI) and then he 
affirms: ‘by populism, we do not understand a type of movement, but a 
political logic’ (Laclau, 2005, 117, quoted in Arditi, 2010, 491) concluding 
with the statement ‘there is no political intervention which is not populistic to 
some extent’ (Laclau, 2005, 154, quoted in Arditi, 2010, 491); a number of 
similar claims could also be quoted. We can easily rationalize such a 
conceptual extension by remembering the ontological grounds for such 
political logic. In Laclau’s theoretical system, every politics contains a 
populistic form because: On one hand, a fundamental lack forecloses all 
definitive forms of totalisation, but on the other hand the fullness which is 
unachievable because of the constitutive lack is nevertheless necessary, the 
need for a transcendent principle of order being a fundamental need. Hence the 
logic of articulation is fundamental. For Laclau, the creation of an overarching 
unity through the articulation of various identities is the absolutely necessary 
precondition of political organisation. 
 
As I already stated in Chapter 3, the real difficulty starts when Laclau equates 
populism with hegemony and to politics in general. Laclau claims the 
universality of the process of the constitution of groups through empty 
signifiers for contextual reasons that are transformed into a coherent ontology. 
This scientific problem of methodology is coupled to a political one: this can 
lead to progressive and reformist politics as during Perón’s reign; the problem 
is that its forms of authoritarianism and leadership still remain. The creation of 
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a people and the identifications it presupposes can indeed be criticized for the 
submissiveness and passivity the delegation of one’s autonomy can lead to, as 
a condition of the symbolic unity of the ‘people’. It can also lead in turn to a 
form of authoritarianism or paternalism where one leader take some or all 
decisions for the people he/she represents. Is the despotism of a leader or any 
other master-signifier the only future of human organisation? Does all social 
change require the sacrifice of individualities and of freedom? Laclau and 
Mouffe manage to keep clear of the danger of the institutionalisation of a 
populist movement and by its possible authoritarian drives by claiming the 
permanence of antagonism, conflict and dissensus. A perpetual movement of 
creation of antagonistic frontiers via the articulation between unsatisfied 
demands guarantee democracy and liberty and defends itself from 
totalitarianism. Nevertheless, even if one puts up antagonism as a rampart 
against authoritarian practices, this doesn’t mean that the conditions will be 
united to avoid these practices. How do we stop the mechanisms of 
institutionalisation and the bureaucratisation implied by it if every politics 
necessarily takes a populist form? One of the consequences of 
institutionalisation is its halting of the revolutionary process and the way it can 
lead to the end of the dissensus, i.e. what Laclau and Mouffe are extremely 
critical of. How is the institutionalisation of populist movements to be 
avoided, and is that even possible? 
 
IV.v. Robinson and Tormey’s counter-example and the ethical 
commitment to post-representational politics 
  
 
Even though Laclau and Mouffe seek to build a precarious and entirely 
constructed unity that could prevent any attempt of complete totalisation, some 
thinkers as well as activists reject their model of construction of chains of 
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equivalence and the vision of power it presupposes. Rather, they exhort the 
adoption of a postmodern vision of power, inspired by Foucault, and an alter-
modernist vision of emancipation inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy developed in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
As seen in Chapter 3, Andrew Robinson and Simon Tormey embrace the 
philosophy of abundance, and claim that verticality in politics, which is a 
consequence of representational politics, has to be fought since it does 
violence to the ‘people’ represented. They think that not only representational 
politics is not the only way of constituting political identities, but also that it 
has to be transcended, because it is not desirable: representational politics is 
violence imposed on singularity and difference and to consider that it is the 
only way of doing politics is simply a ‘closure of perspective’ (Robinson and 
Tormey, 2007, 131). This mistrust regarding representation is shared by the 
thinkers Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, the latter believing that representation 
is a ‘corruption’ (Negri, 2002, 134) and goes against the multiplicity 
characteristic of the ‘multitude’. First I shall provide the philosophical 
arguments that Tormey and Robinson deploy to prove the urgency of going 
beyond representational politics. The reflections of Deleuze and Guattari on 
the necessity of going beyond representation is for them a very productive 
resource. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Robinson and Tormey link 
‘representation’ to verticality and hence hierarchy. In turn, generally as theory 
is a way of shaping practices as well as being a reflection of them, the logic of 
representation is dependent on a system of practices which is vertical and thus 
reproduces the relations of domination that one wanted to challenge in the first 
place.  
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Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy claims that in reality sameness and identity 
are categories produced by the human mind
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 among other things, whereas 
only singularities and differences really exist. Difference is here thought as 
difference in itself and not in relation to a presupposed identity; hence it is 
radically opposed for example to a Platonist or Aristotelian type of philosophy. 
Sameness and identities are just the products of human mind, a way of 
apprehension of realities.
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 Similarly, a ‘people’ is just ‘a collective category 
deployed rhetorically’ (Tormey, 2006, 143) but in reality it is a collection of 
multiplicities. This is because differences remain difference through time, and 
are not superseded into a larger logic of identity as was the case in Hegelian 
dialectics. That’s why it is logically impossible to represent singularity and 
difference without denying what they really are, and then doing violence to 
them. Becoming minoritarian, rather than being something, is the eternal 
process of affirmation of difference whereas the logic of representation is the 
negation of this logic. Becoming minoritarian is the contrary of being 
‘resubsumed or overcoded within majoritarian categories as a passive element 
of the same’ (Tormey, 2006, 143). Singularity is,  
 
an active process of differentiation in which the becoming-something is itself 
constitutive. It is for this reason that it cannot be represented without doing 
violence to its singularity. (Robinson and Tormey, 2007, 131) 
 
For Robinson and Tormey, there is no constitutive lack, there is no negativity 
either, hence the hegemonic process of sacrificing pluralism is not necessary 
                                                 
53 The mind is one thing that produces such effects but not the only one. As we have seen, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis does, as does capitalism etc. 
54 For a more detailed exposition of their reading of the history of philosophy, see Olkowski, 
1998.  
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and can be avoided.
55
 For the two authors, in each relation of representation 
there is a form of distortion and alienation, since every voice is irreducible to 
any representation; for them the extreme form of representation would be 
equivalent to totalitarianism. Robinson and Tormey are hence opposed to the 
traditional channel of doing politics such as parties, elections, etc., and 
generally to everything which includes in its organisation something vertical. 
They are consequently for the destruction of the State. Thomassen summarises 
the matter thus:  
 
… either one organizes within a Party or with an overarching programme, 
[or] … resistance is done horizontally, creating networks and spaces of 
resistance. (Thomassen, 2007, 114) 
 
In other words, either one reproduces what was the problem in the first place, 
namely an alienating and disempowering system of representation on the 
model of a trunk or arborescent form of politics as Deleuze and Guattari would 
say – in contrast to their idea of the rhizome – or one tries to create spaces of 
resistance that respect singularities and subjects’ becoming, and create 
relations of equality and democracy between the members of that space. 
Concretely it means that one should not put forward a programme for a better 
and more just world but rather one must create the spaces for the creation of 
new worlds, spaces of deliberation and collective decision. Such creations 
happen in social forums for example, or happened during the recent 
                                                 
55 Totally opposed to that definition of plurality is Laclau’s theory of heterogeneity (Laclau, 
2005, 223): ‘Heterogeneity does not mean pure plurality or multiplicity as the latter is 
compatible with the full positivity of its aggregated elements. Heterogeneity in the sense in 
which I conceive it, has as one of its defining features a dimension of deficient being or 
failed unicity.’ This deficient being is what is behind the logic of overdetermination and 
hegemony whereas in Deleuze’s philosophy there is no such negativity that would render 
overdetermination necessary.  
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occupation movements, but mainly the model can be found in different kind of 
indigenous movements in Latin America mainly. Politics must be considered 
as a making process, during which decisions have to be taken in common with 
respect of each singularities. A politics of singularity or difference is hence 
opposed to ‘an identitarian politics in which the needs, interests or wishes of 
the majority are merely asserted – as in the case of traditional ideological 
politics, as well as the hegemonic politics associated with Laclau and his 
followers’ (Robinson and Tormey, 2007, 133). However, it is one thing to 
defend an extremely radical change and another to provide evidence of the 
practical efficiency of the path chosen for these changes. Throughout recent 
history, representative politics has been used to struggle against various 
oppressions and sometimes won battles against them. Could we imagine a 
mode of horizontal organisation resting upon the respect of differences and 
singularities but which would combine the efficiency of representative 
politics? Has a movement ever been capable of going beyond representation 
and created a form of organisation which would prove that hegemonic politics 
is not ‘the only game in town’?   
 
IV.vi. The Zapatista struggle versus populism: a radical critique 
of power 
  
 
Robinson and Tormey never answer this question directly; however they try to 
convince us at least that the possibility of overcoming representative and 
vertical politics is possible. The two authors advance an empirical falsification 
of the absolute character of representation by providing concrete examples of 
actual post-representational politics that are not constituted following the 
populist schema; with these examples, they hope to prove that other kinds of 
articulations and constructions of identities are possible. Indeed one counter-
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example would be sufficient to prove that the validity of Laclau’s theory of 
politics as populist is neither ontological nor universal.  
 
Tormey and Robinson’s argument is that there are actually indigenous 
communities who organize without representation, but on a dialogical, 
reciprocal or horizontal basis. The two authors interpret in particular 
indigenous peoples’ organisation as networks of ‘rhizomes’. The existence of 
other logics is a proof that Laclau and Mouffe have ‘unduly constrained the 
field of the possible’ (Tormey, 2006, 134) thus providing a pessimistic view of 
emancipation and of democracy. The analysis of other forms of organisation 
based on a horizontal articulation and on ‘interconnection of rhizomes in a 
smooth space’ (Tormey, 2006, 134) proves that another kind of political 
construction is possible. By taking examples of diverse indigenous forms of 
organisation, such as the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) against the 
violence of Indonesia, whose discourse reveals experiences of fullness which 
would pejoratively be called ‘primitive’ and who ask to be left outside the 
capitalist Indonesian system, Robinson and Tormey want to show that some 
indigenous experiences enter into contradiction with the supposedly universal 
human condition described by Laclau and Mouffe (see Robinson and Tormey, 
2009, 143-144). Furthermore, this description appears to the eyes of the two 
critics like a typical Eurocentric gesture of universalizing from the 
particularity of some urbanised European societies. Even within European 
urbanised societies, some movements which function with immanent politics 
without hegemony cannot be taken into account by Laclau and Mouffe’s 
conception of the political. According to Natalie Fenton, the multiplicity and 
politics of certain new social movements such as the anti-capitalist summit 
protest movements can also be seen as the realization of these rhizomatic types 
of organisation, that break with dominant structures and understandings of 
power in a post-hegemonic frame. ‘New social movements are usually non-
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hierarchical, with open protocols, open communication, and self-generating 
information and identities’ she claims (Fenton, 2011, 180).  
 
Their networks are often anti-bureaucratic and anti-centralist, more organic 
and operate horizontally rather than vertically (Tormey, 2006) creating 
networks of resistance, in which the internet can be a tool and a model because 
of its participatory and interactive attributes.  
 
This different conception of politics requires another definition of the social 
from that of Laclau and Mouffe, and a reconsideration of the politics of 
‘everyday life’. Robinson and Tormey argue that a lot of practices are actually 
resistant to the project of control pursued by the political elite and that many 
ways of action have been found against despotism in everyday practices 
‘without going through the processes of transcendental meaning-construction 
which for Laclau are necessary for political action’ (Robinson and Tormey, 
2009, 149). Those kinds of practices function without a signifier but they are 
not ‘apolitical’: in the sense of being without contestation, deliberation or 
power. The whole opposition between Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of 
political strategy and Robinson and Tormey’s conception is linked to a certain 
conception of power and how to resist to it. I shall analyze this in detail in the 
second part of my chapter, with the explanations of notions such as biopower 
and biopolitics.  
 
The more developed example Robinson and Tormey take is the struggle of the 
Zapatistas, in Chiapas, Mexico. It is an example of an anti-capitalist struggle 
which for them is clearly post-representational and proposes a vision of an 
alter-modernity capable of transfiguring the usual ways of thinking and 
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practicing politics.
56
 According to Robinson and Tormey, the Zapatistas 
attempt to elaborate structures, institutions and processes that go beyond 
representation. As Roger Burbach shows, many contemporary currents want to 
go beyond the politics of modernity (Burbach, 2001, 13) and create an alter-
modernity, the Zapatistas movements being a clear example. For him it is the 
first ‘postmodern revolutionary movement’ (Burbach, 2001, 116). Burbach 
shows well how the Zapatista movement in Chiapas – based on the 
transformation of civil society, not on a simple seizure of state power – has 
managed to link anti-capitalist demands to feminist and ecological demands, 
even if they are far from being as radical as one might hope (see Goetze, 1997, 
quoted in Burbach, 2001). The urge of the Zapatistas for creating free spaces 
coincided with their demands for self-determination, and can be explained by 
the history of the forced assimilation to the liberal system and state they had to 
suffer for centuries. The ethnic solidarity, the difference of traditions, the class 
nature of these movements (peasants for the most part) shapes the form the 
movement takes and it cannot be reduced to autonomist movements as the 
West knows them.  
 
First, we have to reconsider the Zapatistas’ rebellion and its origin within the 
context of the collapse of state socialism and of the emergence of alternative 
movements in Latin America (see Burbach, 2001, 105), but most of all we 
shall recall that the indigenous peoples in Latin America have a long history of 
governmental oppression, forced assimilation, expropriation of their commons 
– land and resources. The Zapatista movement occurred within a larger 
spectrum of peasant movements in Latin America, such as the landless 
                                                 
56 Alter-modernist movements are different from the anti-modernist movements who refuse 
modernity and demand that an identity is to be preserved (with the idea of an authentic 
identity) Alter-modernists movements demand the right to ‘become what we want’ rather 
than the right to be who we are (see Negri and Hardt 2009, 106). They advocate the 
constitution of alternatives rather than being conservative. 
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movement in Brazil, the struggles of the coca farmers in Bolivia, the rebellion 
of the Mapuches in Chile, and the Indian uprisings in Ecuador in the 2000s 
and many other struggles in the Andes. Nevertheless, the Zapatista movement 
has a profound originality linked to its demands that goes beyond the 
immediate demands of peasants, such as feminist and ecological demands. In 
its organisational form it is also an attempt to overcome the authoritarian 
tendency of past revolutionary movements such as the Cuban revolution, led 
by an ‘avant-garde’, or the Peronist movement, that both led to the 
institutionalisation of the revolution and the reproduction of many oppressive 
practices that one originally wanted to overcome. 
 
As regards the internal history of Mexico, according to Jan Rus (Rus, 2003), 
the economic crisis that began for Chiapas’ indigenous people between the end 
of the 1960s and the mid-1970s was the local manifestation of a larger crisis in 
the political-economic model that had governed Mexico since the mid-1930s. 
State and regional peasant organisations independent of the CNC 
(Confederacion Nacional Campesina, National Peasant Confederation) began 
to emerge in the mid-1970s. As the 1970s progressed, indigenous people (or 
campesinos, a notion including peasants and indigenous people) increasingly 
turned away from the CNC and state corporatism in favour of independent 
peasants’ organisations such as the Central Indepediente de Obreros Agricolas 
y Campesinos (Independent Confederation of Agricultural Workers and 
Peasants, CIOAC), the Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Zapata (Emiliano 
Zapata Peasant Organisation, OCEZ) and the Union de Uniones (Union of 
Unions, UU).
57
 Most Indians in Chiapas were however not openly affiliated 
with these alternative organisations, because of the dangerous character of 
such affiliations. 
                                                 
57 Complete name: (Union de Unioned Ejudales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de 
Chiapas, Union of Ejido Unions and Peasant Solidarity Groups of Chiapas). 
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Then a wave of migration affected the indigenous people. Since the 60s they 
have emigrated to the Lacandón forest. They found themselves in their new 
home very far away from any statist organisation, such the CNC, as well as 
from federal and state governments themselves. Although this meant for them 
a quasi-absence of state public service such as the construction of 
infrastructures, etc., it also left them a unique freedom for political and social 
organisations outside the corporatist model. As Rus states: 
 
Independent coffee cooperatives that were organized regionally, for example, 
flourished. Colonias in the Lacandon also developed new types of political, 
social, and religious organisations different from those of their communities 
of origin. After just a few years, they were governing themselves through 
local, regional, and general assemblies, which they convened by means of a 
single organisation, the Union of Unions. (Rus,  2003, 12) 
 
More generally, as the possibility of using legal channels to resolve their 
demands diminished after the mid-80s, ‘thousand of the migrants to the 
Lacandon jungle, as well as members of the communities from which they had 
emigrated, particularly in the highlands joined the Zapatistas. In the wake of 
the Zapatista Uprising, political mobilization among such people has, in turn, 
focused increasingly on the creation of autonomous municipalities and 
regions, and on developing permanent structure for governing themselves, free 
of the kind of control the state has always exercised over them’(Rus, 2003, 
14). 
 
The rebellion started on the 1
st
 January 1994 against the Mexican government, 
with twelve days of combat against the Mexican Army. The Zapatistas had 
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also an army, the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation, EZLN). Since 1994, thousands of Indians living in the 
highlands and the northern regions of the state as well as Zapatista 
communities in the rainforest declared the formation of Regiones Autonomas 
Plurietnicas (Pluriethnic Autonomous regions, RAP) and Regiones Autonomas 
Zapatistas (Zapatistas Autonomous Regions RAZ). From December 1994 to 
February 1995, the territory under EZLN control grew from four 
municipalities to thirty-eight as local people adhered to the cause and declared 
their townships municipios libres, free municipalities, that is, land outside 
government control.  
 
One of the most original aspects of the Zapatista movement is their radical 
critique of power (see Khasnabish, 2010, 81-95); this in turn is linked to their 
demand for self-determination and interconnectedness, their demand for a 
world free of exclusion, division and violence. The Zapatistas have not 
themselves completely rejected ‘representational’ politics as such. 
Nevertheless, Simon Tormey in his article (Tormey, 2006) distinguishes what 
the Zapatistas actually demanded and what they practiced. The first element 
Tormey points out is the fact that the Zapatistas didn’t themselves claim to 
‘represent’ the groups and peoples inhabiting Chiapas. The EZLN makes itself 
accountable to the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena (Indigenous 
Revolutionary Clandestine Committee, CCRI) which were local and regional 
assemblies based on the principle of delegated democracy, which were in turn 
answerable to the thirty-eight autonomous municipalities that the Zapatistas 
helped to set up in 1994. The CCRIs were not, insists Tormey, sovereign 
bodies that ‘govern’ but were entirely subject to the views of the communities; 
they ‘lead by obeying’ according to the Zapatista slogan; Tormey remarks that 
this is beyond Marx’s Paris Commune model of ‘immediate recall and rotation 
to embrace the demand that delegates listen to each and every “campanero” 
who turns up’ (Tormey, 2006, 147-148). This principle of omnipresent 
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consultation of the Zapatista communities themselves created a great sense of 
solidarity and of communal cause, without the aim being the creation of a 
General Will or the creation of a People.  
 
According to Tormey, the Zapatistas’ communiqués have a strong sense of the 
impossibility of speaking in representational terms since there is an awareness 
of the huge differences between the various groups, communes, regions etc., 
hence the favoured expression is ‘the peoples of the Chiapas’, echoing the 
multiplicity that Deleuze thought of as positive and irreducible. 
Subcommandante Marcos didn’t represent the indigenous people; he was 
simply a spokesperson for the indigenous among others, with no greater 
supplementary right or position than any other member of the community. 
Moreover, the Zapatistas had never already prepared a programme that should 
be imposed on other groups nor a vision of what society should be; they rather 
wanted to create the space where these kind of discussions could take place 
and common decisions be taken. This required precisely the abolition of 
representational practices. A lot of scholars have insisted on that precise point, 
along with the respect of differences, because it is really a shift compared to 
the previous rebellions in South America and to any self-claimed vangardist 
rebellion (the Guevarist one for example) (see Neil Harvey, 1998).  
 
To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists 
that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to “The People”; 
there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only “lived 
experience.” (Khasnabish, 2012, 83) 
 
Zapatism is an ‘intuition’ for Marcos (see Khasnabish, 2012, 83) with no 
singular and transcendent truth. It is a political force that is concerned with the 
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means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, 
whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and 
strategies that have prevented voices being heard’ (Tormey, 2006, 151). 
Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos 
declared (on behalf of the Zapatistas):  
 
“We aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an 
antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will 
not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a 
free and democratic space for political struggle.” (Marcos, quoted in Tormey, 
2006, 151) 
 
This also means that Zapatism encourages differences for themselves and 
recognizes multiplicity as essential to life, as a manifestation of justice and 
liberty; hence self-determination is advocated not only for the community but 
for individuals too, as the Zapatista slogan ‘queremos un mundo donde quepan 
muchos mundo’ (we want a world which holds many worlds) would suggest 
(Navarro, 1998, 162, in Khasnabish, 2010, 91). 
 
IV.vii. Lasse Thomassen’s interpretation of the Zapatista 
movement 
 
 
In the debate that opposed Simon Tormey to Lasse Thomassen, the latter, 
following Laclau and Mouffe’s argument, claimed that contrary to 
appearances, representation is constitutive, it has been constitutive even in the 
Zapatista movement. For him going beyond representation is neither possible 
nor necessary, neither is it possible to avoid a certain amount of exclusion and 
146 
verticality. After a re-exposition of Tormey’s argument, Thomassen attempts 
in the second part of his article (Thomassen, 2007) to show that the Zapatistas 
can be subsumed within the Laclauian schema; first by explaining that Marcos 
cannot be just a spokesperson as he gives a voice to the voiceless; he had to 
add something to these missing voices. Quoting Thomassen:  
 
Marcos and the Zapatistas add something to the voice-less in order for them 
to have a voice; the demands and identities are (also) constituted through this 
relation of giving-voice-to. For instance, the various demands stop being 
merely isolated demands and become simultaneously demands against 
“Power”. The demands thereby lose some of their singularity and autonomy 
because they become dependent on their place of inscription within the 
Zapatista discourse, and they become associated with the other anti-“Power” 
demands (Thomassen, 2007, 116).  
 
Here Thomassen attempts to show that the voice of Marcos acts as a signifier 
for the other voices and demands, creating a chain of equivalence between 
them and hence finding their unitary expression in that single voice. He tries to 
prove that representation is constitutive and hence that the relation of 
representation shapes and gives meaning to the actual form of the voice whose 
different components are articulated to produce an ‘anti-power’ discourse. 
Thomassen founds his argument especially on the Derridean conception of 
representation as a citation or reproduction, and as performativity, that is a 
creation of something new: ‘Representation must both performatively bring 
something into existence and cite, as already existent, that “something” (an 
authentic voice, the will of the people, and so forth)’ (Thomassen, 2007, 117); 
following the Kantian approach to representation, Thomassen adds: ‘As such, 
representation is split between Darstellung (making present) and Vertretung 
(speaking for and standing in for)’ (Thomassen, 2007, 117). The reason for 
that is the universality of language, which functions through syntagmatic 
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relations of combination and paradigmatic relations of substitutions 
(Thomassen, 2007, 115).  
 
Firstly the problem with this analysis concerns its practical consequences. The 
attempt to subsume indigenous struggles into hegemonic struggles is in vain 
because their practices contradict Thomassen’s argument: Indigenous 
struggles are beyond radical democracy because the demand of the protection 
of their commons (land, water, grazes) challenges the roots of the liberal 
framework and capitalism. They are anti-capitalist and anti-liberal struggles. 
Radical democracy advocates the radicalisation of current forms of 
democracy, that is a form of gradualist path towards more and more 
equalitarian relations. However, the Zapatistas do not demand inclusion within 
the liberal democratic framework but self-determination and political and 
economic autonomy from the state. Hence, whereas the logic of representation 
and the hegemonic logic could be considered as gradualist, corresponding to 
the re-articulations/disarticulations processes that do not question the 
conditions of these as such, indigenous struggles can be characterized as anti-
systemic and in clear rupture with the liberal democratic 
framework.
58
Moreover, the concrete political practices of indigenous struggles 
are not representational but based on direct participation. The communities 
have no leaders; they are organized on a horizontal basis according to a logic 
of a consensus, and collective decisions. If the Zapatista struggles were truly 
following a logic of representation, Marcos would be a leader rather than a 
spokesperson with the delegation of power from the represented it 
presupposes. Secondly, by analysing the ‘Mask’ of the Zapatistas for example 
                                                 
58 Mouffe wrote many times that radical democracy was the radicalisation of democracy or 
the extension of it as it currently exists in the Western world. Radical democracy is ‘the 
extension and deepening of the democratic revolution initiated two hundred years ago’  
(Mouffe, 1992, 1), and its strategy is ‘a radicalisation of the modern democratic tradition’  
(Mouffe, 1992, 1).  
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as an actual master signifier, I suggest with Simon Tormey that Thomassen is 
not trying to see what is new in the Zapatistas’ experience but tries to subsume 
these experiences to the logic of representation. According to Tormey, by 
trying to reduce different political phenomena such as Zapatismo to 
representational politics, Thomassen is trying to ‘make phenomena fit into the 
model to which he is, as a political theorist, wedded’ (Robinson and Tormey, 
2007, 136).  
 
Finally, recalling the ‘European gesture’ of the universalisation of a Western 
singularity, many post-colonial thinkers would criticise Thomassen’s attempt 
to impose a model characteristics of Western modernity on the Zapatistas 
movement and on the indigenous struggles for self-determination in Latin 
America in general. This attempt at universalisation that reproduces the 
attempt of the Enlightment to impose one single view of human nature and of 
its fulfilment, can be criticised for the reification and essentialisation it 
induces, even if it essentialises an ontology of lack hence absence of ontologic 
ground. The decolonialist thinkers inspired by the twentieth century 
Martinican intellectual and activist Frantz Fanon (see Mignolo, 2005, XI) 
would argue that even ‘democracy’ with its Ancient Greek origin has to be 
decolonized and does not have anything in common with the democracy 
indigenous people practice in reality (see Mignolo, 2011). Mignolo could have 
shown how Thomassen’s attempt to subsume the Zapatistas’ struggles to the 
logic of representation and language is an attempt to apply a paradigm of 
knowledge that is based on the geo-historical location of Europe and that this 
would be an attempt at cultural imperialism. Instead, one needs to shift 
knowledge to a new terrain of decoloniality and propose to situate the 
argument ‘within the decolonial paradigm of knowledge and understanding 
enacted by Waman Puma de Ayala (...) as well as other intellectuals after him 
belonging to the sphere of society that anthropologist Eric Wolf identified as 
‘people without history’. All that we can read on the Americas is historically 
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located ‘from a European perspective that passes as universal’ (Mignolo, 2005, 
XII).  
 
Whereas Robinson and Tormey depart from normative considerations on what 
the real should be like and try to find already existing movements that match 
their hopes, Thomassen departs from ontological statements and subsumes 
existing movements to the logic of representation. If we analyse some 
victorious progressive movements in the last twenty years, we see that 
horizontal and immanent practices within movements are not automatically 
condemned to failure and horizontally constructed movements can have their 
own means of defence, such as an armed faction, like in the case of the 
Zapatistas. One must also recognise that the condition that allowed the 
rebellion to flourish were exceptional, in the sense that the state’s domination 
over the lands was already minimal when the Zapatistas took control of them. 
What is certain is that these kinds of movements cannot be situated in the 
mainstream political field, such as the elections, unions or parties. Rather, they 
must situate themselves in the immanent social field. However, if a space free 
from the state was given to people for a post-representational politics to be 
conducted, this wouldn’t mean the resolution of all oppressive practices, and 
the result could be anything but socialism or anti-sexist or anti-racist practices. 
The question of articulation of demands would be crucial, since the existence 
of such spaces does not evacuate the political moment of struggling against 
oppressive practices that could be reiterated within those spaces. Post-
representational politics must not be seen as the end of politics but rather as a 
mean to struggle against oppressive ideas and practices in a long process 
towards an equalitarian society.  
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IV.viii. Hegemony versus exodus and desertion; an overview  
 
 
Now that I have outlined Robinson and Tormey’s critique of the populist 
forms of organisation based on the ontology of lack, I can turn to what has 
been the most debated new theory in the leftist political circles, namely Hardt 
and Negri’s theory espoused in their trilogy Empire (2000), Multitude (2004) 
and Commonwealth (2009). The debate between representational and post-
representational politics tally in many ways the debates Negri and Hardt have 
provoked with Laclau. Negri and Hardt’s position is singular in the sense that 
they claim to be communists while advocating completely new methods and 
strategies such as ‘exodus’ and ‘desertion’. Their singular position which 
Richard Day characterizes as ‘Autonomist Marxist’ defends the actualization 
of horizontality in the present time with a communist society in perspective. 
With this, they seem to be radicalising what Tormey and Robinson advocate, 
namely a political action within the domain of immanent social practices 
where rhizomatic connections are possible, as well as a desertion from the 
state and its ‘arborescent’ model as Deleuze and Guattari have termed it. 
Nevertheless, Negri and Hardt’s path of analysis differs completely from 
Robinson and Tormey’s path which was empirical/ethical. Hardt and Negri 
link the strategies of exodus and desertion with a Marxist historical 
materialism. In the following part, I shall explain how their discourse is 
constructed showing first the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, 
their explanation of strategies of exodus and desertion in terms of the historical 
consequences of the postmodern condition. I shall explain what the passage to 
postmodernity and to biopolitical production means and then confront Negri 
and Hardt’s tactical arguments with Laclau and Mouffe’s critiques. 
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IV.ix. Strategies of exodus and desertion and the postmodern 
caesura  
 
 
For Negri and Hardt, Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist gesture is not radical 
enough, as it reproduces the modern conception of a transcendent power, to 
seize and transform from inside. Indeed for Negri, ‘if we want to shatter the 
bourgeois capitalist conception of power, we must go beyond the modern 
conception of power itself’ (Negri, 2008, 18). The modern conception of 
power is monolithic or analogical to a monotheist conception of power, with a 
single centre of contestation challenging it – a class or, the people. For Negri 
and Hardt, post-modern power is not centred as it was before. Hence the desire 
for a rupture and a break with the neoliberal order implies a different strategy 
than that which prevailed in the modern era. This new strategy must be a self-
conscious leave-taking, or exodus, which is central to what Negri and Hardt 
call ‘the constituent power of the multitude’ (Negri and Hardt, 2000, 410). 
Paolo Virno explains that exodus is ‘an engaged withdrawal’, a ‘founding 
leave-taking’ that consists in a ‘mass defection from the State’ (1996, 197, 
quoted in Day, 2008, 249).  
 
In Empire, Negri and Hardt write:  
 
Whereas in the disciplinary era, sabotage was the fundamental notion of 
resistance, in the era of imperial control it may be desertion. Whereas being-
against in modernity often meant a direct/or dialectical opposition of forces, 
in post-modernity being-against might well be most effective in an oblique or 
diagonal stance. Battle against the Empire might be won through substraction 
and defection. This desertion does not have a place; it is the evacuation of the 
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place of power. (Negri and Hardt, 2000, 212)  
 
In other words, contrary to the hegemonic forms of organisation, which is the 
attempt to change the centre of power from one hegemonic bloc to another, 
exodus is the desertion from the loci of power. What is very important to 
retain is that Negri and Hardt’s advocacy of exodus and desertion as a strategy 
for emancipation is linked to what they claim to be the existence of a new 
world order and a change in the form of power and sovereignty itself. The new 
strategies for the left correspond to the new order that appeared with the post-
modern caesuras. On this point, Hardt and Negri can be said to be post-
Marxists too, but with a very different understanding of what post-Marxism is. 
Indeed, what Hardt and Negri try to do is to actualize Marx by changing the 
outdated Marxian theses rooted in the analyses of nineteenth century capitalist 
system and rendered meaningless in the context of the postmodern world; 
whereas for Laclau and Mouffe, these fundamental Marxian theses were 
inherently wrong and had simply to be changed by other ones.  
  
As stated in the quotation above, one of the caesuras that led to the paradigm 
shift Negri and Hardt are attempting to theorize is the shift from a 
disciplinarian regime to a regime of control, under the management of the 
welfare state. This claim relies on Deleuze’s commentaries on the passage 
from disciplinary society to the society of control in Foucault’s work (see 
Hardt and Negri, 2000, 22-23), (see Deleuze, 1992). In the new form of 
sovereignty that appears with the shift to postmodernity in the post-nation state 
which is named ‘Empire’, the exercise of power is not centred anymore, it has 
infiltrated everywhere. This regime of control is namely ‘biopower’, in other 
words power’s pervasion of the totality of life. ‘Whereas discipline was an 
“anatomo-politics” of bodies and essentially applied to individuals, writes 
Negri, biopolitics on the contrary represents a kind of great “social medicine” 
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attempting the control of populations in order to govern their lack: life now 
belongs to the field of power’, explains Negri (Negri, 2008, 30-31).  
 
Foucault and Deleuze believed that we were undergoing the transition from a 
modern society based on disciple to a postmodern society which works rather 
on control. This is ‘a progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of 
domination’ (Deleuze, 1992, 7). Disciplinary societies appeared in the 18th and 
19
th 
centuries and saw their height at the outset of the twentieth. Discipline 
relies on a functional and hierarchical control of space and time, prisons 
serving as the analogical model, which was also applied to the organisation of 
factories. The society of control differs from the disciplinary societies on four 
points 1) the aim is less to produce some corporal habits with the play of pain 
and pleasure than to provoke needs and desires, 2) secondly, the energy used 
for the control of individuals is more the energy of the controlled individuals 
themselves than the one of the institution. Institutions act not by coercion but 
with the ‘voluntary mobilisation’ (mobilisation volontaire) of individuals 
(Castel, 1981, 208), 3) the rules of control are internalized and they are lived 
as the natural consequences of a state of facts, and not as pressure coming the 
institutions 4) personal interests cease to correspond to the interests of the 
institutions. Violence as a tool of domination progressively disappears to be 
replaced by the production of affects, self-violence and self-control (see 
Razac, 2008, 112-113). In economic terms, the new paradigm is said to be 
characterized by the Marxist concept of ‘real subsumption of society under 
capital’ (see Negri, 2008, 23) or colonization of every form of life by capital – 
the commodification of life – whose political structure is named biopower. 
The result is that the post-structuralist account of power is one of being 
immanently constitutive of social structures.  
 
The analysis of biopower, capitalism’s total investment of life, and the 
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absolutely fetishized and commodified world as well as the totalitarian effects 
of biopower was already present in Lyotard, Baudrillard and Virilio’s works. 
For Negri, these authors thought that there were nothing to be done but escape 
from alienation on an individual plane. Whereas for Negri there is a possibility 
of collective resistance because of the generalisation of oppressive practices. 
Beyond Deleuze and Foucault’s influences, Negri and Hardt’s idea that where 
there is exploitation, there is resistance takes root in the Operaista idea that 
‘capitalist development is subordinated to worker's struggles’ and that 
therefore resistance comes first (See Tronti, 1971, 89 in Mandarini 2005, 193). 
It means that: 
 
Not only does real subsumption of society under capital signify domination, 
writes Negri, [but] it also signifies, and we have already insisted on this point, 
the global emergence of contradiction, antagonism and their discrepancy. 
(Negri, 2008, 79) 
 
Following the Operaista idea, Hardt and Negri emphasise resistance as 
ontologically prior to the powers of state and capital (Hardt and Negri, 2005, 
64). Vidar Thorsteinsson explains that ‘they maintain that the global 
emergence of Empire is not only the result of capital’s own dynamics of 
expansion but a reaction to working-class struggles in the occident, national 
liberation struggles in the global south, and state socialism’ (Thorsteinsson, 
2010, 49; see also Negri and Dufourmantelle, 2004, 60). To fully understand 
this idea it is worth recalling the content of this Operaista idea in detail. 
Operaista ideas emerged in the 60s in journals such as Quaderni Rossi and 
Class Operaia. The main issue, especially for Mario Tronti, was that Marxists 
had for too long seen working class struggles as merely reactive to the 
development of capital. Mario Tronti radically inverts this relationship 
between labour and capital affirming that ‘at the beginning is the working 
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class struggle’ (Tronti, 1979, 1). Capital is said to be reactive and the working 
class struggles set the pace of the whole adjustments, adaptations and general 
development of capitalism. This is because capitalism’s existence is based on 
the vital commodity on which the whole edifice is based: labour power. 
However, Hardt and Negri believe that there is a historical tendency of an 
increasingly ‘immaterial’ form of labour, which is ‘biopolitical’ in the sense 
that what it produces is not so much the ‘means of life’ but  ‘social life itself’ 
(Hardt and Negri, 2004, 146). For Hardt and Negri, immaterial labour involves 
an increased ‘feminisation of labour, a qualitative shift in the length of the 
working day, a growth in affective labour, and the rise of international 
migration’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, 131-137).  
 
The productive excess that is characteristic of immaterial labour is what Hardt 
and Negri call ‘the common’.59.The common is essentially an autonomous 
space, one that includes ‘the languages we create, the social practices we 
establish, (and) the modes of sociality that define our relationship’ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009, 139) It is ‘the sum of everything that the labour force produces 
independently of capital and against it’ (Negri, 2008, 67). Hence, this 
productive ‘excess’ is the most significant aspect of immaterial labour, and it 
is this excess that ‘enables the constitution of spaces of self-valorisation that 
capital cannot entirely absorb’ (Negri, 2008, 43). The point of antagonism is 
not between capital and labour in the classical sense anymore but between 
capital and the common (see Thorsteinsson, 2010, 51). Similar to Marx’s 
argument according to which the form of labour that emerged with capitalism 
gave rise to the proletariat and the subjectivity associated with it, the new form 
of labour that creates the common provides a new form of revolutionary 
                                                 
59 The true novelty of Negri and Hardt is the concept of the common: ‘the common 
constitutes indeed the crucial element differentiating my theorization… from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theorization’ (Negri and Casarino, 2008, 118). 
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subjectivity, namely the ‘Multitude’. The multitude is brought about by the 
transformations of the nature of postmodern labour. It is exploited by capital as 
was the proletariat for Marx. 
 As Negri argues, the second meaning of the multitude is a class concept: 
 
the class of productive singularities, the class of operators of immaterial 
labor. This class is not itself a class – it is rather the creative strength of labor 
as a whole. (…) The struggle of the working class no longer exists, but the 
multitude proposes itself as the subject of class struggle: to become this 
subject, it must be the most productive class ever invented. (Negri, 2004, 112) 
 
Multitude comes hence to replace the traditional function of the proletariat as 
the class meant to liberate all the other classes, as the traditional ‘subject of the 
revolution’. This simple enlargement of the subject of the revolution will be 
the target of strong critiques from Laclau and Mouffe. Just like in Marx, then, 
the antagonistic relation between the multitude and capital remains central in 
posing the possibility of revolutionary subjectivity. Resistance to capital alone, 
however, is not enough to constitute it. For Hardt and Negri, the key to 
understanding revolutionary subjectivity lies in the increasingly autonomous 
capacity of immaterial labour. The multitude has the capacities ‘for self-
organisation and cooperation’ in social biopolitical production. Nevertheless 
the transition from one society to another is said to be non-spontaneous but has 
to be carried out through non-representative means. The material conditions of 
this transformation are partly found in the autonomy of biopolitical production 
(the autonomous production of the common); these are the ‘economic 
capacities’ of the multitude, and they are immanently ‘expressed as political 
capacities’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, 365) For Hardt and Negri, because the 
excess that the multitude creates and that cannot be totally absorbed by capital 
is social life itself, this type of labour ‘tends to produce the means of 
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interaction, communication, and co-operation directly...the creation of co-
operation has become internal to labour and thus external to capital’ (Hardt 
and Negri, 2004, 147). The politics of the multitude is hence immanently 
constructed by its economic activity and has the characteristics of it. The 
economic characteristics of the multitude match therefore the ethical 
commitment of Negri and Hardt to horizontal and autonomous practices.  
 
Along with this definition of the multitude as a class concept, Negri claims 
that multitude also has a philosophical meaning and this meaning comes from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy:  
 
The multitude is defined as a multiplicity of subjects. Here what is being 
challenged is the reduction to unity, which is to say the permanent temptation 
that has poisoned thought since classical metaphysics. The multitude is, by 
contrast, an irreducible multiplicity, an infinite quantity of points, a 
differentiated –an absolutely differentiated- whole. (Negri, 2004, 111)  
 
Hence it is opposed to the concept of a people, as Robinson and Tormey have 
argued, which is a reduction of the multitude to an imaginary unity. The notion 
of people is, due to the new forms of possibility within the population, an 
obstacle to the full deployment of the potential of the multitude, not as a 
community gathered around a precarious point, such as a leader, but its 
multiplicity itself. ‘The community is not a dynamic collection creation but a 
primordial founding myth. An originary notion of the people poses an identity 
that homogenizes and purifies the image of the population while blocking the 
constructive interaction of difference within the multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000). 
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So in this context of a new regime of power, Hardt and Negri argue that the 
best strategy to really challenge the dominant system, since power is not 
concentrated in one point but rather is now thought as a network, is the exodus 
of the multitude. The multitude is an ensemble of singularities,
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 and the 
manner through which it is produced determines the strategy best suited to 
challenge the capitalist system i.e., it is created by the change in the form of 
labour itself.  
 
Negri and Hardt compare the strategy of exodus to the war of position: they 
claim a ‘“disarmed multitude” is much more effective than an armed band and 
that exodus is more powerful than frontal assault’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, 
368) and should be placed in a more global strategy of war of position.  
 
Exodus in this context often takes the form of sabotage, withdrawal from 
collaboration, countercultural practices, and generalized disobedience. Such 
practices are effective because biopower is always ‘subject’ to the 
subjectivities it rules over. When they evacuate the terrain, they create 
vacuums that biopower cannot tolerate. The alterglobalization movements 
that flourished in the years around the turn of the millennium functioned 
largely in this way: creating breaks in the continuity of control and filling 
those vacuums with new cultural expressions and forms of life. Those 
movements have left behind, in fact, an arsenal of strategies of disobedience, 
new languages of democracy, and ethical practices (for peace, care for the 
environment, and so forth) that can eventually be picked up and redeployed 
by new initiatives of rebellion. (Hardt and Negri, 2009, 368) 
 
                                                 
60 The politics of the multitude is hence linked to ‘a discovery, deepening, and development 
of another heritage of modernity; a heritage that, instead of hiding differene behind identity 
and repetition, exalts it through the diversity of life’ (Negri, 2004, 74).  
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Hence the typical social movements that Negri and Hardt would defend are the 
World Social Forums, starting by the first one in Porto Alegre in Brazil, in 
2002. Porto Alegre’s forum was first thought as an alternative to the world 
economic forum. It united a great number of movements from civil societies as 
well as individuals from leftist parties from all around the world. The unity of 
the diverse groups is only the unity of the common goal they set and they built 
together.
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 It is considered as the movement of the movements outside any 
alliances with economic or political power structures. It was said to be 
possible that the forum would be the mean of action of the multitude, giving 
birth to the democracy of the multitude (Hardt and Negri, 2003, 10).  
 
 
IV.x. Critiques of Hardt and Negri’s concepts  
 
 
The concept of multitude has attracted a lot of critiques from opponents 
including from Laclau and Mouffe. They see two main problems in Negri and 
Hardt’s political thought: the spontaneism of the multitude’s challenge to the 
dominant system, and secondly the class reductionism operating with this 
concept. We can find many affirmations in Negri and Hardt’s work about the 
generalization of resistance, since they totally accept the Operaista assumption 
that where there is power, there is resistance. In the era of biopower and the 
                                                 
61 ‘Le second point frappant est que le réseau de Porto Alegre prend la forme d’un processus 
commun. Les connections sont transformées en discussions et le réseau se mue en une liste 
d’exigences et de projets. Identifier et construire ce que nous avons en commun est ce qui 
fait l’unite du réseau. Il n’est pas tant question de trouver un point d’unité ou d’identité, 
mais simplement de découvrir ce que nous avons en commun dans nos différences et 
d’élargir cette communauté en laissant nos différences proliférer’ (Hardt and Negri, 2003, 
8). 
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‘global extension of capitalist power over society’ one must have ‘the global 
spread of insubordination’ (Negri, 2008, 50). As the entire ‘cooperating 
multitude’ is today the new proletariat, it means that the multitude is this new 
collection of multiple forces resisting subordination. About this Negri writes 
that there is on one side the imperialism and colonialism of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
century and the permanence of biopower, and on the other side, beneath this 
power ‘an entire history of resistance, insurrectional movements, 
experimentations in cooperation and alternative solidarity, attempts at political 
and cultural autonomy, struggles, and utopian projects of liberation’ (Negri, 
2008, 50). 
 
Whereas in Laclau and Mouffe’s thought, resistance was already the result of a 
hegemonic articulation, in Hardt and Negri’s the multitude is already 
antagonistic, a heterogeneous and non-homologous entity, produced by the 
new forms of sovereignty emerging during the age of globalisation; for Laclau 
and Mouffe antagonism has to be constructed and nothing guarantees its 
constitution. Claiming that ‘wherever we find exploitation, we always 
encounter resistance, antagonism’ (Negri, 2008, 64) may be a pure tautology 
from Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective: if a situation is lived as an exploitation, 
that would mean that the antagonism has already been transformed from a 
relation of subordination to a relation of exploitation to be fought. The 
multitude is created without any political mediation; it relies on the form of 
labour which corresponds to it, namely immaterial labour. This cannot be 
accepted by Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau states: ‘according to Empire, it [unity] 
does not involve any kind of political mediation. Because it is only natural, 
according to the authors, that the oppressed revolt, their unity is simply the 
expression of a spontaneous tendency to converge. Unity, as a gift from 
Heaven, occupies in their theory the same place we attribute to hegemonic 
articulation’ (Laclau, 2005, 240). Laclau tries to explain where out of 
heterogeneity this unity comes from and for him it presupposes the 
161 
establishment of equivalential logics and the creation of empty signifiers; but 
in Negri and Hardt’s thought, unity is built through action and the construction 
of a common, it is the result of the productive process of labour itself. The 
multitude has the capacities ‘for self-organisation and cooperation’ in social 
biopolitical production. 
 
It is true that in Laclau and Mouffe’s thought, we could perceive very clearly 
what were the concrete mechanisms of the creation of political unities, through 
empty signifiers. Whereas it is hard to imagine how a unity, or a relation to 
others can be constructed in a completely immanent plane. For Negri and 
Hardt the multitude is a set of singularities, but for them all singularities are 
relational: they can’t exist apart from the relations they have with others within 
society; the political form of the multitude is immanently constructed within it.  
 
The second critique that would be made by Laclau and Mouffe concerns the 
role of the multitude and its relation to the former category of ‘proletariat’ that 
Marxists used to use. The concept of multitude comes replacing the concept of 
proletariat as it was understood by Marxists and then for Laclau and Mouffe, 
Negri and Hardt’s intervention remains locked in a classical Marxist paradigm. 
The different shape the concept of ‘multitude’ has in relation to ‘proletariat’ is 
a consequence of the change in work that began with the New Deal, a 
tendency towards the hegemony of immaterial work and globalization of 
economic processes, and the change of concepts such as nation-state, people, 
sovereignty (Negri, 2008, 22). It does retain some remnants of class-centric 
analysis identified with the task of the multitude. Furthermore, the ‘multitude’ 
is the result of an objective economic process: ‘the concept of multitude 
follows from the relation between a constitutive form – of singularity, of 
invention, of risk, to which the entire transformation of labour and the new 
measure of temporality lead –, and a practice of power – the destructive 
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tendency of labor-value that capital must today enforce. But while capital used 
to be able to reduce the multiplicity of singularities to something organic and 
unitary (a class, a people, a mass, a collection), this process no longer 
functions. The multitude must necessarily be thought of as a nonorganic, 
differential and powerful (puissante) multiplicity’ (Negri, 2008, 45). Laclau 
and Mouffe would disagree with that analysis as for them the objective 
relations of economy never led to the collection or unity (a class or people) it 
is always already a political construction. It seems that the multitude is the 
proletariat for-itself, which will bring a ‘new global vision, a new way of 
living in the world’ (Negri and Hardt, 2000, 214).  
 
Whereas for Marxists of the Second International the development of 
capitalism was meant to lead to a unifying process of the proletariat, for Negri 
and Hardt, the post-modern paradigm of capitalism might conduct the 
multitude to a global resistance against oppressive practices. It is never clear 
what kind of struggles the multitude is concerned with, and in the case of 
purely social struggles (such as a demand for higher wages) resistance can 
hardly spontaneously transcend its corporatist moment, and this was exactly 
the thesis of Gramsci that to become political, demands have to be articulated 
to others, in a process of hegemonisation. With the task incumbent to the 
multitude it is not clear either whether it is really a collection of singularities 
or if it has a unique centre. On one hand, the multitude is indeed theorized as a 
multiplicity in Deleuzean sense, that is ‘as a non identitarian formation of 
subjects in perpetual motion, sailing the ‘enormous sea’ of capitalist 
globalisation in ‘a perpetual nomadism’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 60-61) or a 
creative constellation of powerful singularities; but on the other hand Hardt 
and Negri give the multitude a single task, direction and something like a 
centre. Indeed it will achieve certain goals for humanity as a whole and 
according to Richard Day, ‘although it may be internally differentiated and 
fluid the task of the multitude – as it is envisaged by Hardt and Negri at any 
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rate – [it] is to counted one totalising force with another, to struggle for 
hegemony in the leninist sense of this term’ (Day, 2008, 152). 
  
IV.xi. Concluding remarks  
 
 
I have shown that Negri and Hardt share with Robinson and Tormey the 
Deleuzean interpretation of the epiphenomenal character of unity and identity 
where everything is multiple, different and singular. However, the arguments 
of Hardt and Negri in favour of rhizomatic organisation are very different from 
Robinson and Tormey’s argument. The focus is not the same: while for 
Robinson and Tormey, it is unethical to sacrifice plurality and multiplicities in 
the name of the creation of a people through hegemonic practices, for Hardt 
and Negri it also refers to the best strategy that is adapted to the shape of the 
postmodern world. Negri and Hardt nevertheless do not seem to avoid a 
certain amount of reductionism that Laclau and Mouffe’s have identified in 
classical Marxism. Laclau and Mouffe’s work has the benefit of making it 
clear that we cannot simply assume that something like ‘the multitude’ exists, 
nor can we hope to bring together the multitudes under a single sign without 
reproducing all that is bound up with the logic of hegemony (Day, 2008, 154).  
 
One would nevertheless remark that the criteria of practical efficiency 
underlies one extreme discourse and another, without being explicitly 
deliberated, exposed, problematised in the texts of both Thomassen and Hardt 
and Negri. Many occurrences could be quoted here. At the end of 
Thomassen’s article (Thomassen, 2007), there is for instance an ambiguity 
between ontological reasons for defending representation and efficiency of a 
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form of government or presence of a leader. There is nevertheless a problem 
because in the notion of hegemony, there is already the idea that efficiency is 
precisely linked to the form of the political practices in play. The hegemonic 
practices aim to be hegemonic, that is provoke a change, become more 
powerful, control a wider range of relations; whereas horizontal practices think 
themselves as disconnected from practical efficiency, except in Hardt and 
Negri who try to link horizontal tactics to efficiency without being very 
convincing. 
 
I have argued that transforming representation into a logic could be interpreted 
as a will to impose a model characteristic of Western modernity, but at the 
same time willing to impose horizontal practices at any costs would also be 
vain and could lead to a form of leftism, if it is done without consideration of 
any context or situation. Gramsci himself adapted tactics to situations, with the 
development of notions such as war of movement and war of position, each 
being destined to a specific context. This exigency of practical efficiency has a 
little link with ontology, and only indirectly; it rather has a tie with the idea of 
situation understood as the state of force relationships in question, the political 
traditions of a nation, the international climate and so on. A conjuncture of 
favourable situations can decide of the success of a movement, whereas the 
initial form of the movement is given by the principles or by the philosophy 
guiding the action.  
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General conclusion  
 
i. Overview 
 
 
In this conclusion I summarize the principal arguments of my thesis and make 
some additional remarks. My thesis analysed the genesis of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s post-Marxism politically and theoretically, confronted its underlying 
ontology of lack with the so-called ontology of abundance and showed how 
this could be translated into concrete political strategy.  
 
The first crisis of Marxism was instigated by Bernstein’s revisionism. The key 
issue concerned Marxist dualistic interpretation of the social world as 
composed of two fundamental elements: first the structure or the economic 
base, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. Orthodox Marxists of the 
Second International like Kautsky considered that the class-consciousness of 
the proletariat was dependent of its infrastructural unity. This was the 
condition that made the proletariat the subject capable of overthrowing the 
capitalist system and emancipating society once and for all. However, in the 
context of a growing economic fragmentation, as the seizure of power and the 
victory of the proletariat was subordinated to its unity, the new question was to 
know how to create this unity. If the politico-ideological unity of the working 
class was not a direct consequence of its social homogeneity as the 
Revisionists argued, then its politico-ideological unity had to be constructed. 
Gramsci and subsequently Althusser’s contribution was to suppress the 
dualism of Marxism; the two authors developed the idea of necessary 
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ideological struggles to raise class-consciousness, and their purpose was to 
bring a new materialist theory of the social discarding the mechanistic idea of 
a determination of superstructures by the movements of the superstructures. 
Even so, as Laclau and Mouffe showed, these theories remained locked in the 
dualist paradigm and somehow they couldn’t overcome the class-centric 
analysis and the reductionist approach (found in the theory of determination of 
the last instance of the economy) or conceptualize the real possibility of social 
change. To the dualistic approach which was the common denominator of the 
various Marxist currents, Laclau and Mouffe opposed a monist vision of the 
social field, reducible to the field of discursivity. The consequences were that 
revolutionary subjectivity couldn’t a priori rely on any position in society. Not 
only did they claim that the proletariat wasn’t the designated subject of 
revolution anymore but also they challenged the centrality of the quest for the 
revolutionary subject’s unity. They recognized the ontological existence of 
pluralism and differences and consequently they argued that socialist 
strategy’s first concern couldn’t be the quest for unity anymore but the 
preservation of pluralities and differences.  
 
Post-structuralist theories allowed the final break with Marxism and 
structuralism. Along with the Derridean and Saussurean influences, Jacques 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic ontology of lack was a major influence on Laclau and 
Mouffe and gave them a means to consolidate their post-structuralist theory of 
hegemony. The ontology of lack explains, in the context of the social as a field 
of discursivity, why political subjects can only be temporary and how their 
precariousness is founded on the process of the creations of those identities: 
namely the endless processes of identifications through which particular 
discourses try to fill their fundamental lack. Although Laclau and Mouffe 
reject the traditional analysis of the revolutionary subject and acknowledge 
pluralism as an ontological principle, there is for them necessarily some 
precarious totalisations. Indeed, pluralism, fragmentation and differences are 
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not the end of the matter because a world in which differences would have no 
limit would be psychotic, hence impossible to live in. These totalities are 
constructed around precarious centres or empty signifiers similar to language 
in which the meaning of something is relationally constructed with the other’s 
elements. Everything is constructed like language, in which empty signifiers 
becoming master signifiers block the flow of differences and freeze 
temporarily the meaning of each element of the articulated whole. Hence 
exclusion, violence and decisions by which an empty signifier becomes a 
master-signifier are inevitable aspects of politics and of the formation of 
identities. External heterogeneous discourses form antagonisms, they create 
frontiers between discourses. Antagonism is this other which reveals the 
impossibility of any closure. Because it is an irreducible negativity, the 
antagonism is strictly incompatible with the principles of dialectical logic. The 
process I have described implies therefore that the social is a transcendent 
field, and a transcendent field only will allow the hegemonic elaboration of 
identities.  
 
An ambiguity traverses Laclau and Mouffe’s work regarding the question of 
unity and plurality; they recognize this ambiguity as a tension themselves. 
Every subject or totality is constructed through a dialectic between the absence 
of essence and ground preventing it from being totally closed and on the other 
hand, the desire of full closeness. This ambiguity can especially be found in 
Laclau’s theory of universality where this tension between absolute 
differences and unity is highlighted and takes the name of the tension between 
the ‘logic of difference’ and the ‘logic of equivalence’, between particularity 
and universality. The elements of a chain of equivalence are linked together by 
their common identification and subsumption under an empty signifier. An 
empty signifier is one of the demands that comes to represent each of the 
particular demands of the chain (all the other demands) under certain 
circumstances. As such, it becomes universal, or partially universal because it 
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stills remains open and is susceptible to be de-articulated or rearticulated 
within other discourse. Hence the possibility of totality is a ‘horizon and not a 
ground’ (Laclau, 2005, 71). This vain research for totality is founded on the 
Lacanian conception of being and subject, individual or collective, considered 
as an empty vase which tries to fill its void by identifying with something, an 
idea, a leader, or anything else.  
 
Some authors criticize the tension between the logic of difference and the logic 
of equivalence in Laclau and Mouffe’s work as being not radical enough in the 
acknowledgment and preservation of pluralism and differences. This current 
within post-structuralism rejects entirely the notion of totality, as a ground and 
as a horizon alike. For Robinson and Tormey, Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxism remain locked in the classical paradigm of a single subject 
challenging a monolithic power. For them they just relocate the single centre 
of contestation from one unity to another, from ‘Class’ to ‘People’. The quest 
for political unity which has been central in the history of Marxism and which 
haunts the work of Laclau and Mouffe through the idea of a hegemonic 
construction of subjectivity, is hence entirely rejected by those thinkers. 
Accusing the ontology of lack of being the principal reason for such quest for 
totalisations, they base their critiques on an ontology of abundance and of a 
completely different vision of power and resistance inspired by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s postmodern philosophy of singularities and becoming and 
Foucault’s notion of biopower. Their interpretation of reality as a field of 
differences leads them to adopt an ethical position refusing the repression of 
these differences through hegemonic practices, hence criticizing Laclau and 
Mouffe’s ‘submissive gesture to the real’ (see Robinson and Tormey, 2009, 
133). While Laclau explains that populism is the royal road to understanding 
politics in general, this frontier that splits the social into two antagonistic 
camps and two master signifiers, Robinson and Tormey take the Zapatista 
movement as a way to consolidate their ethical commitment to immanent 
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politics and to prove that an alternative way of doing politics is possible. The 
quest for unity has been rejected for ethical reasons according to Robinson and 
Tormey, because it is incompatible with the political commitment to 
emancipation; this is intimately linked to  eleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
ethics as practical composition and creation of being. In my fourth chapter I 
investigated Negri and Hardt’s peculiar approach to this question. For them 
this quest is in vain, for it belongs to an imaginary which is outdated in the 
context of biopower. Radicalising the tradition of Operaismo blended with 
 eleuze and Guattari’s conception of multiplicities, Negri and Hardt develop 
the idea that the practices of labour are fundamentally changing today, that 
their effects are increasingly biopolitical in the sense that they produce not 
only the means of life by social life itself. Life itself enters the circuit of 
capitalist production. The excess of immaterial labour is named the common 
and it produces an autonomous space within which a new social subjectivity is 
starting to emerge, namely the multitude. As such a constitution of a political 
subject is thought not as a hegemonic subject but as a multiplicity acting in an 
immanent and autonomous space; the alter-mondialist movement is seen 
hopefully as being the coming democracy of the multitude challenging the rule 
of capital. Revolutionary subjectivity cannot only be constructed in a 
transcendent plane like in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony, but also 
in an immanent one, preserving the multiplicities composing the multitude. 
Laclau and Mouffe have strongly criticised the class-reductionist aspect of the 
multitude; nevertheless the homology between the concepts of proletariat and 
multitude lies not in the content of these concepts but in the method that 
produced them. Like the proletariat, the multitude is defined through the form 
of its productive activity; however due to the modifications of the composition 
of labour brought about by biopolitical production, the multitude is an 
infinitely more expansive subjectivity than the working class (Hardt and 
Negri, 2004, 224). Also, whereas the working-class for-itself was 
characterised by its unity, the multitude is conceived on in contrast as a set of 
singularities and its politics must be one that respects its internal differences.  
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ii. The ontological question 
 
The category of difference has been central throughout my thesis and rests on 
a radical critique of Hegelian ontology. The Hegelian ontology adopted by 
Marx and many Marxists, was turned ‘on his head’ to ‘discover the rational 
kernel within the mystical shell’ (Marx, 1990, 103); it understood the 
possibility of social change from the existence of contradictions and sublation 
of these within a given situation. Hegelian ontology has been accused of 
annulling differences by means of the principles of dialectic negation. The 
search for a new ontology has therefore been vital for contemporary political 
theory. In this thesis two strategies have been identified to overcome the 
perceived deficiencies of Hegelian dialectic and the consequent crises of 
Marxism. The first strategy was to replace it by an ontology of lack inspired 
by Derrida and Lacan and was characteristic of Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxism. The aim and justification of this ontology serves mainly to ground 
the concept of antagonism, which guaranteed that every identity is pierced by 
contingency, precariousness and is constituted around a fundamental 
negativity. The second strategy was to replace it by an ontology of abundance, 
which, as was shown here, was politically much more radical than the 
ontology of lack. For the ontology of abundance, being, equivalent to desire, 
infinitively creates some singularities hence some differences, to preserve 
these and the flow of creation of being, the immanent field is hence necessarily 
the field in which politics must be done. The ontologies of lack and abundance 
are not driven by any teleology; as Negri writes, the theory of the multitude 
‘has no illusions about invisible hands or final causes pushing history forward. 
It is a teleology pushed forward only by our desires and our struggles, with no 
final end point’ (Negri, 2008a, 41), hence revealing the subordination of 
ontology to prior political positions. We are finally left with two distinct 
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strategies for the left, namely the hegemonic strategy related to the ontology of 
lack on one side and the autonomist strategy related to the ontology of 
abundance on the other.  
 
iii. Ethics and Politics  
 
 
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to decide which theory and which 
strategies are the most convincing ones. There is however one point I would 
like to emphasize here and which I find to be a positive aspect of the thinkers 
of abundance, which is that the ontology of abundance introduces a 
fundamental ethical element which is almost totally absent from the ontology 
of lack. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe furnish a perfectly coherent theory for 
describing how political identities are constructed, providing a theory of the 
logic of the political through the conceptualisation of notions such as empty 
signifiers, internal frontiers and antagonism. However they remain neutral as 
to what form of frontier they would like to see established. The ethical 
ambiguity is quite clear in the text analysed in Chapter 3 (see III.iv.b) when 
Laclau and Zac explain the nature and function of the radical investment in 
empty signifiers without saying what kind of investments must or must not be 
privileged. The ethical commitment is missing and in fact the content of the 
attachments to empty signifiers is said to be ‘almost irrelevant’. According to 
Laclau, there is no particular discourse or no particular order that is better or 
worse in itself than any other. The only way one can determine this is through 
an analysis of the level of attachment a ‘people’ accord them. This is 
undoubtedly linked to Laclau and Mouffe’s minimal account of emancipations 
conceived as a deepening of the liberal tradition (see Mouffe, 1992, 1). A 
number of theorists have criticized Laclau and Mouffe’s ethical ambiguity (see 
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Geras 1987, 69, 76, 77; Rustin, 1988, 173, quoted in Harrison, 2011, 98), 
pointing out the absence of any normative basis for a politics of their own. 
 
Robinson and Tormey adopt a totally opposite position; they develop positive 
and ambitious claims about emancipation, conceived as a radical break with 
actual oppressive practices. They subordinate politics to ethics, being faithful 
to the ontology of abundance which asserts the primacy of ethics over 
ontology. The entire critique of Robinson and Tormey as well as their 
commitment to horizontalist practices is based on ethical commitments to a 
domination-free world. As such they are radical utopians: for them utopia is 
not a totalitarian danger but a necessity of imagination to create means and 
ends that would bring about the end of exploitation and oppression. The 
orientation to this no-place must be made to conform and be adjusted to this 
domination-free utopian world and that’s why they affirm that the true 
question is not whether the logic of representation is constitutive or not but 
whether we should sacrifice some singularities and pluralities in the name of 
practical efficiency of a political movement whose aim is to positively change 
the world.  
 
In the light of this, Negri and Hardt’s contribution is extremely interesting in  
that they try to add to the ethical commitment to horizontal practices that 
would respect the becoming of singularities composing the world, an analysis 
of the contemporary mode of production that would join with and give the 
material possibility of going towards this kind of society. As such they place 
themselves in the footsteps of Marx whose originality was precisely to link the 
ethical postulate of the realisation of socialism to the law of breakdown of the 
capitalist system, in other words to give to the socialist utopia a rational basis 
(as Maximilien Rubel has argued, in Rubel, 1948). This link between the 
normative commitment and the objective conditions is also the original 
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contribution of Hardt and Negri regarding the exclusively ethical position of 
Robinson and Tormey. As we have seen, Negri and Hardt insist that historical 
and social change must be understood on the basis of changing forms of labour 
(Casarino and Negri, 2008, 79). As such Negri and Hardt’s theory of Empire 
and multitude could be seen as complementary of Robinson and Tormey’s 
work; combined together the two theories would reinforce each other. What 
pre-Marxist socialists like Fourier or Owen did for example was to reject 
capitalism only on moral bases.
62
 However the existence of exploitation as the 
foundation of capitalism as discovered by Marx and the production of labour 
as setting the conditions for a transcendence of this system was the main 
contribution of Marx to socialist theory.  
What would be interesting to explore in further research is how to test the 
efficacy of autonomous struggles and Hardt and Negri’s theories by relating 
the theoretical debates to analyses of empirical cases, for instance debates 
within the recent ‘occupy’ movements. The question would be to see if it 
would be politically expedient to implement large-scale autonomous practices 
in advanced societies like northern Europe, where in contrast to Chiapas, the 
state is strong and omnipresent.  
 
iv. Two post-Marxisms? 
 
 
From the analyses undertaken, I can conclude that in fact what I have called 
post-Marxism in the introduction must be nuanced; we find ourselves with two 
kind of post-Marxism here; one represented by Laclau and Mouffe and the 
                                                 
62 The originality of Marx’s discoveries are clearly expressed by him in a letter to his friend 
Weydemeyer (Marx, 5 March 1852, in Marx, 1983, 58). 
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other one by Hardt and Negri. The meaning of each is quite different. Laclau 
and Mouffe considered that some of the Marxian theses were originally wrong, 
such as the centrality of the working class and then of labour in the 
composition of revolutionary subjectivity. The task of Laclau and Mouffe was 
to provide a new theoretical framework in which the question of the 
articulation of struggles and identities would be primary and perfectly coherent 
with the theoretical analysis of the open nature of the social world. However, 
Negri and Hardt’s post-Marxism remains partially faithful to the Marxian 
thesis of the centrality of labour in revolutionary subjectivity. Whereas in 
Marx, the proletariat was meant to lead the revolution towards communism, in 
Hardt and Negri this task is incumbent on the multitude. The idea is that Marx 
was not inherently wrong, but some of his assumptions were outdated and had 
to be renewed to be coherent with the new material conditions of post-modern 
society. This difference leads us to our first chapter and to Bernstein’s 
revisionism in particular, whose continuity with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxism is now made clear. Nevertheless, while for Bernstein it was the 
whole Marxist edifice that had to be abandoned, for Laclau and Mouffe some 
of the Marxists’ theses are still relevant for political strategies, as demonstrated 
by their continued use of the Gramscian concept of Hegemony.  
 
Despite all the differences separating them, these two kinds of post-Marxism 
can be however subsumed under the category of post-structuralist thought, and 
share 1) a total rejection of Hegelian ontology and 2) a commitment to 
pluralism and to pluralist struggles. The notion of Hegelian contradiction was 
strongly criticized because it subordinated difference and plurality to identity 
and in consequence was incapable of thinking pure contingency but also 
becoming. Secondly, by their commitment to pluralism and difference, all the 
post-structuralist thinkers studied share a focus on struggles different from 
traditional class struggles. For Laclau and Mouffe class struggle is just one 
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moment in the more global struggle for radical democracy (see section II.vi). 
But for Negri and Hardt too, ‘overthrowing capitalist rule is not the only mode 
of revolutionary activity’ (Negri and Hardt 2009b, 2). In the debate between 
Negri and Hardt and David Harvey, Harvey reasserts the primacy of class, 
whereas Hardt and Negri affirm that race, gender and other identity struggles 
can be revolutionary (Hardt and Negri, 2009b, 1). Capital is not the exclusive 
axis of domination and they claim that strategies of alter-modernity are not 
based exclusively on class, are ‘not defined exclusively by their challenge to 
capitalist rule’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009b, 2), because ‘each axes of domination 
has its own specificity, as do the struggles that challenge them’ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009b, 2). The expansive conception of the multitude indeed allows the 
inclusion of these struggles as potential revolutionary subjects as much as the 
economic struggles. Hence despite their differences, the commitment to 
pluralism, multiplicity and singularity in philosophy and in politics is what the 
post-structuralist political theorists share and this definitively distinguishes 
themselves from the Marxist tradition. From this point the crucial question 
which remains for us now is to know how concretely this could be translated 
into a conscious global political movement which would give a totally new, 
bright face to the politics of emancipations.  
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